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BRITISH EAST AFRICA

AND

UGANDA

A HISTORICAL RECORD

COMPILED FROM

CAPTAIN LUGARD'S

AND OTHER REPORTS

WITH MAP

LONDON: CHAPMAN AND HALL, LD.

1892

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RICHARD CLAY AND SONS, LIMITED,
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BRITISH EAST AFRICA

AND

UGANDA.

I.

THE PARTITION OF EAST AFRICA.

To enable the reader the better to understand the proceedings which have led up to the present situation in Uganda and Eastern Equatorial Africa, it may be useful to sketch very briefly the course of events which gave rise to the delimitation of the British "sphere of influence" in East Africa. It may also be convenient to note in this place that "spheres of influence"—a term concerning the meaning of which there has been a good deal of misunderstanding—are merely defined regions within which certain Powers mutually bind themselves not to trespass upon each other, but in which, at the same time, the respective Powers have no legal rights as against other nations (not signatories of the agreements of delimitation), except such as are obtained by effective occupation.

British Interests in East Africa.—Prior to the year 1878 the trade of the Sultanate of Zanzibar—which then practically embraced the coast for about 1,150 miles from Warsheikh to Tunghi, and exercised predominant influence, if not authority, over the vast regions of the interior backwards to the great chain of inland lakes,—had become almost monopolised, as it had in fact been created, by British-Indian subjects. As Lord Granville pointed out to the German Government in a despatch dated February 14th, 1885 (see Parliamentary Paper, Africa No. 1, 1886), "for the greater part of the present century the Sultans of Muscat and Zanzibar" had been "under the direct influence of this country and the Government of India," and British interests were represented by

British warships maintaining the peace and operating against the slave-trade in Zanzibar waters, by the growth of trade in the hands of British-Indian subjects, by the establishment of telegraphic communication, and by a British line of mail steamers. The operations of these traders, Lord Granville explained, were not confined to the coast, but extended "far into the interior, where the Sultan exercises an influence which has now for many years been used for the advantage of trades of all nations, under the provisions of a liberal Commercial Treaty."

Concession offered in 1878.—In the year 1878 Sultan Barghash, recognising the extent to which the interests of his dominions were identified with those of British commercial enterprise, and feeling that those interests would best be secured and promoted in the future by a closer connection with the individual who had established that line of mail steamers, referred to by Lord Granville, as a regular channel of intercourse and communication with the various ports of the east and west, offered to Sir William Mackinnon a concession under lease of the whole of his mainland possessions at a fixed rent. But considerations of public policy at the time interfered with the acceptance of this offer, which would at once and for ever have secured to Great Britain the undisputed control of East Africa along 1,150 miles of coast. From that period until 1884 the matter lay in abeyance.

Germans on East Coast.—In this year a new foreign element made its appearance on the East Coast, and German agents began to obtain footing in the interior where the Sultan of Zanzibar claimed rights of sovereignty. In the following year these proceedings, as Lord Granville pointed out in the despatch above quoted, began to cause uneasiness in the public mind in this country. There were now, moreover, other British interests concerned in East Africa besides those of the British-Indian traders who had long been settled on the coast and engaged in commerce with the interior. On the 25th of May, 1885, Lord Granville again felt it his duty to write to Berlin informing the German Government of the scheme of "some prominent capitalists for a British settlement in the country between the coast and the lakes, which are the sources of the White Nile, and for its connection with the coast by a railway"—the original outline, in fact, of the Chartered Company which afterwards carried the conception out to its completion—and he expressed to the German Government his opinion that precautions should be taken to obviate any clashing of interests between the British and the Germans in the interior. The British enterprise which Lord Gran-

ville alluded to was the outcome of Sir William Mackinnon's negotiations with Sultan Barghash, who, now alarmed at the aggressions of the Germans, became more anxious than ever to secure his territory and revenue by a concession of them to a British Company.

Agreement of 1886.—The rival interests of Great Britain and Germany led to the suggestion of Lord Granville being adopted, and a Commission was appointed to delimit the respective "spheres of influence." Pending the delimitation, the scheme of the British East Africa Company was held in abeyance by request of the German Government—who, however, made no attempt to control the activity of its own subjects, on the curious plea that it was without power to restrain them as it required British subjects to be restrained. It was Lord Rosebery who, during his first *régime* as Foreign Secretary, put an end to this anomalous state of things, by declaring that where British subjects had acquired rights they were, as far as he was concerned, free to go and exercise them. This declaration of right was assented to without objection, and in 1886 the first delimitation of "spheres of influence" was formally agreed to by both Governments. The same agreement embodied a definition of the territory recognised as belonging to the Sultan of Zanzibar. This, as the map will show, was now restricted to a strip of coast, ten miles deep, extending from the Rovuma River on the south to Kipini (on the frontier of Witu) in the north, together with the ports of Kismayu, Brava, Merka, Magadisho, Warsheikh, and Mruti, on the northern coast, with a few miles of circumjacent territory pertaining to each port. The Sultan's dominions included also the Islands of Zanzibar and Pemba, and several other islands along the coast.

The boundary line between the British and German "spheres of influence" ran from the mouth of the Umbe River (south of Wanga) to the eastern shore of the Victoria Nyanza (one degree south latitude). The British sphere was limited on the north by the course of the Tana River as far as longitude thirty-eight degrees, the line thence striking "direct to the point of intersection of the first degree of north latitude with the thirty-seventh degree of east longitude, where the line terminates."

The district of Witu, immediately to the north of the British sphere, had been made a German Protectorate, and this Protectorate was subsequently extended as far north as Kismayu. The narrow strip reserved to British influence was thus hemmed in both north and south by the protectorates of Germany, and comprised about 150 miles of coast line.

Concession of 1887.—In May, 1887, Sultan Barghash granted the concession of that portion of his dominions included in the British sphere to the British East African Association, which Sir William Mackinnon founded for the purpose, and which in the following year became, by incorporation under a Royal Charter, the Imperial British East Africa Company. In October, 1888, the successor of Sultan Barghash confirmed the concession to the Company, which then formally inaugurated its work on the coast. Already its agents had acquired treaties with the tribes in the interior to a distance from the coast of 200 miles.

German Activity.—Notwithstanding, however, the obligation attached to the pledge given in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1886, binding Germany not to interfere with Great Britain to the north of the line of delimitation—an obligation extended by a subsequent Agreement in 1887 to the regions west of the Victoria Nyanza—German subjects during the years 1888, 1889, and 1890, exercised unrestrained liberty of action in the direction of thwarting the operations of the British East Africa Company, and endeavouring to intercept its future access to the interior behind its coast line. It is not necessary to enter in detail into a recapitulation of the various proceedings of those irresponsible agents, which necessitated the diversion of so much time and attention by the British Company from its proper work.

The Race for Uganda.—Matters reached a climax in the spring of the year 1890. In the preceding year Dr. Carl Peters had proceeded up the Tana with an expedition ostensibly for the “relief” of Emin Pasha (who was then known to be on his way to the coast with Mr. H. M. Stanley), but with the real object, as afterwards disclosed, of forming a chain of German interests at the back of the British coast territory. The ultimate and chief aim of this freebooting enterprise was Uganda. Peters forced his way across the British sphere, pulling down and burning British flags and hoisting that of Germany, until, after being reported dead, he appeared in course of time at the north-eastern end of the Victoria Nyanza. Emin Pasha was subsequently despatched from the coast with a large German caravan for the southern end of the lake, his objective point being also Uganda. Public feeling in this country ran high, and loud complaints were made of the apparent inactivity of the British East Africa Company in the face of those hostile movements.

Pressure applied to the Company.—It was demanded whether the Company was about to allow Uganda and the lake regions—the sources and head-waters of the Nile—to be snatched from the

British flag by more enterprising foreigners, who would bar our trade by hostile tariffs, and appropriate the achievements of our missionaries and explorers who had almost made those countries British soil. It was about this time that the Mohammedan party had been defeated and expelled from Uganda by the united arms of the two Christian parties. The Directors of the Company were warned by the Foreign Office in April, 1890, that there was danger of King Mwanga placing his kingdom under the protection of the first foreigners who arrived in his country with aims at annexation, and Lord Salisbury requested to be informed as to what steps the Company was going to take to anticipate and prevent this danger. The Company, intent upon its legitimate work at the coast, was not inclined, with the limited resources entrusted to it for purposes of development, to embark prematurely upon extended and costly operations in so distant a part of the interior. The Directors had relied upon the terms of the supplementary Agreement with Germany of July, 1887, whereby that country distinctly pledged itself to confine its operations to the countries lying to the south of the Victoria Nyanza. But it soon became apparent, as facts have since proved, that paper titles in Africa must be made good by effective and continued occupation. The position was too important to be left in jeopardy, and other nations did then, and do still, desire to possess it for reasons which need not be entered into at this place. The result was that in the spring of 1890 Captain Lugard received orders to proceed to Uganda to complete that effective occupation of the countries west of the Victoria Nyanza which alone could secure to Great Britain a recognised title to suzerainty.

Situation in Uganda in 1890.—Before following the expedition of Captain Lugard, a few words may be prefaced to explain the situation of affairs in Uganda at this time. In July, 1877, the first British Protestant missionaries, members of the Church Missionary Society, entered Uganda, and on the 22nd of February, 1879, they were followed by two French Roman Catholic priests. In September, 1888, a coalition of the Christian and Mohammedan “readers” (as converts from heathenism were styled) dethroned and expelled Mwanga, who had murdered Bishop Hannington, and was plotting the destruction of both sects of the Christian Missions and their followers. Afterwards, when a fugitive, Mwanga was received by the French priests at the south end of the lake, and professed himself a Roman Catholic. Meantime, two other revolutions had occurred in Uganda, by the first of which the Mohammedans expelled the Christians from their

offices, and drove all the missionaries from the country; and by the second, Mwanga's brother Kiwewa, who had succeeded him, was deposed for refusing to become a Mohammedan.

Designs of French Priests.—In 1889, by the assistance of the converts to Christianity, Mwanga succeeded in recovering his kingdom, and the British and French missionaries returned. But the King continued under the absolute control of the French priests, a control made more secure by the fears constantly instilled into him that the British desired to bring him to punishment for the murder of Bishop Hannington.

In the spring of 1890, when Mr. F. J. Jackson, an officer of the Imperial British East Africa Company, who was in charge of an exploring expedition near the Victoria Nyanza, was invited by the King to enter Uganda, he found Mwanga so entirely a puppet of the French priests that it was impossible to treat with him as a free agent. When Mr. Jackson appeared before the King (whose acceptance of the Company's flag had induced him to enter the country), he expressly declared to King, chiefs, and priests that the policy of the Company, as regarded religious sects, would be a policy of strict impartiality. "I explained to them again and again," he repeated, "that the Company would treat all parties alike, and make no distinction between Roman Catholics, Protestants, heathens, or Mohammedans." This assurance of the Company's intentions was soon afterwards strikingly confirmed from another quarter, which ought to have carried great weight. The Sultan of Zanzibar, and the leading Arabs of the coast, who had personal experience of the Company's dealing in such matters, wrote to the chiefs of their Mohammedan co-religionists in Uganda, counselling them to place the fullest confidence in the Company. The Mohammedans did so, the Roman Catholic party, under the guidance of the French priests, alone refused to follow the general example, and preferred eventually to precipitate a civil war for the attainment of that political and religious supremacy which it had been the constant ambition of Bishop Hirth and his colleagues to obtain. The result of that supremacy would have been fatal to British influence at the sources of the Nile.

In order to be satisfied as to the European Power under whose influence Uganda was legitimately to be placed, Mwanga and the Roman Catholics sent envoys to the coast with Mr. Jackson to see the British, French, and German Consuls-General on the question, Mr. Ernest Gedge remaining in Uganda in the meantime to represent the Company. Such was the situation—unknown as yet at the coast—when Captain Lugard received his orders to proceed to the lake.

Anglo-German Agreement of July, 1890.—Between the date of Captain Lugard receiving his orders and that of his arrival in Uganda, the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 was concluded, by which, owing to the active efforts of the British East Africa Company in counteracting foreign enterprise by extending British sovereignty through treaties in the interior, and in acquiring by a further concession the remainder of the Sultan of Zanzibar's dominions along the northern coast, Her Majesty's Government were enabled to secure to British influence the vast tract comprised between the Juba River on the north and the German possessions on the south (with a coast line of 400 miles), and extending from the Indian Ocean back to the boundary of the Congo Free State and the basin of the White Nile.

Extent of British Sphere.—An idea of the territorial extent of this acquisition can best be formed by comparison. It comprises almost as much territory as British India, nearly double the united areas of France and the German Empire, and more than six times that of the United Kingdom. The Victoria Nyanza, which occupies only a corner of the British sphere, is itself a sheet of water nearly as large as Scotland.

II.

EXPEDITION TO UGANDA.

Departure of Captain Lugard.—When Captain Lugard received his instructions he was occupied some distance from the coast in a humane and admirable scheme for the self-redemption of slaves, in which he took a strong personal interest—a scheme which has resulted in hundreds of slaves obtaining their freedom by their own labour in a short space of time, and which might be made the means, through a larger application, of emancipating every slave in British East Africa.

Slave Caravan.—He had not proceeded far up the country on his road to Uganda when he was forcibly reminded of the object of his recent labour by encountering a slave caravan on its way to the coast. The leaders of the caravan attempted to hide the people in the bush and partially succeeded; but one man in a slave-stick, and one woman slave and three young children, were found and liberated. Captain Lugard's headman, who had been in front, said he had seen fifteen girls in slave-sticks. This was one of those trading caravans from the coast, a number of which go to the interior every year to trade for ivory, and at the same time add to their profits by kidnapping (or buying) slaves, to sell at the coast to dealers who run them out at night from remote creeks for the markets of Pemba or Arabia.

Slave Raiding.—The *modus operandi* of these Swahili traders was described the year before by Mr. F. J. Jackson, who personally witnessed the terror of the poor people of the district frequented by the raiders, when his own caravan entered their country.

"These traders," Mr. Jackson wrote, referring to the caravan traders from the coast, "go up to Kavirondo simply for this reason (slave-raiding), and because food is cheap. A caravan will go to a place like Mumiya's, and stop there for several months, living at the expense of the hospitable and good-natured natives. In the meantime, they will have been on two or three raids into the Wanipi

country between Mumiya's and Masala, on the lake (all slaves falling to them as their share), and when their time is up, knowing they have no spare men to carry food, as they have a large stock of ivory buried at Njemps or Kamassia to carry down to the coast, they return to Baringo *vid* Kitosh, Maragwet, and Elgeyo, stealing all the cattle as food, and kidnapping all the women and children they can. Their custom is to protest the greatest friendship for the people, and encourage the women and children to come into camp by giving good prices for their flour, &c., and at a given signal, surround the camp, secure all the women and children, and shoot down any men who may offer resistance."

It is not always possible, when one of these caravans is met (and they generally take care to avoid routes on which they are likely to meet Company's officials) to distinguish slaves from porters, since the former, when fit, are worked as porters on the way down (costing nothing for wages, hardly anything for food, and selling for a good price at the coast when all is done), and dare not disclose themselves; the women and children are concealed in the bush until the danger is past. As long as caravan-trading continues, depending as it does on human portage, so long will this slave-traffic flourish in spite of any efforts to suppress it. The profits are too tempting; and the atrocious practice will only come to an end when a line of railway to the interior carries merchandise for a hundredth part of the cost of human portage. This is how a railway would, as nothing else can, put an end to the slave-trade in British East Africa.

This incident has been mentioned as an illustration of the condition of things with which we have to deal in East Africa.

Kikuyu Country.—Of the Kikuyu country, some 300 miles from the coast, Captain Lugard gave the same eulogistic description as others who have visited it. A fertile soil, cool upland climate (the elevation is more than 6,000 feet), an abundant supply of pure water and of timber, a profusion of English flowers, hills covered with "the softest, green springy turf," are among the features of this fine region, almost under the Equator. Most of the cultivated soil is rich, and grows a very superior quality of tobacco, much valued in other countries as an article of barter. A species of shrub, called "Kath," much like the arbutus, is found in Kikuyu, and is a valuable substitute for tea. Near Aden, we are told, single bushes of this shrub are valued at 1,000 dollars, and the leaf is dried and used as tea. Honey is abundant and of good quality, and the people are most intelligent,

Description of Country—Splendid Pasture Land.—Proceeding by

way of Lake Naivasha and Lake Nakuru, around and beyond this latter the pasture is singularly rich. "Clover and trefoil abound," says Captain Lugard, "and, where the coarser grass is grazed down by game, the turfy grass is like the richest English pasture." The soil is good, and the streams contain delicious water. This country is from 6,000 to 8,000 feet above the sea, and could be made an admirable grazing ground for stock. Further on, Captain Lugard crossed the escarpment of Elgeyo (8,100 feet) and entered a "vast sea of rich pasture grass." This magnificent pasture, he says, would be admirably adapted for sheep or cattle runs under European settlers, and the entire country from Elgeyo to the Lake (Victoria) is "wonderfully watered."

Usoga—Arrival in Uganda.—Traversing Usoga (to the north of the lake), a country highly cultivated and inhabited by a people much more advanced in civilisation than those heretofore met, Captain Lugard crossed the Nile on December 13th, 1890, and five days later was encamped with his force at Mengo, the capital of Uganda, "on the top of a knoll, about eight hundred yards from the King's hill, on which the King and most of the principal officers of State live." He afterwards found that he could not have selected a better site; and although on account of having been employed in the interior when he received the orders for Uganda, and having marched with great expedition, he was unable to make much show in the way of dress—his "Court dress" consisting of "a very old pair of hunting breeches and the jacket of a sleeping suit"—nevertheless the King was said to have been greatly scared by the celerity of his marching, and his high-handed proceeding in crossing the Nile without asking or waiting for the customary royal permission. The manner of his arrival made a distinct impression in his favour on the weak mind of the treacherous and cowardly monarch.

Mwanga.—The next day, the 19th, Captain Lugard presented himself to the King and handed him his letters. He describes Mwanga as "a young man, with good features, but his face showed irresolution and weakness, and he is given to unaccountable fits of giggling and laughing, which are very irritating." The Catholics and Protestants were the two political parties of the country; the former, led and inspired by the French priests, regarding the approach of British power with suspicion and mistrust, and the latter just the reverse. Captain Lugard, immediately on leaving the King, proceeded to explain to the French priests the provisions of the treaty which he was about to submit to Mwanga and his chief men.

Priests.—The priests, he says, appeared “to consider many minor details connected with their personal liberties and standing to be of more importance than the greater subjects of the peace and organisation of the country, to which latter subjects I had great difficulty in trying to keep them.” Captain Lugard, however, by the exercise of excellent temper and diplomacy, established and maintained the most amicable relations with the French bishop and priests, though he soon perceived that the whole aim and object of the priests was to delay any decisive action on his part.

On December 22nd the bishop and Père Lombard departed for the south end of the lake, with the intention of continuing the discussion of the proposed treaty from that convenient distance. To every argument the priest left behind in charge invariably answered, *Poli, poli* (Slowly, slowly). An identical letter was addressed by Captain Lugard to the Catholic party and the British missionaries, setting forth clearly the conditions of freedom which would be impartially given to both, and explaining fully the various stipulations of the treaty. The Protestant chiefs almost at once agreed to the conditions, but the Catholics raised objections and difficulties. The principal of these referred to the “tributary States,” and the question was whether these tributary States were to continue as part of Uganda. It was a question which Captain Lugard could not undertake to decide. Usoga, the most valuable of these States, had for some time past asserted its independence; and Uganda’s right to claim tribute which it had lost the power to enforce was, to say the least, very dubious. The other tributary States had been arbitrarily severed from the sovereign kingdom by the line of delimitation west of the lake adopted in the Anglo-German Agreement.

Treaty Signed.—When the treaty was laid before the King, “I read it,” says Captain Lugard, “paraphrased it fully into simple English, and had every point fully brought out, and it was thoroughly rendered into Swahili. Many of the men present spoke Swahili fluently, and corrected my interpreter if he did not give the sense. A warm discussion arose on many points, but I waived discussion till the reading was done. Then the chiefs were for signing, but the King held back and giggled and fooled; he demanded time. I replied by rapping the table, and, speaking loudly, said he must sign now.” On December 26th Mwanga signed the document. The King’s manner of doing so was characteristic. He told one of his chiefs to sign for him (he cannot write himself), but Captain Lugard insisted on his making his “mark” with his own hand. “He did this very unwillingly, and dashed the pen at the paper. I

returned it, and insisted on his making a cross on each (copy)." All the principal chiefs present witnessed and signed for themselves; one copy of the treaty was given to the King and the other retained by Captain Lugard, who remarks, by the way, that from the first the King seemed "greatly relieved and pleased by his tone," which, while he acted with a show of power, was excessively polite to the half-savage potentate.

Provisions of Treaty.—The provisions of this remarkable treaty were mainly as follows:—"The King signs and ratifies the treaty with the full consent of the chiefs of all parties of the State. He acknowledges the suzerainty of the Imperial British East Africa Company, places his territories under its protection, undertakes to fly no other flag than that of the Company, to make no treaties with, grant no kind of concession whatever to, nor allow to settle in the kingdom, acquire lands or hold offices of State, any European of whatever nationality without the knowledge and consent of the Company's Resident. The Company's Resident to exercise full authority over all Europeans resident in Uganda, and over the Company's officials. The Resident to be *ex officio* President of the Committee of Finance and Revenue, which shall consist of four members, elected (except the President) by the Council of State, and shall assess, collect, and administer all the customs and taxes. The public revenue is to be applied (1) to the maintenance of the Royal State, the salaries of public officials, &c.; (2) to public works, &c., for the good of the country, the development of trade, &c.; (3) to the maintenance of the army. The army to be organised and drilled by the Company's officers. Traders of all nations to be free to come to Uganda, provided they do not import goods prohibited by agreement among the Powers. There shall be free trade within the whole British sphere. The Company to provide a staff of officials for the organisation and administration of the country—all expenses of the Company not incurred in its private trade to be borne from the public revenues. All offices of State to be filled by selection, irrespective of creed. Slave-trading and slave-raiding shall be declared illegal and punishable by law. The import or export of slaves is prohibited. Missionaries engaged solely in preaching the Gospel and teaching the arts of civilisation and industry shall be free to settle in the country irrespective of creed; their religious rights and liberties shall be respected, and strict impartiality shown to them."

The clause relating to traders provides against the importation of arms and ammunition. It was not without pressing reason that Captain Lugard inserted this provision, for there was at the time a

large consignment of breech-loading ammunition and powder at the south end of the lake awaiting an opportunity of being brought into Uganda. Captain Lugard sent a letter to the trader in possession of this store of murder prohibiting him from attempting to bring it in, and at the same time requested the co-operation of Emin Pasha, who represented German authority in that region.

Priests Trading in Gunpowder.—It may be added here that, previous to Captain Lugard's arrival, Mr. Ernest Gedge had made a treaty with Emin Pasha, providing for the seizure and confiscation of boats or canoes crossing the line of boundary between British and German jurisdiction without a pass issued by the respective authorities and flying either the British or German flag. This arrangement was aimed at the illicit trade in gunpowder, largely carried on by the French priests, and it was found necessary, against the strongly-expressed wishes of the priests, to subject mission boats to the same supervision as all others.

As to the definition of the term missionary which is laid down in the clause of the Uganda treaty as a person "engaged solely in preaching the Gospel," &c., the meaning was that if the French priests engaged in trade as they had done in their settlements south of the lake, or interfered in politics as they had been doing in Uganda, they should be deprived of their special privileges as missionaries. Of course other missionaries were equally liable to the same forfeiture of privileges for like transgressions.

Condition of Country.—On December 27th, Bishop Tucker, of the Church Missionary Society, arrived at Mengo, and both the bishop and Captain Lugard give the same account of the state of insecurity and distrust generally prevailing through the hostility of the Catholic and Protestant factions. The treaty decreed the registration of all fire-arms, and there were a number of rifles abroad which Mr. Gedge had lent to the chiefs to assist in meeting a recent invasion of the Mohammedans. Every man possessing a gun carried it about with him constantly—Bishop Tucker was astonished to see the Christians coming to church with their rifles in their hands. This situation of matters was a delicate one to handle, but Captain Lugard was resolved that he would get in the Company's rifles and make the people lay aside their arms. With what effect he applied himself to this task in the face of suspicion, distrust, and fear on the part of both factions has been reported by Bishop Tucker.

On January 18th, Captain Lugard was able to write that confidence was already being restored; the people were beginning to bring in food from the country without fear; that both sides had for the most

part laid aside their arms and few were to be seen carrying a rifle; matters of dispute were being settled, and larger questions submitted to him for his arbitration.

Improvement.—In other respects he says "the change even since our arrival here is marked; the paths overgrown with elephant grass are daily being cleared into broad roads, and patches of waste land are day by day being enclosed and cultivated." Captain Lugard takes an habitually modest and probably inadequate estimate of the work he has done, and in his views in general is not prone to optimism, but there can be no mistaking the change for the better in all things which his presence in a few weeks effected in that distracted country. The explanation is obvious; apart from the influence of Captain Lugard's personal interference in affairs, the impregnable fort he lost no time in constructing on his encampment overlooking the King's palace and capital—a stronghold mounting two Maxim guns and filled with a force of well-armed and disciplined men—was a standing sign of strength which inspired the people with confidence, and the treacherous and evil-hearted King with fear and respect.

Native Views as to Company's Authority.—A "codicil" which was added to the treaty, and to which Mwanga and his chiefs attached so much importance that they made it a *sine quâ non* to their acceptance of the treaty, involved a fact which at the present moment it is of some consequence to appreciate. The codicil provided that if a greater man than Lugard came to Uganda—i.e., a man invested with higher authority—the treaty made with him should be held to be null and void. The reason was that the King and chiefs were not quite satisfied, first, whether Uganda was to "follow" England or another European Power, and secondly, if the country was assigned to England, whether Lugard had his orders *from England*. Envoys had been sent to the coast to obtain authoritative information from the Sultan of Zanzibar and the three Consuls-General (British, German, and French), and until their return the treaty was therefore provisional. After the signature of the treaty the same uneasiness continued, and in the middle of January the King and all the chiefs begged Lugard to invite Emin Pasha to visit Uganda, in order that they might ask him whether it was true that Uganda was in the British sphere of influence, and "whether it was true that Captain Lugard had been specially sent to settle the country, and had his orders *from England*." His letters of introduction from Mr. George S. Mackenzie and Sir Francis de Winton of course made it clear that he was the agent of the Company, but they required more than this, —they required that he should also have the higher authority of a

representative of Great Britain itself. In that character alone would they regard him as invested with power to do what he came to do. Since the days of Sir John Kirk the prestige of the British Crown and flag had been high in those regions; and the native designation of the Company's Resident in Uganda (Baloza, *i.e.*, Consul) sufficiently indicates their idea of his official character and relation.

Captain Williams Arrives.—Captain W. H. Williams, R.A., arrived with reinforcements and supplies on January 31st, and by that time a practically impregnable position at Kampala had been constructed and fortified on the hill which had first been selected. Immediately after his arrival it appeared advisable to deal with the grievances between the parties.

Shamba Question.—The main difficulty was regarding estates which either party alleged to have been forcibly taken from them, and regarding the evictions of men of the opposite creed from estates under the authority of a big chief who belonged to the rival party. Lugard tried to form a court of arbitration. After several days of futile attempts there was a big burza (meeting) on February 15th, 1891, at which he attended. The King of late had been much more just, and had written some days previously asking Lugard to speak to him privately, and he had then told him he saw that he was helping him, and he intended to abide by his counsel and do justice. This led to constant private interviews, at which the King became more and more amenable, and the Protestants informed Lugard that the King was now acting tolerably justly. Before this burza of the 15th, therefore, Lugard had proposed that as the King was thoroughly acquainted with all details of the question at issue (one of disputed shambas) he should be arbitrator, and Lugard would support his decision. The Protestants agreed. The matter was fairly argued on either side, and the King showed remarkable tact. Again and again he said he would act as Lugard dictated; that he was arbitrator, and had come to bring peace. This reference to the supreme authority of the Company was a new and great step. Finally, he gave his decision, and there was an uproar, as it was (apparently) most unfair to the Protestants. Lugard said he must enforce it, as the Wa-Inglesa had themselves agreed to abide by it. His report on this matter reads as follows:—

Troubles.—"The Protestants invariably abide by my word, and therefore said no more, but in the argument which arose heated words were used, and ultimately the King left the burza in a passion, having quarrelled with the Katikiro. Disorder prevailed, for this was the signal for trouble. I remained, and sent for the King for a

private interview with me alone. He returned, and I had a satisfactory interview with him. I pointed out that his country would be plunged into war, and he alone was the cause, because he would not do justice to the Protestants. He maintained that he did. I challenged him to prove it by dividing Sesse; he declined. I said, all right, he must take the consequences. He then agreed to do so, and implored me to help him, and spoke in a most satisfactory way.

"Next morning, early, I found the whole country under arms for war. Masses of armed men were pouring in in every direction and preparing for battle, being drawn up on opposite hills, the French party (as the Catholics are always called) having, I think, the French flag. I called the principal chiefs—my friends—and, hastily falling in, the Soudanese I sent to the King's hill (close to Kampala) with the Maxim, and took up a position there with Captain Williams. At my orders the chiefs sent messengers to the various parties to disperse, and I said I would open fire on any mass of men, no matter of what party, who refused to disperse. The Catholics were very obstinate, and all the influence of their chiefs, who did their utmost and remained with me themselves while they sent messengers to disperse the crowds, could barely disperse them; finally the Soudanese, with fixed bayonets on the knee, and the Maxim ready for action, helped to persuade them, and the danger was averted without a shot.

"Had the war broken out the result would have been terrible; not a drop of rain had fallen for two months, every house would have been burnt, and the Mohammedans had been daily reported as raiding closer and closer in very great force, and would have been in Mengo in two days. The King appeared really grateful, and announced in burza that he had never fully believed in our impartiality and professions till now, but now he was completely convinced that we had come for the sole purpose of bringing peace and order to his country. He told them of our conversation the previous night, and how he had thought of it during the night, and saw that my words were true, and had agreed to divide Sesse, and how we had now saved the country when nothing else in the world could have done so, and that without the loss of a single life, and he then publicly declared his intention of following my advice in everything.

"In the afternoon a similar outbreak took place, the cause being a drunken row between some of the parties, shots were fired and the huts burnt, and in an incredibly short time the country was up again. Again I succeeded in dispersing them, but they all said there would be war in the morning unless the case was settled.

Overnight the whole of the chiefs assembled in our fort, the case was tried and justice done, and the war averted. But the people remained excessively excited, and a day or two later some Protestants in an outlying shamba were attacked by the French party, and once again the war drums beat, and the country was up. The chiefs were in despair, and inclined to think a fight unavoidable. I insisted on their redoubling their efforts as before, and once again we succeeded, though the matter was so sudden that Captain Williams and I were holding the King's hill with twenty Soudanese only, before we could be reinforced. This excitement led to daily outrages, and men were murdered, and either party were continually rushing in to me in great excitement, to say that large parties of their side had been evicted from their shambas.

"I now proposed that two laws should be passed in full burza—one, that on no account whatever should any chief evict any man from his shamba without the express order of the burza, and if he did so he should be liable to lose his place; second, that all the dwellers on any shamba should do the work of the chief immediately over them, and he again of his superiors, providing the customary food or tribute, &c., entirely irrespective of party or creed. This had a most quieting effect. I then managed to settle one great point of dispute, and paired off others against each other, and effected a settlement. After this things again became much quieter, and remaining grievances were, I was told, slowly being arranged. Just at this time the French bishop and his party arrived, and the bishop wrote me a letter which both Captain Williams and myself considered extremely ill-advised. Judging however that it was the result of misinformation and inaccurate knowledge, and dictated by the idea that there was only one side to the question, I wrote a very temperate reply, and went and called on the priests, pointing out that we were doing our utmost to exert an impartial influence for peace. And after much conversation we restored the cordial relations which had existed before the bishop's arrival, and which have been maintained (and, I think, considerably increased). . . .

"Towards the end of February the difficulties between the parties became a good deal quieted down, though up to the end of that month there was almost daily fear of an outbreak which would lead to war. The King became most friendly, and I had continual private talks with him, at which he constantly insisted that we had saved his country, and he intended to do justice and be guided in all things by our counsel. . . ."

Shamba Question.—"In the month of March the shamba questions

were slowly but satisfactorily proceeded with. The Catholic chiefs had now become so entirely our friends that they were willing in all cases to refer to me and abide by my decision. This was more especially the case in a very difficult question which now arose. I had from the first intimated my intention of allowing absolute freedom of creed. The Protestants now wished to know whether if a man changed his religion he should forfeit his estates. This was especially stipulated in the mutual agreement made between the parties at the time they ousted the Mohammedans, which I had agreed to respect at the time the treaty was signed, provided no clause in it contradicted anything in our treaty. It now appeared that only a very small proportion indeed of the country were either Catholics or Protestants. The vast majority were heathens, who were called Catholics or Protestants according to the religion of their chief. All these, it was alleged, would at once, unless restrained by the loss of their estates, go over to the religion of the King, viz., Roman Catholic. This would be doubly a heavy blow to the Protestants, destroying their power as a political party, and preventing their admission into these estates for the purpose of propagating their creed. The Protestants urged this, as did their missionaries. The Catholics retorted that I was going back on my own proposition, because of the wishes of the Protestants; but they behaved admirably, saying they were content to leave the matter in my hands. I replied that it was true that this had been my own proposal, but the Catholics themselves, when I first came to Uganda, had insisted on my signing the codicil, which stipulated that their own mutual agreement should be respected, and that now, since the Protestants had pointed out that I was breaking my word by carrying this proposition, I had no option but to acquiesce. It was therefore agreed that the matter stand over pending the arrival of the envoys from the coast, and that in any case the present arrangement should not last beyond the two years for which my treaty holds good. On March 11th the mails sent forward by Mr. Martin arrived, and with them some Waganda, bringing the news of the envoys from the coast. The envoys were following slowly with Martin. The Protestants were of course delighted to find all I had said was confirmed, and though the news was adverse to the Catholics (or rather French) party, both they and the King received it with apparent satisfaction."

Kabrega.—"Messengers came on the 16th from Kabrega, apparently to negotiate a peace. As I heard privately that Kebrega would on no account allow a European to enter his country, I arranged that Mwanga should not make peace with Unyoro. Kebrega has

throughout all these troubles uniformly fought against Uganda, and is now helping the Mohammedans. A treaty of peace would in no way tie his hands, as he would continue to send help to the Mohammedans secretly, being most deceitful and treacherous, while it would tie ours. Since the main difficulties appeared now to be settled, I urged that we should go out to war against the Mohammedans, who had raided almost the whole of Singo, and established themselves a great force there. Accordingly preparations were at once begun. The parties could not agree concerning the appointment of the general for the war—who takes, *pro tem.*, the name and powers of the King. All agreed to refer to me, so I appointed the King himself. Though I knew he would never go, I laid great stress on it, and at last, yielding to his excuses, I said the next biggest man must go. This of course was the Katikiro, who is, I understand, the best soldier among them. Though disappointed, the Catholics at once agreed, and the matter was decided in the way I intended it should be."

Envoys Arrive.—"On March 31st the envoys arrived with Mr. Martin. There was a very big state durbar, and the announcement was made by Samweli of all he had been told at the coast, and that Uganda was under England. It was all quietly received. Immediately the burza was over, I got the King to come out and beat the war drums. This was done, and it was a singular spectacle. Masses of armed men came pouring in from every direction to swear their oath of allegiance, and then the Katikiro was handed over to them as their general. We stood by the King during the ceremony. The Katikiro, according to custom, prepared to start at once. They however said that they were without ammunition for the war, and I was under the necessity, very much against my will, of issuing to them thirty kegs of powder. For this I made them pay at the rate of two kegs for a frasilah of ivory. I also lent them some spare rifles, and gave them ammunition for them, and Captain Williams repaired a very great number of damaged ones for them."

War against Mohammedans.—"No time was lost, now that the envoys had at last arrived. They came on March 31st. On April 1st was the big durbar at which they announced the results of their mission: the same day war drums were beaten, and the Katikiro started, while the rest of the chiefs went off to collect their men. By April 7th I had completed the large mail and reports Mr. Martin was to convey to the coast, and answered all correspondence, and made all arrangements for Mr. Martin, who started on that day with sixty-six men. On the following day we marched out to join the war party, leaving Mr. de Winton, with some sixty-six men, in charge at

Kampala. At this time the rains were at their heaviest, and the men suffered considerable hardship, being without clothes or cloth to make their little tents. There was, however, none to issue to them. In anticipation of the war I had laid in gradually 129 loads of flour, and a flock of sheep and goats from Busoga, which served us in very good stead later, in the dearth of all food."

Proposals for Peace.—"Our line of march was at first N.W., bending round later to W.N.W. and W. till we reached the borders of Unyoro. This country (called Singo) in its western part is full of elephants. When near to the enemy Captain Lugard succeeded in getting a woman, who had been captured foraging, to return to the enemy with letters, in which the Mohammedans were informed that Captain Lugard was most anxious to avoid war, and that if they would give up their chief or Sultan Mbogo (who, being an uncle of King Mwanga and of royal blood, would be a source of trouble if left with them), he would guarantee his safety and treat him honourably, and there would thus be no difficulty in settling any other points. I pledged my word to them," says Captain Lugard, "in regard to Mbogo, and said that the rest of them must return each to his own place, under his own chief, where lands should be given them according to their rank to settle on, and they should be free to worship God by what religion they pleased. To this they at first seemed to agree, and were most anxious to be allowed to live all together in one place." Various proposals for this object were discussed, as they appeared to be an industrious and brave people. The chief men were all in favour of peace, seeing only defeat in front of them, and dreading to oppose the British. At the last moment, however, their plans were again reversed by the impetuosity of the younger warriors, who were eager to fight.

Defeat of Mohammedans.—On May 7th the fight took place, and resulted in the rout of the Mohammedans and their Unyoro allies—the latter were said to be 1,300 guns, under two of Kabrega's sons. They were prevented from following the enemy into Unyoro by the flooded state of the rivers, and the reported want of food supplies in the country. After the wounded had been carefully attended to by Dr. Macpherson, Captain Williams was sent back to Mengo with part of our force, and with the remainder Captain Lugard marched southward to Ankole.

III.

EXPEDITION TO THE ALBERT NYANZA.

THE first object Captain Lugard had in view in marching south was to prevent the tribes on the frontier (one degree south) from importing further gunpowder and guns for the use of the rebels, and in this task he was loyally seconded by the German officers in charge of the Imperial station of Bukoba.

Ankoli and Toru.—Having attended to this matter, Captain Lugard's next anxiety was to secure to the people of the kingdoms of Ankoli and Toru—comprising all the country west of Buddu, as far as the British sphere extended—permanent and effective protection against the depredations and oppressions of Kabrega, King of Unyoro. This task occupied him some six months. He made a treaty with Ntali, the King of Ankoli, and restored to the kingdom of Toru its rightful sovereign, who had been driven out by Kabrega.

Salt Lake.—Arriving at the Lake Albert Edward, he visited the Salt Lake referred to by Mr. Stanley in the narrative of his travels. This is in the form of an annex or inlet of that large sheet of water, and is a very valuable deposit of salt, just eastward of the thirtieth meridian, and therefore within the British sphere. To protect this, which he describes as more valuable in that region than a gold mine—salt being the chief currency of the countries around—Captain Lugard constructed and garrisoned a fort on a narrow peninsula (Fort George), and left orders with the commandant that, while no one was to be allowed to take away salt without paying for it, liberal payment was to be made in that precious commodity for ivory, food supplies, or any other desirable products the people might bring in. Up to that time Kabrega's troops had forcibly excluded the inhabitants of the surrounding countries from all access to the Salt Lake, which the king of Unyoro had seized for his own use and profit, and they had as an alternative to have recourse to the extraction from saline earth of such supplies of salt as they needed for use or barter.

After establishing Fort George, Lugard marched to the base of the Ruwenzori Mountain, near the northern arm of the Albert Edward Nyanza, and here constructed another fort (Fort Edward) as a barrier against the Wanyoro, leaving in it a garrison of a hundred of his best fighting men, and establishing there Kasagama, the son of the late King Nyika of Toru, whom he had brought with him to reinstate in his father's kingdom as soon as Kabrega should be expelled. This work brought Captain Lugard up to August 25th of last year, and on that day he marched out of Fort Edward and directed his course due north towards the southern end of the Albert Nyanza, with the view of constructing a line of forts along the frontier of Unyoro in this part, as a barrier against any further incursions by Kabrega.

Road for Transport Animals.—It may be added that up to this point (Fort Edward) he had carefully, and to his entire satisfaction, ascertained the capabilities of the road from Victoria Nyanza for transport animals. With only three hundred men now left—of whom half were mere porters—Lugard marched north through Toru. His progress was constantly opposed by Kabrega's troops, whom, however, he was able to disperse without firing a shot, so unconquerable was the reluctance of those freebooters to await a steady advance in regular military formation. Besides, they knew Lugard had a Maxim with him. It was a standing order of Captain Lugard to his soldiers upon all occasions, never to fire until attacked, and to fight soldiers only; and on many occasions—such as on this march—when continually fired upon by the Wanyoro, they did not reply by a single shot.

Opposition from Kabrega.—Ammunition was very scarce for one thing, and the Wanyoro were wretchedly bad shots. "A very great deal of ammunition was fired by them," says Captain Lugard, "but in spite of their heavy firing there were no casualties on our side." They evidently feared "our steady advance and the flanking party."

Wanyoro Oppressions.—Proceeding along the Semliki River, they "came on some small villages of extremely friendly natives in the heart of a forest. Everything they possessed had been lately seized by Kabrega, who I heard had devastated these countries quite lately, and who is the terror of the people far and wide. . . . These unfortunate people dare neither to keep cattle nor to grow crops, knowing that if they did all their produce would be seized by Kabrega. Even as they are, continued raids are made on them y the Wanyoro, and their women and people killed or carried off as

slaves." These poor natives, having neither crops nor flocks, made their wretched living by "washing the earth collected from certain saline deposits and making salt, which they sell to the people in the hills in return for food."

Semliki Valley.—The valley of the Semliki River—which, as most will remember, Mr. Stanley in his last journey discovered to connect the lakes Albert Edward and Albert, flowing round the western base of Ruwenzori—is about 2,200 ft. elevation, the high plateau of Unyoro from 4,300 ft. to 5,300 ft. appearing like a range of hills to the N.E., and the Kavalli plateau presenting a similar appearance on the other side of the valley running nearly north and south. Along this route, as far as a place called by Captain Lugard Butanuka, "the country is very wild and extremely close, with high elephant grass and scrub. Around Butanuka there is a dense population, as shown by the enormous areas of cultivation, and miles on miles of banana groves along the base of Ruwenzori and to the east. Thenceforward the soil is rich and cultivation frequent, till Kiaya is reached.

"This valley is extremely rich and well watered, but as it opens out into the wild country already described, cultivation and population cease. The valley of the Semliki is a level plain (imperceptibly sloping to the lake) of rich soil and excellent pasture. In places it is swampy. The whole of the country from the Albert Edward Lake onwards abounds with elephant. Most other game and cattle have died of the plague"—the plague which has destroyed almost all the cattle and game of East Africa during the past year, from the Juba to the sources of the Nile. Captain Lugard's further remarks concerning this country are worth transcribing, and the fears of the people, as well as his responsive assurances, convey a moral that needs no pointing to all who respect the sanctity of British honour and good faith:—

"The soil in the inhabited areas is excessively rich, and crops most abundant. Beans of many kinds are very extensively grown, also grain (mohindi, wimbi, mtama, &c.). Enormous forests of excellent timber trees extend along the eastern boundary of Toru. Along the foot of the hills on the west of the Semliki Valley, the forests consist of acacia, tamarind, mteroanda (an excellent wood for gunstocks, &c.). In these hills a hard, white, glazed rock-like marble abounds. Throughout this march, in spite of the fact that the country was hostile, and we had to fight (*i.e.*, to fight the Unyoro invaders), I would not allow any damage to be done to the crops and banana groves; the houses were left unharmed, and no sheep or goats were allowed to be taken. Some people were caught from time to

time. I released them all at once, telling them that this country was now under the British, and we did not fight with women and children and villagers. If they wished to accept our rule they could stay in peace, if not they could go to Kabrega. I subsequently heard, on my return journey, that the news of these methods, so strange to these people, had spread everywhere through the country, and that people were, in consequence, most anxious to accept our rule and that of Kasagama. I told them we had come to help them, and to turn out Kabrega, not to injure or enslave them. Their reply invariably was that they acknowledged Kasagama as their rightful King, and they would welcome us gladly, but they feared we should only stay a short time and then leave them, in which case Kabrega would massacre them to a man, as he did the people around Mruli when the Egyptian Government evacuated those stations. I assured them that these countries were British by international agreement, and that the British flag would never go back; that if they doubted they could go and see the fort we had built on the lake," &c.

Soudanese Refugees.—At Kavallis, at the south-west end of the Albert Nyanza, Captain Lugard was met with great rejoicings by the Soudanese refugees who had abandoned Wadelai after the departure of Emin Pasha. The Pasha himself had shortly before passed that way, and, it appeared, had tried to revive their loyalty, but it seemed that they treated all his new professions with distrust, and generally gave him the cold shoulder. Selim Bey, their leader, was absent at the time of Captain Lugard's arrival, having gone to meet a large party of refugees who had recently arrived from the Equatorial Province and its outlying districts. When Selim returned, the refugee party numbered in all about 8,000 souls, of whom some 1,000 were armed soldiers of the old Egyptian regiments, having about eighty rounds of ammunition each. Theirs had been a singular history, though Captain Lugard does not touch upon it in his report.

It will be remembered that Mr. H. M. Stanley, after waiting about the south end of the Albert Nyanza (his camping ground was six miles north of that occupied by Captain Lugard) for some ninety days in all for Selim Bey and his party to turn up, proceeded on his journey by easy marches, so that the refugees might, if they would, overtake and accompany him to the coast. Selim and his people failed to turn up, and Mr. Stanley went on his way. Before Mr. Stanley left Kavallis he buried a large quantity of gunpowder and ammunition with which he was unable to burden his expedition to the coast. When Selim Bey eventually returned with his people from Wadelai he dug up this ammunition, and it supplied his troops

during their two years' sojourn at the place where Captain Lugard found them, leaving them with about eighty rounds a man remaining. Captain Lugard now offered to take Selim Bey and his men into the Company's service, but "Selim, however, would not agree to take service until he should have the direct permission of the Khédive, whose flag he said he had served until he had grown grey in its service, and which he would never desert."

Agreement with Selim Bey.—Such loyalty deserved a better reward than it had met from Cairo, and than, perhaps, it is likely to meet. Eventually Selim and his people enlisted themselves under the Company's flag, on Captain Lugard undertaking to write to the Khédive. A number of these people, it may be remarked, were subsequently sent home to Egypt by Captain Lugard. It would have been evidently most impolitic, after freeing the district of the ravages of the Wanyoro, to consent to leave there a large number of people with arms in their hands, whose only means of subsistence would have been found in raiding the natives.

Return Journey.—On October 5th Captain Lugard left Kavallis, and recrossed the Semliki with his immense host of 8,200 people, and, following a route in Unyoro some distance to the east of the boundary of Toru, proceeded to establish along this frontier a line of five fortified stations for the purpose of keeping Kabrega in check in the future. He had a good deal of trouble in controlling the predatory instincts acquired by the Soudanese since leaving Wadelai, but in due course he built the five forts along a line from the south of the Albert Nyanza, generally due north and south.

Forts.—These forts were intended, not as a line of roads or transport, but as a line of frontier defence. They were named—1, Wavertree; 2, Lorne; 3, Kivari; 4, Utari; and 5, Grant; and in each was left a garrison of Soudanese soldiers. It was in charge of No. 3 (Fort Kivari) that poor Mr. de Winton was left, whose death from fever was recently announced. Mr. de Winton had been sent from Uganda with reinforcements, &c., and had met Captain Lugard at Fort Edward.

As regards Kabrega, the King of Unyoro, the common enemy and devastator of all this region, Captain Lugard pronounces no uncertain judgment, and it is one which everyone who has any knowledge from Sir Samuel Baker's writings or elsewhere of that savage's character, will be prepared for:—"I look on Kabrega as a man who has lost any claim to indulgence by his cruelties for years past. He is a curse to his country, and since he has taken every opportunity of attacking Europeans, joining the Mohammedans against us,

&c., the war has been entirely of his own seeking." Having completed his line of forts, garrisoned and supplied them, and left lists of stores, orders, and minute instructions with the several commandants, Captain Lugard returned to Uganda with the remainder of the people, and arrived at the capital on December 31st.

Road between Lakes.—Besides the liberation of Ankoli and Toru from the oppression of Kabrega, Captain Lugard kept carefully in view throughout this western expedition the tracing of a road suitable for animal traffic. In this he was successful. Starting from Luambwa on the Victoria Nyanza, and following a course in a straight line W.N.W. to Ibanda, "thence the route bends sharply round to the north, following the Ruwenzori. This is the only angle throughout, and it will be seen that the extra distance involved is not great, and is more than compensated for by the route touching the Salt Lake, and the trade of the Albert Edward Lake. Thus return caravans can come down loaded with salt, which is extremely valuable in Uganda, Busoga, Kavirondo, &c., and can also bring down the goods, (ivory, &c.), purchased at Fort George for salt." All along the route, from Victoria Nyanza to the Albert Nyanza there is abundance of fodder for transport animals, of water, and of portable food as distinguished from that which must be consumed where found, as too bulky to be carried.

Trade Capacities.—Of the trade capacities of these western countries Captain Lugard (who is no optimist in such matters) speaks with confidence. The two abundant and precious commodities of salt and ivory are in themselves enough to give considerable commercial value to the region, and to make it well worth the while of traders to follow the route he has marked out from the western shore of the Victoria Nyanza.

IV.

THE TROUBLES IN UGANDA.

Return to Uganda (Dec. 31st, 1891).—On arriving in Uganda Captain Lugard received from Captain Williams a report of events since the preceding May. With this we need not deal here. There had been troubles enough, constant jealousies and contentions, requiring the greatest tact and firmness on the part of Captain Williams to deal with so as to avoid an outbreak. The King, of course, had no authority at all with either faction, and no thought at any time except for his own safety. To show the condition of the royal authority, however, and the character of Mwanga, the following incident from the report of Captain Williams may be quoted :—"On December 26th I heard a tremendous row, and went up to the King. I found him very nervous, and found that the Catholics in his boma had tried to seize some other Catholics, also in his boma, whom they accused of certain offences. The King was very depressed, and on hearing a gun fired close to his baraza door jumped up and ran out at the back. He came back for me, and, with my three soldiers, I remained with him until things were quiet." Next day a report was spread that the Catholics were prepared to put up the son of Karema—a young boy—as their King. "I went to the King," says Captain Williams, "and told him that I myself, with thirty men, would come to his assistance at any moment, and I told the Catholic chief that I would fight for the King." Then the matter blew over.

Improvement in Uganda.—On the whole, however, Captain Lugard observed great improvement in the country on his return. "I think," he wrote on January 11th, "the improvement in the country is most marked—shambas and estates are fenced in ; large and handsome houses built in every direction, where a year ago was waste land and jungle growths ; roads are cleared ; people pass to and fro, bringing produce to Mengo without fear of highway robbery ;

trade has revived greatly; huge churches are being built by either party, &c. All this is material development which gives the people a greater interest in preserving peace. A short time ago they would not build or cultivate beyond absolute necessities, daily anticipating the destruction of any such labour by war."

Origin of the Outbreak.—Now, as to the origin of the outbreak on January 24th, concerning which more shall be learned in a later part of this narrative. In the first place, it was unexpected, even by the leading chief on the Catholic side. This man's name was the Sekibobo. Of him Captain Lugard speaks in warm terms. "He is a charming man and a great friend of mine. He bids me a cordial good-bye (when going out to war against the Mohammedan); the Sekibobo is, perhaps, one of the very best men in Uganda, and a great personal friend of my own. It has been mainly due to him that war has been averted in former cases, and his absence, probably, was one great reason for the outbreak. His only child, a little girl, plays in my room daily. I have managed to rescue her from among the captives, and she is now here and the pet of the place." (This was written on February 4th.) Prior to Captain Lugard's return the influence of Captain Williams with the King was so great that Mwanga was in the habit of seeing him privately and alone. On one of these occasions Mwanga confided to Williams his earnest wish to openly join the "Protestant" party and identify himself with the British *régime*. Captain Williams thought it prudent to dissuade him from such a step for the time, lest it should provoke an outbreak.

It may be observed that in the *Church Missionary Intelligence* for September, 1892, this matter is more circumstantially related by an independent authority, so that it appears Mwanga's intention was publicly known in Mengo at the time. One night the drums suddenly beat in the Catholic quarter, but the excitement soon ceased. The Sekibobo, who was to start the next day on an expedition against an insurgent party called the "Futabanji," or bang-smokers, apparently did not know the cause of the excitement, but, in consequence of it, he did not start as intended. Captain Lugard told the Sekibobo that the disturbance was in consequence of Captain Williams's secret interviews with the King. In fact, he confided everything to this great chief, who thoroughly agreed with Captain Lugard that, the country being now under the British, "it was ridiculous that all this fuss about the English and French sides should still continue." The Sekibobo said he would tell all the chiefs Captain Lugard's words, and then start for the war on which he was bound. This he

did, but it is quite evident he would not have left had he apprehended the outbreak which followed in a few days.

Murder of a Protestant.—On January 20th a man was killed in the bazaar—a Protestant—and his party were defied by the others to remove the corpse. Captain Lugard went to the King and insisted on the corpse being removed, and this was ordered. But he also demanded firmly that, according to a standing agreement, the murder should be expiated by the death of the murderer. There was no justification whatever for the deed—it had been most wanton.

Changed Attitude of the King.—The King admitted that this was true, and that the murder should, according to law, be expiated: but he urged that evidence should be heard. Judgment was given for the Catholic murderer. The whole attitude of the King was suddenly changed. When Captain Lugard remonstrated against the decision he became insolent, defiant, and even used threats. Nothing like this had happened since Captain Lugard first arrived in Uganda.

Outbreak fomented by the Priests.—Captain Lugard mentions at the time as a “coincidence” what others on the spot emphatically declared to have been the cause of this sudden and striking change of attitude. On January 12th a party of French priests arrived from Europe, and although Captain Lugard, writing on February 4th, is only “inclined to think,” others there had reason to be quite sure, that those gentlemen brought with them the news of the contemplated withdrawal of the Company from Uganda. “We had heard,” says the Rev. G. K. Baskerville, writing from Uganda on January 31st, “news a little before that the English papers were talking of the probable early withdrawal of the Company from Uganda, and about the same time arrived a party of French priests who, it is evident, gave this information to their people, representing to the King that this was only a trading Company, and that it would be against their interests to fight; and further, that if they were about to withdraw, and if the Roman Catholic party held out a little longer, they would soon have everything their own way. You will see as I go on how this gave great confidence to the King, and caused him so far to defy the power of the Company as to challenge them to fight him.” Both Captain Lugard and Captain Williams, as their later letters show, found this to be the fact. From another source (Parliamentary Paper, Africa No. 8, 1892) we quote the following from a report by Captain Lugard:—

“On January 12th the French Bishop, who had gone to meet a party of French priests, reached Mengo. Though our mail was supposed to be leaving in a day or two, he despatched urgent

mails, *vid* Usukuma, without waiting for it. Almost immediately after this date matters began to assume a critical aspect here. There had been hitherto every prospect of continued peace, but now difficulties and quarrels began to spring up daily between the two parties, and as far as I could judge the trouble in every instance arose from aggression on the part of the Catholics. This, with other reasons which I cannot detail here, induces me to believe that the Bishop's party had brought the news of the announcement in the English papers of the intended withdrawal from Uganda, and that they had for some reason used this information in such a way as to bring on the crisis. Matters culminated in the cold-blooded murder of a Protestant by a Catholic in the streets of Mengo," &c.

It is also important to note here, as evidence of the premeditation of the French priests, that immediately after the defeat of the Mohammedans in May, 1891, Father Achte, an active member of the French missionary body, wrote in an unguarded moment to the Catholic periodical, *So Gott Will*, as follows:—"The fight with the Mussulmans was hardly over before it became needful to begin another and far more arduous battle with the Protestants. It seemed to us to be the most opportune time [Captain Lugard was then away with great part of his force] to make an energetic forward movement towards the extension of Catholicism and stirring up the dogmatic zeal of the Catholic chiefs. I shall inspire the Catholic army with courage."

Lugard's Attitude towards Parties.—On January 23rd—the day before the outbreak—two incidents illustrated in a singular manner the attitude of Captain Lugard towards the rival parties. First, he received from the French Bishop a long list of Catholic grievances, with a letter accusing him of "continued and constant partiality to the Protestants," &c. On the same day strong representations were made from the other side that he was allowing the Protestants to be trampled on, despoiled, and even murdered in the streets. The sympathy of every one must go out to a man striving persistently to act justly and impartially in such a situation.

The Fight.—The next day, Sunday, February 24th, while Captain Lugard was reading a letter, the war-drums rang out from the Catholic camp. The two parties were arranged for battle. To the last Lugard spared no effort to avert fighting. The Catholics had been some time firing, a Protestant had been shot in the face, and still Captain Lugard would not allow the Protestants to fire a shot. He even at this late stage sent to the King to say that if the original murderer was given up he would leave all other matters of dispute to be settled in baraza next day. It was all in vain, however. A

heavy fire was opened on the Protestants. These were, comparatively, very few in numbers, and, what is worse in Uganda, fewer in leaders, their principal chief being absent on an expedition for the State. Lugard gave them all the guns he had; and as he could not send a party to protect the French priests at Rubaga, he sent strict orders to the Katikiro that they were not to be harmed. The result of the fight was the defeat and rout of the Catholics, the flight of the King (of course); but his house was saved by Captain Williams, who, immediately followed first by Mr. Grant, and then by Captain Lugard himself, hastened to Rubaga to save the priests.

Priests Rescued.—"I succeeded," says Captain Lugard, "in bringing down all the fathers to Kampala, and we gave them of our very best, and did everything in our power to make them comfortable. The arrival of stores by Mr. Martin's caravan enabled us to show them much hospitality. All their followers, men, women, and children in large numbers, were brought over safely, and they were allowed by me to sleep in our own dwelling-houses contrary to our usual rules. Captain Williams vacated his own bed for Monseigneur (Hirth), and, tired as I was, I remained till a late hour at night, after all had gone to bed, arranging in every way I could for their comfort. I also left a guard over their goods and houses for the night, and sent up large numbers of men all the next two days to remove their property, which I stored in Kampala. Nothing on their part could exceed their courtesy, and they constantly assured me they owed their lives to us."

King anxious to return.—The King had fled to a neighbouring island, and "the Kago, a Roman Catholic chief, who is most moderate and a great friend of mine," says Lugard, "and who had done his utmost to prevent the war, came and slept in Kampala. He said the King was anxious to return." Next day Monseigneur Hirth told Captain Lugard he wished to go to the Catholics, and promised to use all his influence to induce the King to return to his capital. Captain Lugard, on his side, promised that the King's honour and power should be the same as before, and he invited all Catholic chiefs to meet him to discuss matters in an amicable spirit.

Prevented by Bishop Hirth and carried off.—Monseigneur Hirth went away, and wrote back that the King's repugnance to returning was strong. Others, who knew the facts, told a different tale. The King was carried off against his will by Monseigneur Hirth, first to Sesse and then to Buddu, and people in Uganda openly declared that it was the Bishop who prevented him from returning to his capital, as he wished, and as he was loyally invited by Captain Lugard to do.

V.

PACIFICATION OF UGANDA.

Plans of the Priests.—Buddu, the richest province of Uganda, bounded on one side by the German territory and on another washed by the Victoria Nyanza, had long been fixed upon in the plans of the Roman Catholics as an important theatre of their particular enterprise. Father Achte, as already stated, a prominent and active member of the Roman Catholic missionary body, inadvertently disclosed in a report written immediately after the defeat of the Mohammedan party by the allied arms of the two Christian bodies the aim of his faction to “make an energetic forward movement towards the extension of Catholicism and stirring up the dogmatic zeal of the Catholic chiefs,” the object being “to begin another and far more arduous battle with the Protestants.” Two children, sons of Karema, the brother of King Mwanga, were (and are still) kept by the priests at their station in Bukumbi, at the south of the lake. The importance to a seditious party of keeping possession of these children is manifested when it is remembered that no authority can attach the loyalty of the Waganda unless it enjoys the sanction of a prince of Mtesa’s blood.

Designs as to Buddu.—The designs of the Roman Catholics in reference to Buddu contemplated the contingency of their being some day compelled by reverses to withdraw from Uganda, in which event they meant to declare an independent kingdom in Buddu under the nominal sovereignty of one of the infant Princes. Mwanga, no doubt exists at all, was well aware of this intention, and the fear of a second rival king (the Mohammedans having as their head his uncle Mbogo) must have largely influenced him in identifying himself with the cause of the Roman Catholics. Buddu, moreover, from a strategical point of view, possessed more than one recommendation to the schemes of the Roman Catholic managers. It interposed between Uganda and the Western States of Ankole, Toru, &c. (lately annexed by Captain

Lugard), on the one hand, and between Uganda and the German sphere and the old trade route to the coast on the other hand. It was, as before stated, the richest province of Uganda.

More than all, its lake front, enhanced by the possession of the adjacent island of Sesse, would give Buddu the command of the Victoria Nyanza. The strenuous efforts of the party to keep possession of this important and dominating island, thickly peopled and famous for its shipbuilding, was not hard to understand, and Captain Lugard showed excellent policy in refusing it to them in the end. Possessed of the advantages which they calculated upon, the Roman Catholics would be in a position to gather their strength until the first favourable opportunity enabled them to break in upon their rivals and drive them out of Uganda. They had reckoned, too, on the support of the Germans, a calculation in which they were signally disappointed.

Bad faith of Monseigneur Hirth.—These explanations will make the attitude of the Roman Catholics under the leadership of Monseigneur Hirth more easily understood. When the Bishop left Captain Lugard's Fort of Kampala two days after the fight of January 24th he had repeatedly given his promise to induce the King to return to his capital, where Captain Lugard promised to restore him to his former position of honour and power. It was notorious that Mwanga, now convinced as to which was the stronger party, was anxious to return. Monseigneur Hirth, however, instead of acting up to his promise, virtually made the King a prisoner, and carried him off to Buddu. The Bishop saw that it was more important to possess Mwanga himself as the nominal head of his party than one of his infant nephews.

Proposals for Peace.—On March 6th Father Achte wrote, on behalf of the Catholics, to Captain Lugard proposing a division of the country between the Protestant and Catholic parties. The captive King wrote to the same effect, "begging me," says Captain Lugard, "to divide the country, as it was quite impossible for the Protestants and Catholics to live together again. I replied that I would not divide the country until he returned, for that was essentially his work, and I knew nothing of the boundaries, area, population, and comparative merits of the country." Again and again, in answer to overtures for peace, Captain Lugard reiterated that until the King was allowed to return to his capital and resume his royal functions as the King of Uganda he would discuss no terms of settlement. Four Catholic chiefs came as an embassy from Buddu to Captain Lugard, "and they fully admitted that the war was

their fault, and that they had done very wrong, and now came to throw themselves on my mercy. I said I was most anxious for peace, and to do my best for them, but I could discuss no terms of peace until the King returned." They at once agreed to go back and fetch the King. "I, at this time," Captain Lugard adds, "received further letters from Monseigneur, and I cannot say that I liked the tone he adopted. For it appeared to me that unless I conceded to his ideas of 'justice' to the Catholics, which did not agree with my ideas of what they had a right to claim after their action, he held up indirect threats or inferences that the Catholics would fight to the very end like desperate men, and that my action (I suppose through his representations) would be regarded in Europe as a religious war for the propagation of Protestantism."

Overtures from Mohammedans.—Whilst these communications were proceeding with the Catholic party in Buddu, Captain Lugard received overtures for peace from the Mohammedan party, and their envoys came to Kampala. Owing to the failure of his efforts to obtain from the Catholics the liberation of Mwanga, he now began seriously to consider the policy of placing the Mohammedan King Mbogo on the vacant throne. Something would have to be done without delay for the restoration of order and authority. The Catholics were notified of the danger, but Captain Lugard lengthened out the negotiations with the Mohammedans pending the result of the mission of the four Catholic chiefs who went to bring back the King.

Return of the King.—"They succeeded in their mission, and Mwanga returned on March 30th, the Mohammedan envoys arriving the following day. It appears, however, that the bulk of the Catholics were entirely averse to giving up Mwanga, and had even desired to kill him rather than allow him to return. He therefore came by canoe with the connivance of the chiefs who had gone to fetch him. His entry into Mengo was a strange sight. Messenger after messenger arrived to say he was coming—that he was ready to be killed, or imprisoned, or transported—that he threw himself on my mercy, and implored me to make blood-brotherhood with him. I sent back to say that I wished him to come straight to Kampala—which he has never entered since we came to Uganda—in order that all the country might see the reconciliation.

"His fears did not permit him to rest, and he came on twenty miles, arriving in the evening. A vast crowd had assembled to escort him, and the wildest excitement prevailed. I brought him into Kampala, where his appearance was a very marked contrast to

what he had been before his flight. Haggard and thin, trembling with fatigue and fear, he could hardly either speak or walk, and was almost in a state of collapse, presenting a spectacle one could only pity. I escorted him inside, spoke a few words of welcome, and gave him a small present, as is the Uganda custom the first time a guest enters. For once in his life I believe he was really grateful, saying that he had come expecting imprisonment, and was received as a welcome guest, &c.; that henceforth he was 'under the flag of the Queen utterly and entirely.'"

Negotiations with Catholics.—At this time Kabrega, the King of Unyoro, who had suffered defeat in an attack on the forts in Toru, which, it will be remembered, Captain Lugard had built and garrisoned with the refugee Soudanese troops, sent envoys to beg for peace; and the King of Koki and the Buziba of South Buddu had also sent envoys. The King now being reinstated on his throne, the settlement with the Catholic party was proceeded with. On Mwanga being referred to "he agreed to divide the country, provided his nephews were restored to him (who are now in the keeping of the French priests at Bukumbi). On this subject he was very, very emphatic. He declared that it had always been the intention of the Catholics to set up one of them as their King if they had a separate part of the country. They were placed at Bukumbi at a time when these southern provinces were subservient to Uganda."

Captain Williams had been sent to obtain the release of the children, but had failed; he had, however, received a guarantee that, they should not leave Bukumki. After considerable discussion it was agreed, to the great rejoicing of the Catholic chiefs at Mengo, that their party should have Buddu. Captain Lugard was anxious also to give them a strip of territory known as "Kaima's country," extending from Buddu along the lake to the vicinity of the capital. The Protestants were violently opposed to this concession, and a letter received at this juncture from Monseigneur Hirth himself decided the matter. This letter informed Captain Lugard "that the Catholics, who were now massed ready at Buddu, would prefer to fight and regain all they had lost. The priests in Mengo were at the same time assuring me of the absolute loyalty and devotion of the Catholics. When I informed them that I had news that they would prefer to fight they said it was a malicious lie. On my telling them that Monseigneur himself was my authority, and showing them his letter, they were completely taken aback. They promised to get an explanation from him, but none ever came. Meanwhile, in face of the French bishop's letter, I could not but agree that it would be

folly for me, as a soldier, to allow a party lately in arms against us, and now stated, on no less authority than Monseigneur himself, to be eager for war, to come within striking distance of the capital."

Settlement.—Kaima's country was therefore withheld, and the Katonga River was made the boundary; but to compensate the Catholics Captain Lugard made other concessions to them. One can hardly help feeling that he gave them a great deal more than they had any right to receive, and indeed throughout his tolerance of the party was carried to the verge of indulgence. However, Captain Lugard was himself the best judge, and it will be admitted that if the terms of the Treaty (see Appendix A.) are exceptionally favourable, under the circumstances, to the Catholics, they are judiciously directed to the attainment of the peace which was, after all, the paramount need of the Kingdom.

Importance of Islands.—Before dismissing this part of Captain Lugard's report, two or three points call for special notice. The first explains the motives of the Catholics in desiring to obtain control of Sesse and the islands, and the reasons why this desire was not gratified. "First, as these islands are densely populated, it would give them little or no extra room for their people, and on these grounds alone can they claim territory, since by their action they have forfeited claims to mere suzerainty; second, whoever commands the islands and shores commands the canoes. The Catholics already, in gaining Buddu, gain control of a large number, and their object in wishing for Sesse is to have the control of the remainder. The King was averse to this, and I was averse to it, for it is absolutely necessary for us to have the command of a number of canoes to bring up cloth from Usukuma, while it is better that the Catholics (until their future loyalty is fully proved) should not have the means of getting unlimited supplies of guns and powder from the south."

Catholics led by Priests to expect German Help.—The Catholics, in retiring to Buddu, had undoubtedly counted on the help of the Germans. Captain Langheld informed Captain Williams that he had received messages from Mwanga and the Catholic party asking for assistance to fight the Company, and couched in such terms as to show they had been led to expect such assistance. Common report in Uganda had it that the cause of the Catholics rising in arms was the assurance of German aid given them by the priests; and Captain Langheld more than hinted that the French bishop had suggested his active interference in Uganda against the British officers. The absolute refusal of any help or countenance disheart-

ened them. Captain Langheld, the commandant of the German station, took every opportunity to emphasise his unanimity with Captain Lugard and the Company, declaring that "he would teach the natives that they could not play off one European against another." From the first occupation of Uganda by the British force the constant loyalty and friendship of the German officers at Bukoba have been a conspicuous and pleasing feature of Captain Lugard's reports, as well as those of any British official who came in contact with them.

Bishop's Responsibility for the Fighting.—Bishop Hirth was repeatedly and earnestly declared by the King to have been the fomenter of all the fighting. Captain Lugard would not accept the word of Mwanga on anything as reliable evidence, but confirmation of the King's assertions was not wanting. The passage in which Captain Lugard specially refers to the bishop's responsibility involves so grave a charge, and is so temperately worded, that it deserves attention :—

Urged the Catholics to Fight.—"Mwanga's word is not to be relied on, but his evidence (which I note for what it is worth) was that Monseigneur had told the Catholics to fight in the first instance. This he said he knew for a positive fact himself, and not from hearsay. This is the positive opinion of all the Protestant party, and considering the very great influence Monseigneur exerts with the Catholics—an influence great in proportion to the tenets of the Catholic religion, which places great powers in the senior priest—together with the tone of his letter to me, in answer to my appeal, on the eve of the war, that he should use his influence to avert fighting, and the tone of his subsequent letters, I am myself bound to believe that his power has not been exerted for peace, nor does it seem possible to me that the Catholics would have provoked the war in the deliberate way in which they did had it been counter to his advice."

Breechloading Rifles distributed by French Bishop.—"On the islands, after the first battle (when the bishop, on leaving Kampala, had pledged himself to Captain Lugard to use all his influence to induce Mwanga to return to Mengo so that peace might be made), Mwanga told me Monseigneur had again counselled war, and independent evidence on this point is contained in my former report. Persistent rumours reached me that Monseigneur, after the first fight, had issued breechloading arms to the Catholics to continue the war. These reports would be worth nothing unless supported and confirmed by other evidence. The chief of the Roman Catholic

Party himself admitted to me that Monseigneur had issued ten to his own knowledge subsequent to the outbreak of the war, and in view of the fact that the Germans, in recovering the property looted by the natives from the caravan of the French priests, found, I am informed, breechloading arms (sixty, I believe) concealed in the loads, it is impossible to throw aside the suspicion as baseless.

"The latter startling discovery has been officially reported, I believe, by Captain Langheld, and he informed Captain Williams of the fact. The large number of French-made guns in Uganda proves that in the past arms have been imported by the priests, if I am right in believing that there is no commercial import of French arms on the East Coast of Africa. On one occasion also I asked the King, in conversation, whether any arms had been distributed in the island, after the first fight, by Monseigneur? He said, 'Yes.' I asked, how many? He then, in consultation with the servants of his house around him, began counting upon his fingers the numbers he could recollect, naming each man who had received one, and being reminded and prompted by those around him, he arrived at a total of seventeen, and said he could not recollect if there were others. Mwanga's word, as I have said, is unreliable, but the manner in which the evidence was given, and his own ignorance of the importance of the subject, compelled me to believe there is truth in his statements. The gravity of these charges, as against missionaries, is sufficiently obvious."

Negotiations with Mohammedans.—Which means, apart from the moral aspect of the business, that under the treaty made with Mwanga and the chiefs of Uganda in December, 1890, and which formed the public law of the country, the French bishop and priests, if those charges are true, have forfeited their special status and privileges in Uganda as missionaries. Mwanga having returned the day before the arrival of the Mohammedan envoys, Captain Lugard now told them that he recognised him as sole King of Uganda, and, as it was impossible that there should be two Kings in the country, the Mohammedans must render up their King Mbogo as an essential condition of peace. Captain Lugard guaranteed Mbogo's safety and honour, and agreed on this condition to give the party a portion of Uganda in which to settle in peace. "This giving up of their King was, however, a very, very hard word, and therein lay the whole crux of the question." Captain Lugard found the envoys "a specially nice set of men," and, treating them as guests, they became great friends with him. He found them very much more easy to deal with than either sect of the Christians.

It was at length agreed with them that their party should receive the three small provinces of Kitunzi, Kasuju, and Katambala, comprising only a sixth or seventh of the total area of Uganda, and that Mbogo should be given up to Captain Lugard. They were well satisfied, being weary of war and of living in the "desert," as they called any country which was not Uganda. On April 11th Captain Lugard despatched Selim Bey (the Egyptian colonel) with the Mohammedan chiefs to bring Mbogo, and himself promised to go as far as the capital of Singo (70 miles) to meet him and arrange the final details of the settlement.

Value and Loyalty of Soudanese Troops.—In the course of the negotiations with the Mohammedans certain facts became known which fully confirmed the prudence of Captain Lugard's policy in enlisting the Soudanese troops, who had been abandoned in the Equatorial Provinces, in the service of the British flag. Not only would 800 armed and disciplined men, having themselves and upwards of 9,000 dependents to provide for, have been a dangerous element at large in the British sphere, but the Mohammedans now acknowledge to Captain Lugard that it had always been their plan to coalesce with their co-religionists in the Soudan and re-conquer Uganda. The united forces of the Christians—if it were possible to unite them—could not have resisted this force, and would have been utterly annihilated.

After the Soudanese troops had been placed in charge of the frontier forts the Mohammedans made strenuous efforts to seduce them from their new allegiance, but without avail, and they thus not only lost a powerful alliance, but found this loyal force so placed in their rear and flank that even with the assistance of Kabrega they did not now dare to again invade Uganda. This fact had decisive influence in leading them to seek for peace. The importance of this reliable force of seasoned and disciplined soldiers can hardly be overrated, in view of the responsibility which devolves on the nation to maintain its hold on Uganda and the neighbouring districts.

As in his negotiations with the Catholic Party, so in those now going on with the Mohammedans, Captain Lugard was much annoyed and obstructed by the grasping selfishness of the Protestants, who, while anxious enough for peace to be concluded, wished to retain everything for themselves. "I told them," he writes, "that it was largely for their sakes that Uganda had not been evacuated, but that if they were found to be so treacherous and almost hostile to the

Company, the sympathy for them at present existing in England would be withdrawn, and it was quite possible that by thus endeavouring in every way to thwart me and upset my plans for the good of the country, they would only succeed in bringing ultimate ruin upon themselves."

Settlement with Mohammedan Party.—"Being weary of their attitude I decided the question with the Islam myself, and told the Protestants that if they did not like it they could do as they pleased; but I would not assist them if they quarrelled with the Islam." There was considerable difficulty before negotiations with the Mohammedans were brought to a successful issue. "The main trouble was in regard to Mwanga, whom, they said, they would neither work for nor obey, though they were willing to do so for 'Kapelli'" (Captain Lugard). They were also afraid for the safety of Mbogo. But when Mbogo came to Captain Lugard's camp to negotiate, and was permitted to depart again not only in safety but with honour shown to him, their suspicions were allayed. Captain Lugard agreed that Mbogo should not be handed over to Mwanga or the Waganda, but should remain under his own personal protection at Kampala and should have charge of the infant son of Karema (Mwanga's late brother), and that no restraint should be put upon the exercise of the Mohammedan religion, "for Protestants, Catholics, and Islam were all absolutely free under British rule to worship God as they thought right, and those who did not 'read' any religion were also free to do as they chose." On this basis peace was made. The shambas were divided among the chiefs, and accompanied by Mbogo and the heads of the party, Captain Lugard marched to Mengo.

Rejoicings at Mengo.—Their entry into the capital was a great ovation, King, Catholics, Protestants, all uniting to celebrate the event with frantic joy, and repeatedly expressing their thanks to Captain Lugard for having "taken war out of the country." The meetings of old friends and close relations who had been fighting against each other, and had not met for years, are described as most enthusiastic. Mbogo received a house in the precincts of the fort, and was greatly pleased, and thus was peace at last restored to Uganda.

Treaty Ratified.—Before the Mohammedan chiefs left the capital Captain Lugard read over to them the treaty which he had made with Mwanga on March 30th [see Appendix B.], especially explaining to them the clauses relating to the prohibition of the import of arms and gunpowder, the registration of arms, and the suppression of the

slave trade. They all accepted and signed it, and then departed to settle down on their shambas.

Liberation of Slaves.—In consequence of the new law 100 slaves, belonging to Arabs, who had come with the Mohammedans, were immediately liberated and given certificates of freedom. The Protestant missionaries took charge of these. On March 17th Captain Lugard had also issued a decree declaring freedom to all subjects of the Sultan of Zanzibar who might be in slavery in Uganda. Many of these were found, chiefly women, who had been captured in the late wars. The Protestants at this time (which was before the peace with the Catholics and Mohammedans) declared their willingness to abolish domestic slavery altogether in Uganda as far as they were concerned. Captain Lugard's remarks upon this proposal are interesting.

Domestic Servitude in Uganda.—"So far, however, as my observation goes, domestic slavery among the Christians in Uganda approximates rather to a system of serfdom or a feudal system than to what in Europe is conveyed by the idea of 'slavery.' Such a system is possibly as good a one, in the ordinary development of our early civilisation, as any other; if indeed it is not (as would appear from the history of our Western civilisations) a natural stage in the evolution from savagery to civilisation. It has therefore its advantages in the prevention of idleness, the enforcing of respect for rank, which alone enables the government of a semi-savage country to be carried on.

"In any case, I felt it premature to deal with the question at the moment pending the return of the King, the settlement of the country, and a more complete inquiry into the status of the domestic slave in Uganda, and the effect such a revolution would produce on the various social questions involved. Premature and hasty legislation, based on inadequate knowledge of the results involved, and without a clear conception of the system which should supersede the one to be abolished, might only be expected to result in unforeseen and possibly deplorable contingencies. Nor would it, under any circumstances, in all probability, have been advisable for only one of the three parties to adopt so sweeping a measure. It would, therefore, be necessary first to ascertain how far the other two parties were ripe for such a reform, of which, in the present state of the development of the country, I am very doubtful. I, therefore, praised their intentions, but postponed any decisive steps in the matter *pro tem.*"

Captain Lugard returns to England.—On June 9, a portion of the Railway Survey party, under Captain Macdonald, R.E., arrived at Kampala, and Captain Lugard learned “for the first time definitely that the occupation of Uganda was limited to the current year.” He determined to return to the coast with the Survey party, by which he was freed from the necessity of detaching a single rifle from Uganda. The reading of the debates on the Railway Survey Vote showed Captain Lugard that so many misapprehensions existed regarding his action in various matters, and that the continued retention of Uganda had now become a question of such urgent importance, he felt his presence in England imperatively necessary.

Just as he had brought to a successful conclusion in a general peace the labours which had cost him so much anxiety and patience during eighteen months—just as he had solemnly concluded a new treaty in perpetuity, in which protection and good government were pledged under the British flag to all classes—it must have caused Captain Lugard a feeling of dismay to learn that all the results of his work were likely to be abandoned and his pledges dishonoured. The announcement of his approaching departure was not made until a couple of days before he left, and he was followed from Kampala by the Katikiro and many of the chiefs and a considerable crowd. At the Nile he was overtaken by messengers bearing letters from Mwanga and his chiefs to the Queen and the Directors expressive of gratitude and earnest loyalty, and praying that the protection of the British flag might never be withdrawn from their country. [See Appendices C. D.]

Prospects of Trade.—That we have given “hostages to fortune” in Uganda no one who reads this narrative can fail to be convinced, and on this ground alone our duty to maintain this important outpost of the British flag is beginning to be felt by all parties. On the prospects of traffic for the proposed railway Captain Lugard speaks with great caution. The question, he points out, depends very largely on the demand for imported goods, which, as far as the countries between the coast and the Lake are concerned, would have to be cultivated. In Uganda, however, the demand does exist, and in its sister countries, and a demand which is not only not confined to simple requirements, but is rapidly progressive and will continue to grow without limits.

Demand.—“As cloth becomes obtainable by all, the richer people will demand better and more expensive qualities. Nor are their wants limited to dress. The last request of the Katikiro to me was

that I would send up white donkeys and opera glasses, for which they would pay any price, while stationery, utensils, &c., would be eagerly bought." When ivory was no longer obtainable (though with a system of preservation there is no reason why the supply could not be maintained indefinitely) the people will raise other marketable produce to purchase the desired goods.

Source of future Food Supply.—And it must be borne in mind that Uganda is no further from the seaboard than the grain-producing districts round Delhi; so that with the vast intervening regions brought under cultivation, there is no reason why East Africa should not in time rival India as a source of food supply for Great Britain. "The keynote to the whole question," says Captain Lugard, "is to my mind contained in the word extension, viz., the opening up of fresh markets. If the railway is made to the Lake, our base of supply practically becomes the railway terminus, or rather the Lake shore, and we can then hope to develop the trade of a large area of Africa, radiating from the lake. It will become feasible to hold the Nile sources and to tap the vast ivory preserves there, so long closed to exportation, either *via* Khartoum or the south; we can navigate the waters of the Albert and Albert Edward Lakes, and collect the produce of the countries that border their shores.

"We can put a limit to the awful devastations of the Manyema slave raiders from Ipoto and the Congo basin, now reported to be laying waste vast regions in Monbuttu and the Nile basin, in the so-called 'British sphere.' Uganda itself is the key to these countries. I say it with the more confidence after a year and a half's residence and experience. Besides being the key to extension, it may become in itself, as suggested in my No. 2 Report, the scene of many agricultural and industrial experiments, of the cultivation of wheat and other cereals, of coffee, vines, tobacco, and oil-producing plants. But the discussion of the possibilities of Uganda, with a railway to the Lake, would form the material for an essay in itself."

Heathens.—It may be added that not the least rejoiced of the various parties at being enabled to settle down in peace and freedom were the heathen section, who had previously been tyrannised over by the Christians. Captain Lugard warned the Catholics and Protestants (the former, it appears, needed the injunction most) that he would tolerate no coercion in matters of conscience or religion, and that the heathens should be as free as they were themselves. Captain Williams, his trusted and able second in command, was left in charge on Captain Lugard's departure, and it is satisfactory to

learn that news up to the middle of August bears testimony to the promise of the peaceful settlement completed in May. Everything was reported to be going on well—which is a good deal in Uganda, and indicates that the various parties are realising the advantage of that peace and order which had been so long absent from the country.

EFFECTS OF WITHDRAWAL FROM UGANDA.

It was not until June 9th last, on the arrival of the Survey party, that Captain Lugard heard that the occupation of Uganda was definitely limited to the present year. This was serious news to him after having, in good faith, pledged protection to the various peoples. Moreover, the pledge of that protection had now become the only guarantee of the continuance of the peace which, after so much trouble, had been established. It appeared certain that an abandonment of Uganda and the adjoining countries after the solemn treaties we had made, would be the signal for a renewal in more sanguinary and desperate form of the civil wars, and the immediate ruin of the work which Lugard and Williams had been patiently and laboriously doing for eighteen months. Nothing could be more certain than that if the British flag was once withdrawn, no native of Uganda or the adjoining countries would ever put faith in it again. [See Appendix E.]

It cannot be too clearly understood that it was not as the agent of a private trading company that Lugard was regarded by the King and chiefs of Uganda, and of the other countries who made treaties with him. His initial difficulty, as has been already shown, was due to their uncertainty as to the character and authority of his mission. Emin Pasha had informed them that Uganda was now part of the British sphere, but they wanted to know whether Lugard represented Great Britain and not a mere British Company. Then they learned through their envoys that the Company acted under the powers of a Royal Charter, and their misgivings disappeared. They confided themselves and their country to the protection of the British flag, not to that of a private company. It is therefore to the British nation that they look for the fulfilment of the pledges made to them under the sanction of the nation's flag. This situation forms our first responsibility. The withdrawal of the flag would be the removal of

the only guarantee for peace, and with it would pass away all native respect in Equatorial Africa for British faith.

Slave Trade.—It is repeatedly said that there is no slave-trade route in British East Africa. Every trade route for coast caravans is a slave route. These trading caravans go up the country for ivory, which is the only product that will pay for transport by human porters, and they combine with ivory trading the equally profitable business of kidnapping. Captives cost almost nothing to bring down, and they are sold at the coast; and all of them who are fit to carry loads are made to do the work of porters on the journey. In this way it is that the coast traders are able to repay the outfit money which they borrow at usurious interest, and at the same time to pocket large profits for themselves. If anything is clear it is that as long as there is a market for slaves these trading caravans will make it their business to supply them, and as the country is opened up, so will fresh facilities be afforded to the slave traders, unless the occupation which covers their operations is put an end to. Slave-trading, therefore, cannot be suppressed in British East Africa as long as caravan-trading continues; and in a country in which no means of transport exists except that of human porters, caravans of the present kind and character must continue until human portage is superseded and extinguished by a better, cheaper, and quicker method of conveyance. These facts explain the necessity of a railway, which alone is competent to revolutionise at a stroke the present evil system and put an end once and for ever to slave-raiding and slave-trading in our territories in East Africa.

Advantages of a Railway.—It is scarcely necessary to point out the advantages, political, commercial, and humanitarian, which would redound to Uganda and the Lake regions generally, from the construction of a line of railway from the coast to the Victoria Nyanza. To these countries it would mean everything. It would mean a great deal more to Great Britain. It is now generally felt that the nation cannot abandon those regions, and it is trite to add that it cannot retain them without some expense. A railway would develop commerce so rapidly that its completion would soon be followed by the disappearance of any financial burden involved in the administration of the lake regions. This relief therefore, together with the accompanying advantages to our national trade, would form a considerable set-off against the amount of the guarantee required by the railway. Imports would create demand, and demand would stimulate production. There is ample and fertile field for production as soon

as the native sees that it is worth his while to do more work than the limited needs of mere existence demand. In Uganda itself, as Captain Lugard tells us, the demand at the present moment is keen for European goods, and in the intervening countries there is abundant natural fertility awaiting development. (See Appendix F.) The office of a railway in a new country is not in the first instance to tap traffic, but to create it ; and commerce is created from the productiveness of the land. There is no lack of inducement, concurrent with the obligations of a high duty, to encourage the British nation to undertake its responsibilities in East Africa.

APPENDICES.

APPENDICES.

A.—SETTLEMENT WITH CATHOLIC PARTY.

AGREEMENT.

1. THE party formerly calling themselves the "Wa-Fransa" shall in future reside in Buddu, the boundary being the Katonga River. That part of Kamia's country (Buganga) to the south of the Katonga shall be included in Buddu.

2. The islands and the tributary States, such as Koki, shall not be counted as a part of Buddu. If mission extension is contemplated outside of Buddu, permission for the proposed extension shall first be obtained from the Resident at Kampala.

3. All armed men of this party who recently fought against the British shall remain in Buddu. If any armed party wishes to leave Buddu to come to Mengo, or elsewhere, they shall obtain permission to do so, and state the number of guns they have. If armed men enter the remaining part of Uganda without permission they shall be liable to have their arms confiscated.

4. The British flag shall be flown in Buddu, and the employees of the Company passing through Buddu shall be well treated and supplied with food.

5. If the Company builds one or more stations in Buddu every facility shall be given, and the Company's representative and employees shall be treated with all respect.

6. If, after a period of two years from this date, there shall be no reason to entertain any doubt as to the loyalty and good conduct of the people of Buddu, it shall be open to the Resident to modify the above restrictions.

7. All rifles and arms belonging to the Company, and now in the possession of the people of Buddu, shall be returned to Kampala.

8. All the conditions of the treaty made this day with Mwanga, King

of Uganda, shall be observed and carried out, and Mwanga shall be recognised as the sole King of Uganda.

9. The status of Koki shall be as formerly, viz., a tributary State of Uganda. Its revenue shall be collected as formerly, by the Pokimo, and messages, &c., to Uganda shall pass through the chief of Buddu. Shambas, however, are not to be siezed or occupied by the people of Buddu, nor is war to be made on Koki without the permission of the Resident.

10. The shambas belonging formerly to the Pokimo in Mengo, viz., those occupied by Buddu chiefs, shall now belong to the people of Buddu.

11. Shambas shall be given to the chief of Buddu at intervals of one day's march from Mengo to Buddu, so that the people of Buddu may camp each night on their own shambas on the way to and from the capital.

12. The Islands of Luamba and Selinia shall belong to Buddu.

13. The status of the Waziba and of Bwera shall remain unaltered, and the old customs as regards messengers, &c., from Ntali of Ankole.

N.B.—There is nothing in this agreement intended to be prejudicial to the interests of the Roman Catholic religion. It has been made at the express wish of the four leading Roman Catholic chiefs lately, Kago, Sekibobo, Kimbugwe, and Tamliiti. They prefer to have a separate portion of the country to be reinstated in their former positions, and they have themselves told me they prefer Buddu to the whole of Singo, Kitungi, &c.

I certify that the above is a true copy.

(Signed) F. D. LUGARD,
and Catholic Chiefs.

KAMPALA, April 5th, 1892.

(Sd.) MWANGA, × (his mark), Kabaka of Uganda.

Witnesses.—I certify that the signature of Mwanga was made in my presence, and was of his own free will.

(Sd.) W. H. WILLIAMS,
Captain, Royal Artillery.

11th April, 1892.

(Sd.) KATIKIRO APOLLO KAGWA, *Katikiro of Uganda.*

(Sd.) KIMBUGWE KAGO, *Mugema*. ("Kimbugwe" is Sebwatu, late Pokino, now Sekibobo, temporarily acting Kimbugwe.

× Mark of SEBOA, *Pokino* (R.C.).

× Mark of SEYATIMBA, late *Kago* (R.C.).

Witness to signatures. (Sd.) S. S. BAGGE.

(*Swahili.*)

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,
Captain 9th Regiment,
Commanding Uganda for I. B. E. A. Co.

MWANGA, × (his mark).

I certify that the signature of Mwanga above was made in my presence, and was of his own free will.

(Sd.) W. H. WILLIAMS,
Captain Royal Artillery.

11th April, 1892.

- × Mark of SEBOA, *Pokino* (R.C.), present rank, late Sekibobo.
- × Mark of SEMATIMBA, late *Kago* (R.C.).

I certify that the above marks were made in my presence this the 7th day of May, 1892, of their own free will.

(Sd.) S. S. BAGGE.

Mark of DUWALIRA, *Kangao*.
Name of ABDALLAH, *Pokino*.
Mark of LUTALAH, *Mutasa*.
Mark of WAMALA, *Sekibobo*.
Mark of KAGO, *Asmani*.

Mark of MUEPI, *Mujasi*.
Mark of SEKIRU, *Mugema*.
Name of ABDAL, *Aziz*.
Mark of KAMIA, *Kimbugwe*.

B.—TREATY WITH MWANGA, DATED MARCH 30TH, 1892.

I, MWANGA' Kabaka of Uganda, do hereby make the following treaty (in supersession of all former treaties whatsoever, with whomsoever concluded) with Captain F. D. LUGARD, D.S.O.—an officer of the Army of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, Queen of England, &c.—acting solely on behalf of the IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY (incorporated [by Royal Charter]; the aforesaid Captain F. D. Lugard, D.S.O., having full powers to conclude and ratify the same on behalf of the said Company. And to this treaty the principal officers and chiefs of my country do sign their names as evidence of their consent and approval :—

Clause 1. The Imperial British East Africa Company (hereinafter called "the Company") agree on their part to afford protection to the kingdom of Uganda, and by all means in their power to secure to it the blessings of peace and prosperity; to promote its civilisation and commerce; and to introduce a system of administration and organisation by which these results shall be obtained.

Clause 2. I, Mwanga, Kabaka of Uganda, in the name of my chiefs' people and kingdom, do acknowledge the suzerainty of the Company, and that my kingdom is under the British sphere of influence, as agreed between the European Powers. And in recognition hereof I undertake to fly the flag of the Company, and no other, at my capital and throughout my kingdom; and to make no treaties with, grant no kind of concessions to, nor allow to settle in my kingdom and acquire lands or hold offices of State, any Europeans of whatever nationality without the

knowledge and consent of the Company's representative in Uganda (hereinafter called "the Resident").

Clause 3. The Resident, as arbitrator, shall decide all disputes and all differences between Europeans in Uganda. All lands acquired by Europeans in Uganda shall be subject to his consent and approval and shall be registered in his office. All arms in possession of Europeans and their followers shall be marked and registered by the Resident. His decision in all matters connected with Europeans shall be final, and subject only to appeal to the higher authorities of the Company. All employees of the Company shall be solely under the orders of the Resident.

Clause 4. The consent of the Resident shall be obtained, and his counsel taken by the King, before any war is undertaken, and in all grave and serious affairs and matters of the State, such as the appointment of chiefs to the higher offices, the assessment of taxes, &c.

Clause 5. Missionaries, viz., those solely engaged in preaching the Gospel and in teaching the arts and industries of civilisation, shall be free to settle in the country, of whatever creed they may be, and their religious rights and liberties shall be respected. There shall be perfect freedom of worship. No one shall be compelled to follow any religion against his will.

Clause 6. The property of the Company and its employees, and all servants of the Company, shall be free from the incidence of all taxes.

Clause 7. The revenues of the country shall defray, as may be found feasible, the money expended purely on the development and organisation of the country, the expenses of its garrisons, &c. For such objects the King shall supply labour and give every facility.

Clause 8. All arms in the country shall be registered, and a licence given for them. Unregistered arms shall be liable to confiscation. The importation of arms and munitions is prohibited.

Clause 9. Traders of all nations shall be free to come to Uganda, provided they do not import or offer for sale goods prohibited by international agreement.

Clause 10. Slave-trading or slave-raiding, or the exportation or importation of people for sale or exchange as slaves, is prohibited.

Clause 11. The Company will uphold the power and honour of the King, and the display of this Court shall be maintained.

Clause 12. This treaty shall be binding in perpetuity, or until cancelled or altered by the consent and mutual agreement of both parties to it.

Dated Kampala, this 30th day of March, 1892.

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,

Captain 9th Regiment,

Offg. Resident in Uganda, I. B. E. A. Co.

(Sd.) MWANGA, × (his mark), *Kabaka of Uganda.*

Witnesses.—I certify that the signature of Mwanga was made in my presence, and was of his own free will.

(Sd.) W. H. WILLIAMS,
11th April, 1892. *Captain Royal Artillery.*

(Sd.) KATIKIRO APOLLO KAGWA, *Katikiro of Uganda.*

(Sd.) KIMBUGWE KAGO, *Mugema*. ("Kimbugwe" is Sebwtu, late Pokino, now Sekibobo, temporarily acting Kimbugwe.)

x Mark of SEBOA, *Pokino* (R.C.).

x Mark of SEYATIMBA, late *Kago* (R.C.).

Witness to signatures. (Sd.) S. S. BAGGE.

(*Swahili.*)

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,
Captain 9th Regiment,
Commanding Uganda for I. B. E. A. Co.

MWANGA, x (his mark).

I certify that the signature of Mwanga above was made in my presence and was of his own free will.

(Sd.) W. H. WILLIAMS,
11th April, 1892. *Captain Royal Artillery.*

x Mark of SEBOA, *Pokino* (R.C.), present rank, late *Sekibobo*.

x Mark of SEMATIMBA, late *Kago* (R.C.).

I certify that the above marks were made in my presence this the 7th day of May, 1892, of their own free will.

(Sd.) S. S. BAGGE.

Mark of DUWALIRA, *Kaugao*.

Mark of MUEPI, *Mnjasi*.

Name of ABDALLAH, *Pokino*.

Mark of SEKIRU, *Mugema*.

Mark of LUTALAH, *Mutasa*.

Name of ABDAL, *Aziz*.

Mark of WAMALA, *Sekibobo*.

Mark of KAMIA, *Kimbugwe*.

Mark of KAGO, *Asmani*.

I certify that these signatures or marks have been made in my presence by the principal Mohammedan chiefs—each by the man noted against it—of their own free will, and without compulsion. The titles shown against each are those held by them among the Mohammedans prior to their return to Uganda. The treaty was also read in their presence in the vernacular before the King, in public burza.

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,

Dated Kampala, this 3rd day of June, 1892.

Captain.

C.—TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM MWANGA TO THE QUEEN.

BUGANDA, MENGO,

June 17, 1892.

To my friend the Queen, our great Sovereign, I and all my chiefs send you many greetings. I write this letter to thank you. Thank you exceedingly for sending the representatives of the Company in order to set my country to rights.

When they reached Buganda, at first I did not like them ; I did not think that they could set the country to rights. After we had fought, Captain Lugard wrote me a letter and invited me and restored me to my kingdom ; then he went and invited the Mohammedans as well with whom I had been at war, and brought them back, and gave them a part of the country. But now my country is at peace ; the agents of the Company have arranged it excellently. Now I earnestly beseech you to help me : do not recall the Company from my country. I and my chiefs are under the English flag, as the people of India are under your flag : we desire very very much that the English should arrange this country : should you recall these agents of the Company, my friend, my country is sure to be ruined ; war is sure to come.

Captain Lugard has now brought to terms these three religions : he has returned to England ; he will inform you of the state of affairs in Buganda. But I want you to send this same Captain Lugard back again to Buganda, that he may finish his work of arranging the country ; for he is a man of very great ability, and all the Baganda like him very much ; he is gentle ; his judgments are just and true : and so I want you to send him back to Buganda. So, our friend, persevere in helping us, for we are your people.

May God give you blessing and long life.

I, MWANGA, King of Buganda, and my great chiefs.

(The names of the chiefs in full are added.)

APOLO,	<i>Katikiro.</i>
NIKODEMO,	<i>Sekibobo.</i>
SIMEI,	<i>Kimbugwe.</i>
	<i>Pokino.</i>
YOND,	<i>Mukwenda.</i>
ZAKARIA,	<i>Kangao.</i>
ABDULLA SUDI,	<i>Kitunzi.</i>
MATAYO,	<i>Mujasi.</i>
KAGO.	
MUGEMA.	
KAYIMA.	
KATANBALA.	
KASUJU.	

D.—LETTER FROM MWANGA AND CHIEFS TO THE
DIRECTORS.

(TRANSLATION.)

BUGANDA, MENGU,
June 17th, 1892.

To my friends the Directors of the Company in England,—I and all my chiefs send you many greetings. My friends, many many thanks for sending so able a man, as this Captain Lugard, to arrange my country. My friends, at first when the agents of the Company arrived in Buganda, at first I did not like them: I thought they had come to ruin my country. But after we had fought, Captain Lugard wrote me a letter, and invited me back and restored me to my kingdom. Then Captain Lugard went and brought the Mohammedans as well as those with whom I had been at war, and brought them back into Buganda, and gave them a part of the country. Now Buganda has been settled and is at peace.

Captain Lugard has returned to England: he will inform you of all affairs in Buganda. But, my friends, I beseech you do not cease from helping me; I want you to send a number of Europeans to Buganda to settle it. Do not be grieved by the thought that there are no profits in Buganda; "our outlay will be without returns": it is not so: I tell you so, because of late what has been making ivory scarce in the country has been the late war; and now Captain Lugard has succeeded in bringing the three religions to terms: he has settled the country; and the Company will make profits.

My friends, I and my chiefs agreed to be under the Company's flag: we want the Company to help us to settle this country, and to occupy it in force. Should you at present recall your forces from Buganda, the country is ruined; there will be war again. Therefore I pray you not to cease from helping us Baganda; for we are your people. Further, we ask you, our friends, to bring us guns for sale and useful articles.

May God help you ever to wise decisions in respect to this our country Buganda.

I am your friend who loves you,

MWANGA, King of Buganda, and my great chiefs.

(*The names in full of the chiefs are added.*)

APOLO,	<i>Katikiro.</i>
SIMEI,	<i>Kimbugwe.</i>
NIKODEMO,	<i>Sekibobo.</i>
	<i>Pokino.</i>
YONA,	<i>Mukwenda.</i>
ZAKARIA,	<i>Kangao.</i>

ABDULLA SUDI, *Kitnnzi*.

MATAYO, *Mujasi*.

KAGO.

MUGEMA.

KAYIMA.

KATAMBALA.

KASUJU.

But we the Protestant chiefs were annoyed with Captain Lugard. It is the small matter about which we wrote to the Elders of the Church (*Church Missionary Society*) to tell you the Directors of the Company, to give us another man, who might, perhaps, please us. But a short time afterwards he (Captain Lugard) settled the matter which had annoyed us, and pleased both us and those of all religions in Buganda, as well as those who do not know how to read. Now he is the friend of all of us who are in Buganda. This is why we have written that you should send him back a second time to Buganda.

E.—EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM CAPTAIN LUGARD,
DATED UGANDA, JAN. 5TH, 1892.

EVACUATION.

“My second half-yearly Report, dated August 24th, 1891, had not reached the Directors at the time their decision of withdrawal (in August, 1891) was made. I am in hopes that the lines therein indicated for developing the country, and the hopes expressed that it may be found capable of bringing in substantial returns when this development of its commercial resources may have taken place, will largely modify their views, and prove to them that no less in the interests of their shareholders than on the broader grounds of Imperial policy, responsibility for the fulfilment of pledges entered into by their accredited agent—and the preservation of the good faith and honour of the British—the retention of Uganda is imperative. By this mail I forward my third half-yearly Report, and from it the Directors will learn that free access to a country abounding in ivory has now been secured; that the Salt Lake (in my opinion of more value than a gold mine of ordinary yield, since the distance from the coast and cost of transport, fuel, &c., would preclude the working of anything except the most fabulously rich quartz) has been secured, and is now the site of a station which promises to bring in substantial returns, and that access to the trade of the Albert Lake has also been secured, and that while obtaining these advantages very heavy responsibilities have been entered into, and protection pledged to a

helpless people (in Toru) who, on the withdrawal of that protection, would be left to certain destruction. These considerations will, I hope, support the Directors in their noble resolve to retain their hold on Uganda and its sister countries, and the possession of these facts will, I hope, enable them so to represent the case both to their shareholders and the British public that there may be no difficulty in raising the required capital to carry on the work on which the Company have embarked in these countries.

"As regards the withdrawal of the Company from Uganda," he continues, "I will briefly state what in my opinion would be the immediate results of such a step, disregarding the remoter contingencies :—(a) In the first place the Protestant party would leave the country with us. This they have always distinctly intimated from the time I first arrived. This means the total break up of the Protestant Mission in Uganda. Secondly, the Catholics are quite unable to defy the Mohammedan party by themselves, and in all probability would fly at once, without engaging the latter. An understanding between these two parties is impossible. The immediate result of our withdrawal would therefore be anarchy, and the rehabilitation of the Mohammedan Raj, accompanied by a terrible amount of bloodshed, and vast numbers of people sold into slavery, as is the custom of the Waganda Mohammedans. (b) Further, our withdrawal from Southern Unyoro and Toru would mean the wholesale massacre of all those people who, relying on our pledges of protection, have sided with us. This massacre would be similar to that made by Kabrega on the Egyptian withdrawal from Mruli, &c. Ntali, King of Ankoli, has also (relying on our treaty) prevented powder passing through his country to Kabrega and the Mohammedans, and thereby incurred their active hostility. (c) We are pledged here by all the binding force of a treaty to maintain a Resident in the country and protect the King. We are equally bound to Ankoli and to Toru. Both by treaty and by repeated verbal pledges that we should infallibly remain I have involved at once the Company's honour and my own, and also that of the British nation, since these people are aware that I am an officer holding the Queen's commission, and being unable to discriminate between the Imperial Government and chartered Companies, they look on me as sent by the Queen and on my pledges as emanating from her gracious Majesty herself."

F.—EXTRACT FROM A SPEECH BY MR. H. M. STANLEY AT
SWANSEA, OCT. 1st, 1892.

THE ownership of the coast-line included the right to an indefinite extent of Hinterland, or the inland region. I consider that the British Company showed sound commercial judgment in the bargain they made with the Sultan, and that they performed a great service to the Empire besides. The investment with ordinary care was as good as buying consols, for the Company took over a known revenue with its responsibility for an annual subsidy which satisfied the Sultan, and left a fair margin of profit in the Company's hands. But the Company unfortunately allowed themselves to be persuaded by Government and the Press to extend their operations into that indefinite interior called the "British sphere of influence." It was urged on them that, according to the Berlin Conference, they were bound to prove their right to the Hinterland by treaties with the native chiefs and elders; otherwise any foreign adventurer might proceed thither and annex the whole region to within ten miles of the coast. The examples of Germany, the Congo State, and the British South African Company were pointed out to them, and it was said that it was un-English to squat by the seaside while the pearl of Africa invited them to its possession. Moved by these specious arguments and probably by something more, the Directors left their safe and profitable business on the coast for adventure in the great sphere of influence. Then began a race of British treaty makers and German adventurers. Expedition after expedition left the Coast, which involved the expenditure of scores of thousands. The British finally crossed over to Uganda, and massed an imposing force there, the supplies for which cost £300 a ton for conveyance. In an incredibly brief time the territory of the Company had expanded from a strip of coast, 450 miles by 10, into one embracing three quarters of a million of square miles. Meantime, you must remember, the British Government had parted with Heligoland to Germany for the right and privilege to absorb this spacious African territory. Now, we presume that there must have been some kind of an understanding between the Government and the Directors, otherwise I, for one, fail to see how half-a-million capital could support such a vast enterprise—as, for instance, maintaining hundreds of troops in Uganda, and forcibly interfering in the affairs of powerful African nations, deposing kings and parting an African Empire among rival religious missions. If Governmental support was promised it has been so long delayed that the Directors have arrived at nearly the end of their resources, and they will be obliged to withdraw from Uganda at the end of the year. No care has been taken for the poor missionaries, who will be left behind, or for the ten thousand Protestants, and the thousands of Roman Catholics, whose former friendly rivalry has become a mutual passionate hate.

CAN WE REMAIN INDIFFERENT?

And, gentlemen, though the Directors may be philosophical enough not to regret the loss of their capital, I am anxious to know whether this nation can remain indifferent to what has happened, or rather to what must happen in a certain contingency. If we abandon the sphere of influence, then we have yielded Heligoland to the Germans to no purpose, our pledges made in the face of all Europe at the Brussels Conference two years ago remain unredeemed, the late outlay for the survey of the Nyanza Railway will have been wasted, the capital of the East African Company will have been spent in vain, £100,000 spent on the mission in Uganda will have been lost, and the missionaries' and the pioneers' labours and lives will have been sacrificed uselessly, and a powerful nation, and a beautiful country will have been ruined. Gentlemen, I am bound to ask your sympathy and influence on behalf of the Protestant Mission in Uganda, their thousands of converts, and also for the Catholics, Mohammedans and heathen in that country, who will be engaged in mutual slaughter presently if the Government remains longer indifferent. I am also impelled to plead with you to use such influence as you possess on behalf of the weaker tribes who on the retirement of the British must become the victims of the Arab slavers. You have heard how the efforts of the British cruisers for the suppression of the slave traffic along the African coast have been crowned with success. (Cheers.) The occupation of the coast by German and British troops has made it impossible in the future, and the Arab slave traders have been compelled to carry their nefarious trade into the far interior. They may be found at present in the central and western parts of the East African territory, and to the north-west and south-west of the German sphere. The slave trade is not dead, it is only removed to a safer locality where they may continue the hunt for the defenceless native with impunity. One of the principal objects of the Brussels Conference was to pursue the slave-trader into the interior of the Continent, and as the slave-supplying area has been absorbed by the European powers, the true method of dealing with the hideous evil and totally extinguishing it became clear and comparatively easy. Great Britain, France, Germany, and Belgium, the powers most concerned, undertook to make roads, especially railroads through their respective African territories, by which means the final blow would be given to the murderous slave-hunt and slave trade. Belgium was the first power to move in the matter. Her railway is being constructed to the Upper Congo, and the Congo River gives her access into the slave nursery of Manyema and the Aruwimi Forest. She already possesses 32 steamers which police the Congo and its tributaries most effectually, and along the river banks she has a chain of fortified stations. The news that you hear occasionally of encounters with the slavers proves that the

civilising forces have come in contact with them. France followed Belgium and with the annual subsidy of £60,000 voted by the Chambers, is protecting her territory and consolidating her possessions. French steamers patrol the Congo and Mubangi, and French troops have reached 6 degrees N. latitude. The third to advance has been Germany. She has expended about £100,000 a year. Her stations are on the Victoria Nyanza, and her lake cruisers are on the way to the Nyassa and the Tanganika. The last to move has been Great Britain. She has secured the Zambesi, and Nyassa Lake against the slavers, but in British East Africa the case is as I have told you. The Chartered Company to whom she delegated her authority are about to withdraw to the coast at the end of the year, and British East Africa is to revert, I suppose, into its pristine barbarism and to its former uses, viz., to supply slaves to the Arabs. Gentlemen, during the last 25 years Great Britain has maintained a naval squadron on the East African coast at an expense of £4,000,000. The occupation of the squadron is gone. The cruisers are now idly sailing up and down the coast, for the littoral traffic in slaves is extinct.

WHAT STANLEY PROPOSES TO DO.

I propose that operations should be resumed on Lake Victoria, that the Lake shores might be rendered as free from the desolating influences of slavery as the sea coast. I propose that we should follow Germany's example, and launch a couple of tiny gunboats on Lake Victoria. But it will be first necessary to construct the Mombasa and Victoria Nyanza Railway, for the survey of which route Parliament recently voted £20,000, and which survey has been completed satisfactorily, the surveyor being now on his road home. Gentleman, a verbal declaration of emancipation for slaves is not enough. We cannot any longer boast that the slave who sets foot on British soil is free, if we remain indifferent to the condition of affairs in Eastern Africa. Lincoln's famous proclamation of freedom was followed by a collective force of a million rifles. The decree of the Czar who freed his serfs, became operative through his vast military power which carried the edict into effect. Tons of British gold backed by the Navy of Britain, gave force to the Parliamentary Act for the abolition of slavery in the West Indies. The Declaration of Freedom to the slaves on British African Territory must in like manner be followed by substantial effort, or we become false to our pledges. The nation, which hitherto has been foremost in the championing of the slave, will surely not be the most backward when all Europe is stirring. To illustrate the slow growth of ideas among nations, I will quote you a portion of a speech delivered by the great Pitt, a hundred years ago. Lord Granville, Bishop Wilberforce, and Sir Bartle Frere in 1873, and Lord Salisbury in 1890 made some eloquent speeches about the obnoxious slave traffic and our duties in regard to it; but they bear no comparison in

grandeur of sentiment and nobleness of expression with that delivered by William Pitt in 1792.

A QUOTATION FROM PITT.

Said he : "Grieved am I to think that there should be a single person in this country, much more that there should be a single member of the British Parliament, who can look on the present dark, uncultivated, and uncivilised state of Africa as a ground for continuing the slave trade, as a ground for not only refusing to attempt the improvement of that continent, but even for hindering and interrupting every ray of light which might otherwise break in upon it, as a ground for refusing to it the common chance and the common means with which other nations have been blessed, of emerging from their native barbarism. It has been alleged that Africa labours under a natural incapacity for civilisation, that it is enthusiasm of fanaticism to think that she can ever enjoy the knowledge and morals of Europe, that Providence never intended her to rise above barbarism, that Providence has irrevocably doomed her to be only a nursery for slaves. Allow of this principle as applied to Africa and I should be glad to know why it might not also have been applied to ancient and uncivilised Britain. Why might not some Roman Senator have predicted with equal boldness—'There is a people destined never to be free, a people depressed by the hand of Nature below the level of the human species, and created to form a supply of slaves for the rest of the world!' Sir, we were once as obscure among the nations of the earth, as debased in our morals, as savage in our manners, as degraded in our understanding, as these unhappy Africans are at present. But in the lapse of a long series of years, by a progression slow, and for a time, almost imperceptible, we have become rich in a variety of acquirements, favoured above measure with the gifts of Providence, unrivalled in commerce, pre-eminent in arts, foremost in the pursuits of philosophy and science, and established in all the blessings of civilised society. But had other nations applied to Great Britain the reasoning which some gentlemen now apply to Africa ages might have passed without our emerging from barbarism, and we might even at this hour have been little superior in morals, in knowledge, or in refinement to the rude inhabitants of Guinea. If we shudder to think of the misery which would still have overwhelmed us had Britain continued to the present time as she once was, God forbid that we should any longer subject Africa to the same dreadful scourge, and preclude the light of knowledge which has reached every quarter of the globe from having access to her coasts." Gentlemen, I could not resist the temptation to quote from such a master of English oratory what so eloquently and felicitously expresses my own thoughts and ideas upon the subject. A hundred years have passed since Pitt spoke, and we find

knowledge and consent of the Company's representative in Uganda (hereinafter called "the Resident").

Clause 3. The Resident, as arbitrator, shall decide all disputes and all differences between Europeans in Uganda. All lands acquired by Europeans in Uganda shall be subject to his consent and approval and shall be registered in his office. All arms in possession of Europeans and their followers shall be marked and registered by the Resident. His decision in all matters connected with Europeans shall be final, and subject only to appeal to the higher authorities of the Company. All employees of the Company shall be solely under the orders of the Resident.

Clause 4. The consent of the Resident shall be obtained, and his counsel taken by the King, before any war is undertaken, and in all grave and serious affairs and matters of the State, such as the appointment of chiefs to the higher offices, the assessment of taxes, &c.

Clause 5. Missionaries, viz., those solely engaged in preaching the Gospel and in teaching the arts and industries of civilisation, shall be free to settle in the country, of whatever creed they may be, and their religious rights and liberties shall be respected. There shall be perfect freedom of worship. No one shall be compelled to follow any religion against his will.

Clause 6. The property of the Company and its employees, and all servants of the Company, shall be free from the incidence of all taxes.

Clause 7. The revenues of the country shall defray, as may be found feasible, the money expended purely on the development and organisation of the country, the expenses of its garrisons, &c. For such objects the King shall supply labour and give every facility.

Clause 8. All arms in the country shall be registered, and a licence given for them. Unregistered arms shall be liable to confiscation. The importation of arms and munitions is prohibited.

Clause 9. Traders of all nations shall be free to come to Uganda, provided they do not import or offer for sale goods prohibited by international agreement.

Clause 10. Slave-trading or slave-raiding, or the exportation or importation of people for sale or exchange as slaves, is prohibited.

Clause 11. The Company will uphold the power and honour of the King, and the display of this Court shall be maintained.

Clause 12. This treaty shall be binding in perpetuity, or until cancelled or altered by the consent and mutual agreement of both parties to it.

Dated Kampala, this 30th day of March, 1892.

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,

Captain 9th Regiment,

Offg. Resident in Uganda, I. B. E. A. Co.

(Sd.) MWANGA, × (his mark), *Kabaka of Uganda.*

Witnesses.—I certify that the signature of Mwanga was made in my presence, and was of his own free will.

(Sd.) W. H. WILLIAMS,
11th April, 1892. *Captain Royal Artillery.*

(Sd.) KATIKIRO APOLLO KAGWA, *Katikiro of Uganda.*

(Sd.) KIMBUGWE KAGO, *Mugema.* ("Kimbugwe" is Sebwtu, late Pokino, now Sekibobo, temporarily acting Kimbugwe.)

× Mark of SEBOA, *Pokino* (R.C.).

× Mark of SEYATIMBA, late *Kago* (R.C.).

Witness to signatures. (Sd.) S. S. BAGGE.

(*Swahili.*)

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,
Captain 9th Regiment,
Commanding Uganda for I. B. E. A. Co.

MWANGA, × (his mark).

I certify that the signature of Mwanga above was made in my presence and was of his own free will.

(Sd.) W. H. WILLIAMS,
11th April, 1892. *Captain Royal Artillery.*

× Mark of SEBOA, *Pokino* (R.C.), present rank, late *Sekibobo*.

× Mark of SEMATIMBA, late *Kago* (R.C.).

I certify that the above marks were made in my presence this the 7th day of May, 1892, of their own free will.

(Sd.) S. S. BAGGE.

Mark of DUWALIRA, *Kaugao*.

Mark of MUEPI, *Mnjasi*.

Name of ABDALLAH, *Pokino*.

Mark of SEKIRU, *Mugema*.

Mark of LUTALAH, *Mutasa*.

Name of ABDAL, *Aziz*.

Mark of WAMALA, *Sekibobo*.

Mark of KAMIA, *Kimbugwe*.

Mark of KAGO, *Asmani*.

I certify that these signatures or marks have been made in my presence by the principal Mohammedan chiefs—each by the man noted against it—of their own free will, and without compulsion. The titles shown against each are those held by them among the Mohammedans prior to their return to Uganda. The treaty was also read in their presence in the vernacular before the King, in public burza.

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,

Dated Kampala, this 3rd day of June, 1892.

Captain.

C.—TRANSLATION OF LETTER FROM MWANGA TO THE QUEEN.

BUGANDA, MENGGO,
June 17, 1892.

To my friend the Queen, our great Sovereign, I and all my chiefs send you many greetings. I write this letter to thank you. Thank you exceedingly for sending the representatives of the Company in order to set my country to rights.

When they reached Buganda, at first I did not like them; I did not think that they could set the country to rights. After we had fought, Captain Lugard wrote me a letter and invited me and restored me to my kingdom; then he went and invited the Mohammedans as well with whom I had been at war, and brought them back, and gave them a part of the country. But now my country is at peace; the agents of the Company have arranged it excellently. Now I earnestly beseech you to help me: do not recall the Company from my country. I and my chiefs are under the English flag, as the people of India are under your flag: we desire very very much that the English should arrange this country: should you recall these agents of the Company, my friend, my country is sure to be ruined; war is sure to come.

Captain Lugard has now brought to terms these three religions: he has returned to England; he will inform you of the state of affairs in Buganda. But I want you to send this same Captain Lugard back again to Buganda, that he may finish his work of arranging the country; for he is a man of very great ability, and all the Baganda like him very much; he is gentle; his judgments are just and true: and so I want you to send him back to Buganda. So, our friend, persevere in helping us, for we are your people.

May God give you blessing and long life.

I, MWANGA, King of Buganda, and my great chiefs.
(*The names of the chiefs in full are added.*)

APOLO,	<i>Katikiro.</i>
NIKODEMO,	<i>Sekibobo.</i>
SIMEI,	<i>Kimbugwe.</i>
	<i>Pokino.</i>
YOND,	<i>Mukwenda.</i>
ZAKARIA,	<i>Kangao.</i>
ABDULLA SUDI,	<i>Kitunzi.</i>
MATAYO,	<i>Mujasi.</i>
KAGO.	
MUGEMA.	
KAYIMA.	
KATANBALA.	
KASUJU.	

D.—LETTER FROM MWANGA AND CHIEFS TO THE DIRECTORS.

(TRANSLATION.)

BUGANDA, MENGU,
June 17th, 1892.

To my friends the Directors of the Company in England,—I and all my chiefs send you many greetings. My friends, many many thanks for sending so able a man, as this, Captain Lugard, to arrange my country. My friends, at first when the agents of the Company arrived in Buganda, at first I did not like them: I thought they had come to ruin my country. But after we had fought, Captain Lugard wrote me a letter, and invited me back and restored me to my kingdom. Then Captain Lugard went and brought the Mohammedans as well as those with whom I had been at war, and brought them back into Buganda, and gave them a part of the country. Now Buganda has been settled and is at peace.

Captain Lugard has returned to England: he will inform you of all affairs in Buganda. But, my friends, I beseech you do not cease from helping me; I want you to send a number of Europeans to Buganda to settle it. Do not be grieved by the thought that there are no profits in Buganda; "our outlay will be without returns": it is not so: I tell you so, because of late what has been making ivory scarce in the country has been the late war; and now Captain Lugard has succeeded in bringing the three religions to terms: he has settled the country; and the Company will make profits.

My friends, I and my chiefs agreed to be under the Company's flag: we want the Company to help us to settle this country, and to occupy it in force. Should you at present recall your forces from Buganda, the country is ruined; there will be war again. Therefore I pray you not to cease from helping us Baganda; for we are your people. Further, we ask you, our friends, to bring us guns for sale and useful articles.

May God help you ever to wise decisions in respect to this our country Buganda.

I am your friend who loves you,

MWANGA, King of Buganda, and my great chiefs.

(*The names in full of the chiefs are added.*)

APOLO,	<i>Katikiro.</i>
SIMEI,	<i>Kimbugwe.</i>
NIKODEMO,	<i>Sekibobo.</i>
	<i>Pokino.</i>
YONA,	<i>Mukwenda.</i>
ZAKARIA,	<i>Kangao.</i>

ABDULLA SUDI, *Kitnnzi*.

MATAYO, *Mujasi*.

KAGO.

MUGEMA.

KAYIMA.

KATAMBALA.

KASUJU.

But we the Protestant chiefs were annoyed with Captain Lugard. It is the small matter about which we wrote to the Elders of the Church (*Church Missionary Society*) to tell you the Directors of the Company, to give us another man, who might, perhaps, please us. But a short time afterwards he (Captain Lugard) settled the matter which had annoyed us, and pleased both us and those of all religions in Buganda, as well as those who do not know how to read. Now he is the friend of all of us who are in Buganda. This is why we have written that you should send him back a second time to Buganda.

E.—EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM CAPTAIN LUGARD,
DATED UGANDA, JAN. 5TH, 1892.

EVACUATION.

“My second half-yearly Report, dated August 24th, 1891, had not reached the Directors at the time their decision of withdrawal (in August, 1891) was made. I am in hopes that the lines therein indicated for developing the country, and the hopes expressed that it may be found capable of bringing in substantial returns when this development of its commercial resources may have taken place, will largely modify their views, and prove to them that no less in the interests of their shareholders than on the broader grounds of Imperial policy, responsibility for the fulfilment of pledges entered into by their accredited agent—and the preservation of the good faith and honour of the British—the retention of Uganda is imperative. By this mail I forward my third half-yearly Report, and from it the Directors will learn that free access to a country abounding in ivory has now been secured; that the Salt Lake (in my opinion of more value than a gold mine of ordinary yield, since the distance from the coast and cost of transport, fuel, &c., would preclude the working of anything except the most fabulously rich quartz) has been secured, and is now the site of a station which promises to bring in substantial returns, and that access to the trade of the Albert Lake has also been secured, and that while obtaining these advantages very heavy responsibilities have been entered into, and protection pledged to a

helpless people (in Toru) who, on the withdrawal of that protection, would be left to certain destruction. These considerations will, I hope, support the Directors in their noble resolve to retain their hold on Uganda and its sister countries, and the possession of these facts will, I hope, enable them so to represent the case both to their shareholders and the British public that there may be no difficulty in raising the required capital to carry on the work on which the Company have embarked in these countries.

"As regards the withdrawal of the Company from Uganda," he continues, "I will briefly state what in my opinion would be the immediate results of such a step, disregarding the remoter contingencies :—(a) In the first place the Protestant party would leave the country with us. This they have always distinctly intimated from the time I first arrived. This means the total break up of the Protestant Mission in Uganda. Secondly, the Catholics are quite unable to defy the Mohammedan party by themselves, and in all probability would fly at once, without engaging the latter. An understanding between these two parties is impossible. The immediate result of our withdrawal would therefore be anarchy, and the rehabilitation of the Mohammedan Raj, accompanied by a terrible amount of bloodshed, and vast numbers of people sold into slavery, as is the custom of the Waganda Mohammedans. (b) Further, our withdrawal from Southern Unyoro and Toru would mean the wholesale massacre of all those people who, relying on our pledges of protection, have sided with us. This massacre would be similar to that made by Kabrega on the Egyptian withdrawal from Mruli, &c. Ntali, King of Ankoli, has also (relying on our treaty) prevented powder passing through his country to Kabrega and the Mohammedans, and thereby incurred their active hostility. (c) We are pledged here by all the binding force of a treaty to maintain a Resident in the country and protect the King. We are equally bound to Ankoli and to Toru. Both by treaty and by repeated verbal pledges that we should infallibly remain I have involved at once the Company's honour and my own, and also that of the British nation, since these people are aware that I am an officer holding the Queen's commission, and being unable to discriminate between the Imperial Government and chartered Companies, they look on me as sent by the Queen and on my pledges as emanating from her gracious Majesty herself."



extent of Uganda, it may be well for me to state that it occupies a strip of 150 miles along the north-east shore of the Victoria Nyanza, between the Kagera river and the outflow of the Nile, with a depth of 60 miles inland.

Included in the British sphere, by international agreement, are the richer adjacent kingdoms of Ankole and Unyoro in the west, and Usoga in the east, adding importance to the central position of Uganda. For brevity of reference in the Handbook, I have, therefore, merely referred to "Uganda" in its widest meaning.

In conclusion, I would express the hope of so many that, as the subjects which I have endeavoured to treat with absolute impartiality are not *party* questions, they may be considered by our legislators upon their individual merits, and in the truest interests of all concerned.

E. L. B.

68, CLAPTON COMMON, LONDON, N.,

12th November, 1892.

N.B.—In the second line above please read north-west instead of north-east.

APPROXIMATE MILEAGE TABLE.

Runners travel about 16 miles per day.

Heavy caravans travel about $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles per day.

APPROXIMATE DISTANCE TABLE.

Mombasa.				<i>Examples:</i> Mombasa to Baringo 476 miles.				Kikuyu to Nile 300 miles.	
Miles.	296	Machakos.							
"	346	50	Kikuyu.						
"	386	90	40	Naivasha.					
"	476	180	130	90	Baringo.				
"	556	260	210	170	80	Mumias.			
"	616	320	270	230	140	60	Wakolia.		
"	646	350	300	260	170	90	30	Nile.	
"	706	410	360	320	230	150	90	60	Mengo. Uganda

THE OCCUPATION OF UGANDA.

In 1875 Mr. H. M. Stanley's invitation from King Mtesa for missionaries to work in Uganda reached England. The Church Missionary Society responded the next year, Alexander Mackay remaining till his death (in February, 1890). In 1879 Mtesa sent a letter to the Queen, the embassy returning from the coast the following year with an acknowledgment and suitable presents.

In February of that year the French Roman Catholic Mission was established in Uganda. At the close of 1884 the aspirations of the Germans became active, and their designs upon what is now the British sphere more pronounced.—(See introductory remarks to the "Imperial British East Africa Company's Work and Claims.")

German explorers had meantime been at work, and early in 1890 Dr. Carl Peters concluded a treaty with Mwanga, who thereupon despatched a present of two tusks of ivory to the German Emperor. At that time the Imperial British East Africa Company's first caravan was exploring the interior to conclude treaties with the native chiefs, but with definite instructions *not* to enter Uganda. When near the province, however, an urgent appeal—supported by both the Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries—was received from the king for aid in repelling the threatened Mahomedan invasion. Mr. Jackson declined to exceed his orders, but on learning that British interests were threatened by the tactics of Dr. Peters, consented.

Captain Lugard had in the meantime been despatched from the coast to consolidate the position in the interior, and, as a result of these measures, the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 was facilitated, and the political complications imminent from counterclaims were thereby averted.

Early in 1891 a two years' treaty was concluded with the king, renewed in perpetuity on 30th March, 1892, as per Appendix B.

Representative Press Opinions.

"It is the German Government much more than the German traders that is pushing forward the present attempt to secure the whole of Central Africa, as far as the Congo Free State on the west and the Soudan on the north. . . . What the British East Africa Company desires the Government to protect it will first have to win."

"The German Colonial organs unreservedly proclaim that every effort must be made to cut off the British East Africa Company from the interior, and confine their operations to the region between the Coast and Victoria Nyanza." One organ says: "If we are to remain victors we cannot make too much haste to push energetically forward. The Congo State to the west, the Soudan

to the north—these are the boundaries without which East Africa would have hardly any economic value for us. Let us exclude the English.”

“The Imperial British East Africa Company cannot, therefore, afford to lose a single day in pushing their influence to the utmost limit contemplated when they obtained the Charter. What would England have to say if she woke up one morning and found that a German protectorate had been proclaimed over the Southern Soudan?”

“The British East Africa Company seems to have the remedy in its own power to a great extent. Surely it is possible for it to send a strong caravan forward to the great lake.”

Berlin, Sept. 23rd. Dr. Carl Peters (before starting to Central Africa): “What is wanted is to connect Wadelai with the East Coast by a series of stations.”

“It follows that if the British East Africa Company wants to keep open its road to Central and Western Africa, it must convert its influence into concrete facts. The road from Tanganyika to Wadelai, which it is entitled to hold, must be actually held.”

(After speaking of German rivalry): “We may rest assured the Imperial British East Africa Company will let nothing come between it and the legitimate extension of its territory and its trade.”

That German competition no doubt led the Company to push forward with greater speed than was altogether judicious, and to attempt a more imposing show of power than they were able to maintain.

That the forward movement of the Imperial British East Africa Company was quite in keeping with the necessities of Imperial policy.

That in the scramble for Africa the Company secured an indifferent inheritance, and indiscreetly, because precipitately, advanced to Uganda without sufficient resources.

That the Imperial Company, recognising that all theoretical delimitations are worthless, undertook extra-commercial operations in Imperial interests, and pushed forward into Uganda just in time to prevent effective occupation by the Germans of a great territory enclosing the British sphere of influence, and barring all developments westwards to the Congo Free State and northwards to the head-waters of the Nile.

That the Company in occupying Uganda had the direct countenance and support of the British Government, which effected further arrangements with Germany to give stability to the rights asserted by its occupation.

That by effective occupation we should disparage the rights enjoyed by the natives who are the masters of Uganda.

That the chiefs of Uganda have petitioned that they very much want the agents of the Company to stay in their country, and have agreed that it shall be subject to the Queen as she rules all her other dominions.—(See pp. 59, 60.)

That England has no rights over the soil of the native inhabitants.

That the negro of Lake Victoria having failed to advance in thousands of years, it is fair for Europeans to govern him for his own good and that of humanity at large.

That the Company are blamed for going to Uganda without counting the cost; but had they merely remained at the coast as Customs masters it would have aroused the indignation of the country, and the sphere now secured would have passed into foreign hands.

That to blame the Imperial British East Africa Company for their rashness in occupying Uganda is sheer ingratitude, when people, Press and Government incited them to that venture which has exhausted their capital.

That there is no truth whatever in the statement that effective occupation is necessary to retain a "sphere of influence," such being simply mutual arrangements between European Powers.

That according to well-known international agreement, effective occupation is an indispensable condition of the recognition by other nations of the rights claimed by any particular nation in virtue of treaties or agreements over hitherto unoccupied territory.

That the commercial interests of the Company in the immediate advantage of its shareholders were obviously confined to the ten-mile zone comprised in the concession of the Sultan of Zanzibar, but the coast territory, however profitable, would have proved a barren acquisition from a national point of view, unless active measures were adopted to effectively occupy the more extended sphere which in terms of the Charter was placed under its jurisdiction.

NATIONAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS.

The conclusion of the Anglo-German Agreement ceding Heligoland in return, *inter alia*, for the recognition by Germany of the British sphere of influence, renders the Uganda question of *national* importance, apart from the commercial and anti-slavery aspects elsewhere referred to.

The *political* importance of Uganda lies in its central and commanding position, its contiguity to the Soudan, and the control of the fertile districts adjacent to the Nile.

"We, that is I, view it (Uganda District) as a country of great possibilities, as the key perhaps of Central Africa, as commanding the Nile Basin, as a field recently of heroic enterprise, as a land that has been watered by the blood of our saints and martyrs, and I for one, as a Scotchman, can never be indifferent to a land which witnessed the heroic exploits of Alex. Mackay, that Christian Bayard, whose reputation will always be dear, not only in his own immediate Northern Country, but throughout the Empire at large."—Earl of ROSEBURY.

That the relinquishment of Uganda to a civilised Power immediately imperils the safety of Egypt, as the diversion or blocking of the head-waters of the Nile could stop her water supply and starve her population.

That if we abandon Uganda, no negro race on the East of Africa will trust us again, and at the next European Conference we shall stand as a Power which cannot be trusted even to do work we eagerly assumed.

That the good faith of Her Majesty and the honour of the Empire are pledged by the events of the last two years, and in the eyes of the whole region withdrawal would mean disgrace to England.

That the retention of Uganda as a step to the conquest and annexation of the Soudan is a dream from which England might have a rude awakening.

That Uganda is of great Imperial value as a factor in the suppression of the Mahdi, should such a contingency become necessary.

That to hold Uganda brings Great Britain within measurable distance of Khartoum.

That the Company is unworthy of its political position if it

relinquishes Uganda, and is unworthy of its commercial character if it cannot make the opportunity pay.

That the commercial interests of the Company in the immediate advantage of its shareholders are obviously confined to the ten-mile zone comprised in the concession it obtained from the Sultan of Zanzibar; but it is equally obvious that that would be a barren result from a *national* point of view.

That Uganda is not only of great political importance, but possesses the capacity to speedily recoup the initial outlay in establishing an effective occupation.

That if we abandon the sphere of influence, then we have yielded Heligoland to the Germans to no purpose, and our pledges at the Brussels Conference remain unredeemed.

That we cannot indefinitely maintain a political vacuum in our sphere of influence.

That the political results to be anticipated from the work justify the support of our Government.

That those who would relinquish Uganda in consequence of the sectarian conflicts which Captain Lugard patiently endeavoured to avert, must bear in mind that France is represented by 17 of her priests, whose attitude is shown by the following translation of cutting from *Hamburger General Anzeiger*, 8th June, 1892 :—The *Post* to-day brings the following letter regarding the religious feud between the French Catholics and the English Protestants in Uganda: "In the clerical correspondence of the *Evangelischer Bund* (Evangelistic Union Newspaper) an eminent missionary correspondent draws attention to the startling fact that as far back as the beginning of 1891—consequently before the recent lamentable events in Uganda—Father Achte threw a sidelight on the situation by writing in an unguarded moment to the Catholic periodical, *So Gott Will*, as follows: 'The fight with the Mussulmans was hardly over before it became needful to begin another and far more arduous battle with the Protestants. It seemed to us to be the most opportune time to make an energetic forward movement towards the extension of Catholicism and stirring up the dogmatic zeal of the Catholic chiefs. I shall inspire the Catholic army with courage.'"

That the retention of Uganda would not directly benefit the Company, but is rather an international question involving grave political issues.

That to annex a country where religion breaks heads and commerce empties pockets, would be socially disastrous and politically insane.

That the commercial advantages of Uganda are things we may take or leave; but the political and philanthropic aspects of the case touch our honour, our reputation, and our moral responsibilities.

That the country will not submit to its credit being dragged through the mud at the feet of an unpatriotic clique, whose views of politics extend no further than their own back gardens.

ENGLAND'S RESPONSIBILITY.

In the introductory remarks to the preceding sections reference is made to the Anglo-German Agreement. This defines—as between the two Powers—their respective specified spheres of influence. It is argued that, in virtue of that agreement, Great Britain incurred moral and national responsibilities she cannot now relinquish, particularly in view of the obligations incurred under the Brussels Act alluded to under the Slavery section of this Handbook.

“That Great Britain which willed the end without providing the means; which chose the instrument without taking steps to make it fit for its work, is itself responsible for the actual situation it now has to deal with.”—TIMES.

That the present situation of Uganda is the necessary result of that African policy which Lord Granville initiated in 1885.

That Great Britain having acquired a sphere of influence by international agreement, to the exclusion of other Powers, is bound to take steps to establish her influence by effective administration. She has delegated her authority to a Chartered Company, as by the Brussels Conference she was permitted to do, and has thereby chosen an instrument to carry out the civilisation of the part of Africa allotted to her. The Company thus became a branch of the British Government. A Chartered Company is, indeed, so much a Government Department that it is prohibited to have any monopoly in trade; it is subject to the British Foreign Office, and by its position is the accredited representative of the supreme power

That if the Imperial British East Africa Company had been merely founded on a trading basis, and with no other object than to obtain a dividend, what was the meaning of the diplomatic negotiations which resulted in the Anglo-German Agreement? *

That money should not be granted towards the retention of Uganda, for if the Company succeeds private individuals reap the advantage; but if it fails—according to the doctrine of national responsibility—the matter is one for the public generally.

That the Government in weighing the Uganda question must keep prominently in view Captain Lugard's words concerning his action there, namely:—

“ I pledged not ‘merely the Company's honour and my own but also that of the British nation, as those people are aware that I am an officer holding the Queen's commission, and are unable to discriminate between the Imperial Government and the Chartered Company. They have looked upon me as a representative of the Queen, and on my pledges as if made by Her Majesty herself.”

Mwanga's letter to Her Majesty is ample confirmation of this statement.—(See Appendix C.)

That, having declared before Europe our intention of including Uganda within our effective occupation, we cannot shelve the responsibility we have incurred for them as well as for our own missionaries.

That if Government sits quiet and allows the evacuation of Uganda, the results may issue in it being hooted into a huge expedition.

That it may be said we are not responsible for native tribes in the interior—neither are we if we stay away; but if we choose to burst into their midst to upset all their rude politics and to originate disturbances of various kinds over hundreds of thousands of square miles, then our responsibility becomes very real indeed.

That, whatever circumstances contributed to the present aspect of the Uganda question, the present Government is in a position to avert the consequences. We have to study, not the cause, but the cure.

That the Government should not subsidise a Company over which it has no control.—(See concluding clause of Charter, Appendix A.)

* NOTE.—This agreement effected the withdrawal of German territorial claims within the present British sphere in return for the cession to them of Heligoland.

That the natives know only England in the question of occupation, and England must accept the responsibility and suffer the disgrace of the consequences if it abandons the task it was so clamorous to undertake when the colonial fever was at its height.

That the Uganda question is no upholding of one party and abusing another; but whether in the name of humanity alone we can abandon to certain massacre those people who have trusted us.—(See Appendix E.)

That the Government have not acted fairly in despatching gun-boats to Nyassa and Tanganyika and at the same time neglecting the more important Victoria Nyanza.

*That Great Britain can only be asked to assist the British East Africa Company if the lives of British subjects are endangered by withdrawal.**

That the Home Government under the sovereign company system avoids no real responsibility, and incurs just as heavy a burden as if it had undertaken the administration of our newly-acquired sphere of influence.

That England is bound to retain her hold over all the territory which is included in her sphere by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890.

That if the national interests concerned are worth preserving, it is for the nation to undertake the work and pay the cost.

That Uganda is universally recognised as within the British sphere, therefore, whether the Chartered Company withdraws or not, the obligations Great Britain incurred under the Brussels Act demand fulfilment, either by direct administration, or, as provided in the Act, through a Chartered Company.

That no blame attaches to the British Government in connection with the evacuation of Uganda, as the Chartered Company went there and will withdraw on their own responsibility.

That the country cannot dissociate itself from the Company, nor ought any political pedantry to be allowed to conceal the fact that our national honour and national interests are as completely involved as if the whole business had been managed directly from Downing Street. The natives of the interior cannot be taught to draw distinctions between a British Chartered Company and the British Government.

* No such assisted evacuation has ever been solicited by the Company.

THE RETENTION OF UGANDA.

The retention of Uganda by Great Britain is urged on account of its inclusion within her sphere, the moral and national obligations incurred thereby, and the disastrous consequences evacuation would entail.—(See Slavery section.)

“We are bound to maintain that continuity of moral policy which Great Britain cannot afford at any time or in any dispensation to disregard.”—Earl of ROSEBURY.

That Lord Salisbury may claim the credit of securing the East African sphere, but Lord Rosebery can obtain the credit of developing it.

That Uganda is to the commercial development of Central Africa what the Suez Canal is to the trade of the East.

That the philanthropy, patriotism, and pacific administration of the East Africa Company in the past justify the confidence of the nation in the fulfilment of any duties hereafter delegated to it.

That if public advantage would be promoted by continuing in Uganda, and the occupation repay the cost, they would be strong arguments.—(See Commercial Aspect and Appendix D.)

That whatever decision may be arrived at in regard to Uganda, it should extinguish the British East Africa Company and transfer any territories it is considered advisable to keep to the direct administration of the Government, which is as directly responsible for the Company's management as if no buffer existed between itself and the African dependencies.

That Uganda should enjoy Home Rule.—(See Appendix D.)

That the Imperial British East Africa Company found Uganda in a state of anarchy, and have substituted peace.—(See Appendix C.)

That the country should not be robbed of its freedom of decision and of action because a Chartered Company has undertaken more than it could accomplish.

That the heritage of the future, combined with the present position of affairs, seems to justify a grant for the administrative

expenditure of Uganda, since not more than £40,000 per annum at most will be required, and even that only for a limited period.

That the question before Government is, whether all the rights in the share of East Africa now assigned to this nation are to disappear with the exhaustion of the British East Africa Company's resources.

That the Imperial British East Africa Company became the informal but none the less authorised instrument for giving reality and validity to the diplomatic arrangements of the State.

That as the Company do not get any revenue out of Uganda, but hold it for the good of the nation and for the preservation of peace and order between rival sects which would deluge Uganda with blood, they are entitled to the sympathy of the nation.

That if we stay in Uganda, let us govern, and if we go, let us give up talking nonsense about "spheres of influence" and keeping a nominal claim to sovereignty over countries for which we do nothing.

That if the Government interferes to take up what the Company throws down, it must interfere for the general interest, not for that of a particular set of private speculators.

That it is notorious that the founders of the Imperial British East Africa Company were actuated by patriotic feelings, and are, therefore, entitled to patriotic treatment, and cannot equitably be classed with commercial adventurers.

That the Liberal Government should take good care that nothing is done which will involve the nation in responsibility for the British East Africa Company's acts, or make Great Britain heirs or legatees of its entanglements.

That the aims of the British East Africa Company are Imperial, and that so far as its Charter is concerned its advantages to the Company are merely prospective.

That it is no good arguing how the occupation of Uganda arose; the present aspect demands a continuance of the British flag in the province.

That no doubt the security for toleration and peace in Uganda rests in the presence of the Company's agents; but to ask that the Government should afford such aid as will enable them to continue there is altogether out of the question.

That the Imperial British East Africa Company is entitled to

the sympathetic support of the nation, having freed hundreds of slaves, broken up slave caravans, punished the captors, scoured out these traders from Masai, Kavirondo, and Usoga, arrested ruin in Uganda, terminated its religious rivalry, pacified the Mahomedan and heathen parties, diminished the Uganda Nero's conceit, and built a number of military stations, maintained jurisdiction in Uganda, and instituted a statute book, concluded pacific treaties with about eighty chiefs to ensure the safety of travellers, and civilised and developed the entire East African littoral.

That the Company wish to keep the coast, but surrender the far interior to the British taxpayer.

That it would be absurd to expect the shareholders to continue paying out money with no prospect of getting value for it, however benevolent they are at heart.

That it would be a profound misfortune if Great Britain were to give evidence of a hesitating temper in carrying out the work she has undertaken in Central Africa.

That there is no revenue anywhere in any country until there is decent Government, and there can be no decent Government in tropical Africa without some preliminary expenditure, both of treasure and life.

That the Company can justly claim Imperial support, having fulfilled the important duties embodied in the instructions to the Imperial Commissioner, as follows: "To endeavour to make the British influence felt by the natives; to maintain peace and order; to develop legitimate trade; to secure the safe circulation of traders and travellers; and, generally, to pave the way for conferring on the natives the benefits of civilisation."

That without a subvention the proprietors—who have already shown extraordinary munificence in the cause of freedom and civilisation—cannot proceed.

THE REPRESSION OF SLAVE TRADE.

"This country will stand when all else has passed away, not by her fleets or her armies or her commerce, other nations have these, but by the heroic self-denying exertions which she has put forward to crush the iniquitous slave traffic. My belief is that, having put our hands to the plough in that great enterprise, we shall not be able, even if we were willing, to look back."—Earl of ROSEBURY.

That the late King Mtesa once told the missionary Mackay that if he had only a few white men to teach his people how to produce articles of trade, he could soon put down slave trading.

That as we cannot, like the Arabs, take payment in slaves, we must teach the people to produce other things that we can take.

That it is doubtful whether the recrudescence of slavery will be a consequence of retirement from Uganda, and even if it be, much as it may be regretted, Great Britain must have regard to the measure of her responsibilities and the extent of her power to meet them.—(See Appendix E.)

"The greatest curse that affects humanity in Central Africa is slavery and the slave trade. This is the withering blight that stifles in the soul of the African every rising aspiration after a higher life and a nobler existence. One great instrument in the destruction of that vile traffic will, I venture to think, be the construction of the railway."—Bishop TUCKER.

That the reliance on the incidental co-operation of the State did not wholly rest on the broad ground of the national interest in the enterprise, but very confidently on the special one of the conclusion of an international agreement directed to the suppression of slavery.

That the callous surrender of fertile countries and intelligent peoples to the tender mercies of the Arab slave trader would be unworthy of the British nation.

"That it is within and near British territory where the horrors of the slave trade are experienced at their worst."—Mr. STANLEY at Swansea, 3rd October, 1892.

That the alternative proposals before the nation are whether Great Britain shall (A) capture a few hundred slaves a year, by expending from £100,000 to £200,000 per annum in slave cruisers, or (B) apply that sum to the establishment of an effective

administration which would stamp out the evil at its seat, and at the same time be ample to stimulate our industrial centres by the promotion and requirements of guaranteed railways, which in the case of India have proved so beneficial and self-supporting.

That the slave-supplying area has been absorbed by the European Powers, and England is now discussing whether she shall relinquish her trust.

That Great Britain convened the Brussels Conference, and undertook to institute certain measures for the suppression of slavery, but it was expressly stipulated that their execution might be delegated to Chartered Companies. Are the shareholders to perform such national duties at their own cost?

That should any indirect advantage accrue to the coast administration by the retention of Uganda, the public may rest assured that such advantage would be directly used for the good of that administration and of the country included under it, and be of paramount importance in the suppression of the export of slaves by sea along the littoral.

That we have secured the dominance of the lake, and rather than spend £100,000 a year upon it, we, with Zanzibar rising into a wealthy colony, and an entrepôt for the whole of East Africa, debate surrendering everything to the merchants of Jeddah, who deal in human flesh.

That it is to be regretted the Africans in their native jungle are given to enslave or eat each other; but why should we take upon ourselves to reform these local habits instead of looking closer at home?

That the evacuation of Uganda is equivalent to the granting by this nation of a new lease to the slave trade, upon the suppression of which many millions of English money have been spent.

That the Company's officers, having induced even the Mahomedans in the Uganda district to abolish slavery, are deserving of support from all parties in its fulfilment.—(See Appendix B.)

That the question is, "Shall Great Britain stand by, and for the sake of a *temporary* expenditure of a few thousands a year, pending the development of a newly-acquired and valuable territory, placidly hand over its dependents to slavery?"

That when ivory is brought to the coast from Central Africa the slaves are collected and used as porters to bring it down, and on arrival at the coast are a marketable commodity.

That the slave trade has flourished because "black ivory" is such an excellent investment.

*That no slave routes exist in the British sphere on the way to the lake.**

"But the place where slave caravans still go, and where it is of great importance that we should stay them, is the tract which lies between this great Victoria Nyanza and the Eastern Coast of Africa."—Lord SALISBURY at Glasgow, 20th May, 1891.

That the present repression of slavery in Uganda under the Imperial British East Africa Company should be contrasted with the following statement of Père Lourdel, residing there in 1888: "These Arab slavers reside for a part of the year at the court of Mwanga to purchase the slaves which the king causes to be hunted and captured, either in his own territories or in those of his neighbours. He often sends out on these slave raids armies of several thousand men. At too frequent intervals the missionaries to their grief see these victorious armies returning, driving before them troops of slaves, often 3,000 or 4,000 at a single time. The king selects those he wants to keep for himself or to distribute among his great chiefs, and sends the rest to the Moslem slave dealers."

That some 20 years ago the export of slaves from the East Coast of Africa was reckoned at about 20,000 per annum, but whilst this export trade has almost ceased, it is notorious the import trade from the interior still continues.

The Uganda question is, after all, a matter of money *versus* human butchery and enslavement.

That in the British sphere women and children are enslaved to be bartered for cotton goods, beads, wire, and gunpowder and arms to Manyema slave dealers.

"The only commerce that exists in Uganda is entirely in the hands of the Arabs and the half-breeds from Zanzibar. They import guns and powder, cottons, and a few goods of European origin, and take away in exchange ivory and slaves. At least 1,000 natives annually are thus sold to the Arabs."

That we have handed over to a large extent our responsibility of developing our British sphere to a Chartered Company, yet

* Captain Lugard passing up captured a slave caravan, liberating 18 slaves and imprisoning the captors. Fifteen girls were in slave sticks.

slavery has flourished in the employment of that Chartered Company.* †

That the Company was in no way specially charged with duties connected with the repression of the slave trade.†

That the surrender of Uganda would frustrate the efforts against slavery in the Lake Tanganyika District, and imperil the lives of British missionaries.

That the extent to which the Company is bound by the Brussels Act will not stand a moment's investigation.

"Under the Act of the Brussels Conference we are bound to do our utmost to prevent the passage of slaves across the territory that we have undertaken."—Lord SALISBURY at Glasgow, 20th May, 1891.

That the slave trade routes do not go through the British East Africa Company's territory.‡

That slave trading existed is apparent from the following extract of a letter from Captain Williams, dated Mengo (Uganda), 4th October, 1891 :—

"It may interest you to know that a few days ago I got the king to issue orders against the sale of slaves across the border. Messengers were sent all over the country, and yesterday a case was brought up to be dealt with at the next *baraza* (council)."

That the Imperial British East Africa Company has no more right to ask the Government to guarantee a railway than other Chartered Companies.

"The Mombasa-Victoria Nyanza Railway will place you in command of the valley of the Nile, so that slaves will not be able to cross thence to the Red Sea."—Lord SALISBURY at Glasgow, 20th May, 1891.

* MEMO.—The Company does not pay the Arab masters, but pays the wages direct to the porters, who may or may not be domestic slaves, their status as such being, of necessity, recognised within the dominions of the Sultan of Zanzibar in virtue of existing treaties.

† NOTE.—Clause 10 of the Royal Charter states :—"The Company shall to the best of its power discourage, and so far as may be practicable and as may be consistent with existing treaties between non-African Powers and Zanzibar, abolish by degrees any system of slave trade or domestic servitude in the Company's territories."

‡ NOTE.—The map used in Parliament during the Railway Survey Debate, the production of which was unknown to the Company, showed nine routes.

That the Company has rendered valuable public service in bringing about arrangements which will eventually result in great economies to the State by the reduction of the annual slave vote.

COLONIAL EXPANSION.

It is urged that, of the few remaining undeveloped portions of the globe, British East Africa is the most hopeful and valuable field for the extension of British enterprise and colonisation, and peculiarly suitable for the relief of the congested districts of India.

"Trade follows the flag, for the flag points the way to enterprise. A new way creates a new field, and the builders of empires possess a keen scent for the resources of trade. We must sow before we reap and plant before we gather."—Mr. H. M. STANLEY at Swansea, 3rd October, 1892.

That a single improvement in the manufacture of textiles, an invention such as Bessemer's, a treaty of commerce with a second-class European Power, would yield more money than an attempt to extend trade in a barbarous country by annexation or conquest.

That if people view with alarm lest the operations of the Company may end in the growth of an Empire, why did we look for a "sphere of influence"?

That England has enough on her hands without being the first to try all the large, risky, and expensive experiments in tropical Africa.

That the Uganda question is merely whether a sphere of influence should be turned into a territorial acquisition—a fertile dependency of this country.

That the burdens so Quixotic an enterprise would impose, and the measureless responsibilities it would entail, would be in no degree compensated by the mere territorial extension of the Empire.

That the Imperial British East Africa Company has converted the vagueness of a "sphere of influence" into an effective occupation.

That no substantial argument has been adduced which appeals to the minds of the masses of people of this country.

That Empire means trade, and trade means employment for the masses.

The nation is asked not only to take over the work which the Imperial British East Africa Company has failed to accomplish, but to re-enter on a career of annexation and conquest, or of protectorates which look in that direction, which both parties have by common consent long ago abandoned.

The rights of Great Britain in Uganda involve:—

1. Access to whatever markets Central Africa may offer in the future.

2. The maintenance of our credit and reputation in the eyes of the world, and particularly of our own subjects.

3. Our ability to deal effectually with the philanthropic problems which we are greatly given to talking about.

4. Generally our whole stake in the development of one of the few great undeveloped areas now left in the world.

That those advocating the retention of Uganda should ask themselves "What is Khartoum the better or we ourselves for an interference which cost us millions?"

That no consideration of petty economy or present convenience should induce the Government to arrive at a pusillanimous and paralysing decision when the rivalry of European nations in Africa is so strong, and when the prospects of great and noble and beneficial results for the African population are so bright.

*That State aid to Uganda only means that one colony is artificially encouraged to the prejudice of others.**

That an Empire to be safe must always expand, and East Africa is of all fields now open the most favourable.

That the Empire which does not grow decays.

That the policy and righteousness may be doubted of conquests made chiefly to obtain new markets, which savours of buccaneering.

That evacuation is a pity, even from the point of view of those who would scrape the gold off the lion and the unicorn, to force

* NOTE.—There is no comparison between a civilised colony under the British flag and a hotbed of slavery existing under a British administration.

the East Africa Company to become mere traders on the coast, instead of pioneers of a new and peaceful Africa, reproducing perhaps, under happier auspices, the grandeur and the services to humanity of the East India Company.

That no attempt should be made to develop and open up those countries brought within the sphere of our influence in Africa by expenditure from the British Exchequer.

That the Government, having expended considerable sums in other portions of Africa, should not hesitate to assist in developing her richer sphere in East and Central Africa.

That it would be an absolute breach of faith if our sphere of influence were converted into a real and effectual dependency of the British people, and made available for their enjoyment.

That sufficient capital would convert East Africa into a second India; but a Chartered Company with only half-a-million subscribed cannot convert semi-barbarism into advanced civilisation.

That the surrender of the interior would sacrifice one of the best fields for relieving the congested population of British India.

A sphere of influence means an area within which this country has established treaties with the tribes, and until the tribes have entered into agreements with us we exercise no power or active authority over them.*

* NOTE.—The treaties already concluded, and approved by the Secretary of State, cover almost the entire British sphere, and encircle Uganda and the British territory west of the Victoria Nyanza.

COMMERCIAL ASPECT.

The retention of Uganda and the State-aided development of British East Africa is of the greatest commercial importance, in view of the restrictive tariffs of foreign competitors, whereby our export trade is curtailed, and distress occasioned by the consequent diminution of employment.

Clause 16 of the Royal Charter of the Imperial British East Africa Company stipulates:—

“Nothing in this our Charter shall be deemed to authorise the Company to set up or grant any monopoly of trade.”

That we should develop our own resources and not depend upon people who have M’Kinley Bills.

That the kingdom of Uganda is by far the best of the bits of Africa assigned to Great Britain under the Berlin Conference.

That those who know Uganda best appear to have the poorest estimate of its value.

That 500,000,000 acres of fertile land are waiting to be tickled by a hoe to smile into plenty.

“Lake Victoria is an objective point worth aiming at. You would now probably like to know what you could get in exchange for your manufactures. It is true that there is no sterling cash in Equatorial Africa, but there is land—something over 500 millions of acres—the most of it a good and beautiful land, a land that will grow rice and millet and corn, fruit, tobacco, coffee, tea, oil nuts and oil seeds; it is true that there is no specie there, but there is good pasturage, which supports cattle by thousands; it is true that there is no store of finished fabrics ready for exchange with you, but there is an unlimited quantity of cheap labour, which, under the stimulus of a market, will create wealth. The negroes of America raise cotton, for which we in Great Britain pay 40 millions sterling. Why may not we raise our own cotton in Eastern Africa? The blacks of Brazil and Cuba export coffee and sugar. The coffee plant and the sugar cane are both indigenous in East Africa, and the blacks of Uganda are mentally and physically equal to those of Brazil and Cuba. The Ceylon and Assam hills produce tea, and that shrub would take kindly to the slopes of Ruwenzori, Kenia and Marsawa. From the Carolinas

we import rice, which could be grown just as well in the Tana and Sabaki valleys, and in Buddu. From Chicago we take pork, but I think we might raise just as good hogs in the uplands of British Central Africa as Americans do on the prairie lands of Illinois. At the outset we should have to be satisfied with ivory, rubber, peltry, hides, ostrich feathers, copal and other gums."—Mr. STANLEY at Swansea, October 3rd, 1892.

That those who consider Uganda not suited to European settlement, should remember the words of Mackay, the pioneer missionary:—

"The climate is delightful, like an ever-English summer. At night seldom colder than 60 degrees Fahrenheit, and in the day time only a trifle above 80 degrees Fahrenheit. This country is really a rich one, and might produce anything . . . but until there is some proper means of access to the country, the soil and its many products must lie idle. Only English enterprise can overcome the difficulty."

That the richest ivory preserves lie in the British sphere to the west and north of Uganda.

That the occupation of Uganda, a rich and fertile region, but separated from the coast by a vast extent of barren and desolate tracts, is obviously a task far beyond the competence of a private Company with a capital of only half a million.*

That the African will not toil to provide produce to exchange for our goods; moreover, if he did it is probable that the Germans would get his custom by underselling us.

That cotton of a very fine description is grown throughout the Equatorial Province. With this Emin's people made the strongest cloth.

That the exports from Great Britain to Central Africa, if proper transport existed, would be Manchester cotton goods, woollen stuffs, beads of various kinds, brass and iron wires, iron hoes, all kinds of hardware, woollen and merino jerseys, boots, blankets, and tawdry ornaments.

That on the entire march of the Emin Relief Expedition from the West Coast to the East Coast, tobacco grew luxuriantly everywhere.

* NOTE.—Half-way to the lake is the district of Kikuyu, well watered and of exceptional agricultural value. One-third of the distance is Kibwezi, where the East African Scottish Industrial Mission has settled on account of the suitability of the district.

That if the sphere is abandoned our commercial rivals are in undisputed possession of East African markets, and the Government will be justly punished for not understanding the permanent interests and aims of the country.

That Zanzibar, being a British protectorate, is directly interested in the retention and development of Uganda and the "Hinterland" of Mombasa.

That the Upper Nile is of the utmost importance in view of the future opening up of the Soudan to trade.

That if Uganda is really a Garden of Eden, why is it not worth the Company's while to build the railway and hold the fort; but if it is a bear garden, not worth anything on commercial grounds, where is the candour in including commercial arguments among those in favour of continued occupation?

That the commercial value of Uganda and neighbouring British provinces (suited to European residence) must not be subordinated to political expediency, considering they are rich in salt (of the utmost value in the district), ivory, cattle (therefore hides), a rich pasture, indiarubber, iron, coffee (indigenous), sugar cane, wild indigo and fibre plants, and are capable of growing, with the cheapest labour, unlimited quantities of rice, millet, corn, fruit, tobacco, tea, oil nuts, oil seeds, which only a railway is needed to develop.

That so far as is known there is very little produce in the African interior which would pay for exportation to Europe.

That in the lake region of Africa is a teeming population waiting to exchange their raw materials for British manufactures.

That every traveller who has visited Uganda invariably speaks of it as a country with a great future.

That for the British Government deliberately to bring into existence an agricultural country in competition with India, Burmah, and Ceylon, would be about as sensible as for the landlords of England to subsidise the construction of railways and grain elevators in the Western States of America.

That the commerce of England requires to be stimulated by the State-aided development of newly acquired colonies, being hampered, as her industries are, by the hostile tariffs of competing nations, assisted by fleets subsidised to divert trade and cripple our naval supremacy.

*That the crux of the whole matter is this, if a great volume of commerce were really waiting to be tapped in the lake region British capital would be at once forthcoming to supply the necessary means of transport to the coast.**

That if East Africa develops into an agricultural country by the operation of natural and economic forces, it will only be the fortune of war, and the British East Africa Company must grin and bear it even if bankruptcy follow.

That the Government should not disregard the powerful memorials from the principal chambers of commerce to hold Uganda for the benefit of British commerce.

That public opinion certainly will not permit Uganda to be ruled or exploited by a subsidised commercial Company, whose withdrawal indeed suggests that its chartered monopoly of trade there should be cancelled.†

That in Uganda coffee, equal to that of Mocha or Ceylon, grows wild in great abundance, which, if cultivated, would become a great source of wealth and revenue to the country.

That by the cultivation of the cotton plant in Africa, England might be freed entirely from being dependent on foreign countries for her raw cotton, much of which could be returned to Africa in the shape of Manchester cloth.

That in our British sphere there are few necessary things which could not be grown, owing to the great variety of climate and altitude of the different tracts of country.

That Emin remarked that great quantities of gold-bearing quartz were brought to him from Latuka, near the right bank of the Nile, east of Lado.

That the promising facts relating to the growth of Zanzibar as a centre of exchange and shipping should revive the interest of commercial men and others in the development of trade with Africa.‡

That for the British Government to develop East Africa of malice prepense would be a form of national suicide.

* NOTE.—The Railway Survey, the vote for which gave the late Government the largest majority of the Session, was the essential preliminary, and was completed in October, 1892.

† NOTE.—See Clause 16 of Charter quoted at the head of this section.

‡ NOTE.—During the half-year, January to June, the net tonnage entered was 131,000 tons against 72,000 for the previous half-year.

That the depression of British commerce, consequent upon the increasing restriction of its markets, may safely seek its revival in the energetic development of the 750,000 square miles of East African territory, and the wants created by immigration which would ensue.

EVACUATION AND ITS RESULTS.

It is urged by the most competent authorities that if the occupation of Uganda be even temporarily suspended, internecine conflicts will intervene, resulting in the enslavement of those people whose loyalty has jeopardised their safety.

"That the advent of men carrying the British flag has an importance for the native races which can hardly be exaggerated; but by precipitate departure the revolution of ideas becomes a disintegrating factor of almost explosive violence, and all the more lawless elements take their revenge for temporary subjection to increased stringency of discipline."—**TIMES.**

That withdrawal means the departure of the whole body of Uganda Protestants, with the complete break-up of the Protestant mission. Next would have to go the victorious Catholics themselves, who can neither fight nor come to terms with the Mahomedans. The Soudanese would in our absence degenerate into a plundering horde. All the beginnings of civilisation would be stamped out; Mahomedanism and its horrors would be supreme, and the natives who have trusted us would be exposed to perpetual slave raiding and devastation.

That the Government by evacuating Uganda dooms the English missionaries to martyrdom in the pursuance of the cause they are too manly to forsake.

That the internecine wars consequent upon the evacuation of the Uganda district would, apart from the disastrous effects internally, so disturb the contiguous spheres as to demand the re-occupation of the province by one or other of the foreign Powers.

That if Uganda is evacuated by consent of the Government and, as is only too certain, the lives of British subjects are sacrificed, it will cost the nation infinitely more in a punitive expedition than would have been honourably expended in assisting a continuance of the Chartered Company's administration.

That too much stress must not be laid upon the questionable occupation of Uganda by France, Germany, Italy, or the Congo State (all of whom have their hands full), in the event of the British withdrawing, but that it is rather the complacent handing over of a helpless people to anarchy and barbarism.

That we cannot surrender a helpless country to the anarchy which we have had some share in producing, or abandon chiefs who have ventured to rely on our friendship to the enemies they have made by so doing.

Rival Christian factions only await our withdrawal to fly at one another's throats, and behind both stand the slave raiders.

That Mahomedanism would triumph in the supersession of Christianity.

That the community which most readily accepted our rule is marked out for extermination.

That the final result of our vacillation is widespread misery and bloodshed.

That the evacuation of Uganda would jeopardise our ancient interests on the Zanzibar coast, which the British Government have taken a great deal of trouble to conserve.

That under the Berlin Act evacuation would justify any Power taking possession of the abandoned province.

That "the continuity of the moral policy of Great Britain is a moral force by which, in my opinion, this country has to be judged. It is the salt which savours our history which has exalted it, and it is by that when we have passed away that in my belief we shall come to be judged."—Earl of ROSEBURY.

That England's work in the world is to give its dark races a fair chance of advancing, to maintain among them that wonderful *Pax Britannica* which makes a continent like India as safe as the Strand; to let them, if they will, civilise themselves and assist them in the work.

That the Company has done much to break oppression and free the slave.

That the Imperial British East Africa Company should not be left to fight the battle of civilisation single-handed.

That this country has the power to abolish the evils in Central Africa with which we are now in contact by an almost imperceptible effort, or to decree their perpetuation by an act of what history will brand as criminal cowardice.

That the Bishop of Sierra Leone struck the right chord when he said "God has not called the missionaries into Uganda and other parts of Africa merely to hark-back again."

That the civilisation of Equatorial Africa, the development of its commerce, the diffusion of Christianity, and the speedy extinction of the slave trade, together with the credit of the Imperial Government and the prestige of our flag on the Eastern littoral of the Dark Continent, depend more directly than many seem to comprehend upon the decision of Her Majesty's Government.

That the question is, "Will our nation now do less for the causes it once held sacred than the Portuguese or the Belgians?"

The surrender of Uganda would be a direct contravention of the spirit of the Brussels Act.

A correspondent to the *Morning Post* of May 16th, 1890, writes:—

"Cardinal Lavigerie, I am informed, has entered into an agreement with the German East Africa Company, the first clause of which is: Uganda is to be monopolised by the cardinal's French Catholic missions, while those of the Church Missionary and other British societies are to be excluded as far as possible."

That the presence of the Imperial British East Africa Company in Uganda prevents certain massacre of many Christian converts, and public opinion would not tolerate its withdrawal unless the Government were to take effective steps to prevent the possibility of such a disaster.

That the worst fears concerning the evacuation of Uganda are confirmed by Sir Gerald Portal, the British Agent and Consul-General at Zanzibar, and others.

That to withdraw from Central Africa would reproduce the ugliest features of Khartoum and Majuba Hill.

That England, through its representative, the Imperial British East Africa Company, has burst in and paralysed the slave trade

in Central Africa ; to now retire would entail a calamitous reversal.

That the surrender of Uganda would have a disastrous effect on the " Hinterland " of Mombasa, and confine the effective influence of England to the strip along the coast.

That for the British taxpayer it is a national loss rather than a national economy we must expect if the future of British enterprise in East Africa is to be deliberately sacrificed.

That if we evacuate Uganda, we might even be driven by the state of native affairs to do again all that has now been well done, and to do it in a hurry, and consequently badly and expensively.

That if the nation shrinks from the dreaded effects of evacuating Uganda, it must take immediate steps for continuing the administration of the province out of Imperial funds.

That the country does not want a hurried evacuation, then an expedition to avenge murdered missionaries, then another attempt to govern, and then another evacuation.

That the arguments in favour of permitting evacuation are few, but merit consideration ; they mainly group themselves around questions of expense and responsibility.

THE IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY'S WORK AND CLAIMS.

In 1878 overtures were made by the Sultan of Zanzibar to cede his mainland territory to Sir William Mackinnon, but circumstances did not permit of his then entertaining the proposal. This offer was occasioned by the apprehensions of the Sultan arising from the activity of German subjects within the Sultanate, which reached its climax early in 1885, when a German gunboat visited Zanzibar with a Consul-General. As a consequence, Lord Granville expressed to the Imperial German Government British uneasiness as to Germany's action and intentions, which indeed were not confined to the coast zone.

This was immediately succeeded by the Emperor granting a Charter to the German Colonization Society. Lord Granville then notified to Germany the intention of British capitalists to develop the interior, and suggested the delimitation of the Sultan's territory and the British and German spheres, as in New Guinea. Prince Bismarck assented, and the proposal was carried into effect in 1886.

In 1887 the Sultan of Zanzibar ceded to the British East Africa Association his mainland territory lying between Wanga and Kipini, and subsequently made over his territory south of Wanga to the German Company.

In 1888 a Royal Charter (Appendix A) was granted to the Imperial British East Africa Company. Germany having, in the meantime, concluded treaties at Witu, next proclaimed a Protectorate over the territory between Witu and Kismayu. Shortly thereafter the Sultan of Zanzibar extended his concession to the Founders of the Imperial British East Africa Company so as to embrace the ports between Kipini and Mruti, the most northern limit of his dominions, excluding Witu, but including the Islands of Lamu, Manda, and Patta.

In the autumn of 1889 the Imperial British East Africa Company was formed, and the Sultan of Zanzibar agreed to the transfer by that Company to the Italian Government of the ports north of Kismayu.

The rival claims of Germany at Witu and in the interior were settled by the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, elsewhere referred to, and subsequently the British Protectorate was declared over Zanzibar, which lies to the south of the Company's territory.

Early in 1891 the Anglo-Italian boundary was fixed, and thus, through the activity of the Imperial British East Africa Company and its Founders, Great Britain is now in possession of 400 miles of the East African coast with its excellent harbours, and, in virtue of the Company's treaties with the native tribes, has become possessed of a vast region extending in the west to the boundary of the Congo Free State, and encircling the northern half of the Victoria Nyanza.

"The Imperial British East Africa Company is far more purely philanthropic than any of the other undertakings. Its object, I believe, has been to deal a deadly blow at the slave trade, the destruction of which has been, along with our own commercial and material progress, the animating impulse of English policy in those regions for nearly a century."—Lord SALISBURY at Glasgow, May 20th, 1891.

The Germans, Belgians, French and Italians have had the benefit of Imperial funds in pushing forward into the interior, whilst the British Company have had to depend on private funds.

FOREIGN SUBVENTIONS FOR COLONIAL OBJECTS IN EAST AFRICA.

<i>Congo Free State.</i>	H. M. the King contributes, per ann.	£40,000
	Belgian Government „ ...	80,000
<i>Congo Railway.</i>	„ „ contributed ...	400,000
	„ „ 7% guarantee on ...	600,000
<i>German East Africa.</i>		
	German Government spent	700,000
	„ „ voted for 1892	140,000
	„ „ marine subsidy	45,000
	„ „ telegraph subsidy	5,000
	„ „ commuted customs rent, guaranteeing 5% on loan of	500,000
<i>Italian Sphere.</i>	Italian Government guaranteed 6% on	800,000
<i>Portuguese Territory.</i>	Considerable, but unknown sum.	

There is a pretty general impression that the Chartered Company had nothing to do but enter in and take possession of a land full of pagoda trees, and to shake their rich fruit into the lap of an expectant public. We were to be philanthropic and rich and Imperial, all upon the cheap.

That it is notorious that the Founders of the Imperial Company were actuated by patriotic feelings, and are therefore entitled to patriotic treatment, and not merely to be treated as commercial adventurers.

That the Company cannot be held responsible for the results of evacuating Uganda, as its unaided and limited resources leave no alternative but to retire from a position the attainment of which they had been encouraged to accomplish for Imperial purposes.

That the Company should not have gone to Uganda if they did not mean to stay.

That the Company has shown considerable patriotism in the work it has accomplished, and that it would be unfair to ask it to submit permanently to a drain which, in proportion to its resources, must be a heavy one, whilst it would be but a trivial item out of the funds of the Empire.

That the Company has displayed great callousness towards its native subjects, towards whom when it accepted the protectorate it also accepted obligations, and whom it now proposes to leave under a régime of anarchy tempered by religious war.

That all sorts of accusations are perpetually flung at the British East Africa Company by people who clearly have never thought it necessary to learn precisely what the Company originally undertook to do—what it did on more or less urgent representations from the Government.

That the Imperial British East Africa Company has displayed towards the Government an acuteness such as the public does not often see, except in the case of some over-clever defaulter under examination as to his goods in a court of bankruptcy.

That the Imperial British East Africa Company cannot single-handed compete with powerful Governments in securing effective occupation.

There is danger in the acts of a Chartered Company when the responsibility for the issues rests upon the nation.

That the responsibility of a Company differs from that of a Government in that its means are limited.

That the Company seems to increase the difficulties and responsibilities of England rather than diminish them.

That the Company went to Uganda in implicit reliance on Imperial assistance, which not having been fulfilled, justifies the sole consideration of the interests of the shareholders.

That a quasi-Imperial authority should have counted the cost before it acted.

That the Company, whose office is to earn dividends, does not see profit in the business, so retires and Uganda comes back on our hands.

That the Company cannot be expected to continue extra-

commercial operations for the benefit of the nation without Government subvention.

That things will never again run so smoothly if the Company accepts the House of Commons as its working partner, therefore the Directors should strain every nerve to hold Uganda.

That the Company cannot be held responsible for the consequences of evacuation, having given warning in August, 1891, to the Government that their restricted resources precluded their continuance in Uganda.

That the East Africa Company does not understand the responsibilities of Government; as for white men to invade negro states, upset their existing order, and then retire because the profit is insufficient, is nothing better than dacoity.

That the Company, having had all the advantages of their Charter, now wish to shield themselves under that Charter from the responsibility for their failure to make the best of it.

That the Imperial British East Africa Company has done more than its duty, and instead of violating the privileges of its Charter, is now handing over to the nation the acquisitions which it has gained at great sacrifice.

SOLUTIONS OF THE DIFFICULTY.

"That if an annual subsidy effects the discharge of national obligations upon better terms than we can get in any other way, surely it becomes the merest pedantry to insist upon the general objection to State-assisted enterprises."—TIMES.

That the Zanzibar protectorate should take over and administer the British sphere under the British Commissioner, recouping the present shareholders, and associate a Mahomedan with a British Resident in Uganda.

That a pension should be offered to King Mwanga to remain loyal to the British Crown.*

That even, with the most inadequate resources, effective occupation has been undertaken of a very considerable portion of the British sphere, and that with very moderate encouragement and support from the Imperial Government, similar service could be rendered by the Imperial British East Africa Company and its officials over the whole of the Lake Albert region, and probably with little difficulty over the Upper Nile.

That by cutting a road, we do not say a railroad, of 350 miles, establishing a post or two, putting two or three steamers on the Victoria Lake, and organising a minute force, say 3,000 men, of Ghoorkas and Soudanese, with three mule batteries of artillery—we can give a country as large and fertile as England, with a large population, profound quiet, commercial order, and the opportunity of rising from the African to the Asiatic grade of civilisation.

That the solution of the Uganda question would be to assume the administrative and military functions and leave the commercial element to the Company, in return for which the latter should be called upon to contribute towards the services rendered by the nation.

That the development of a new sphere of influence is best accomplished by private effort rather than by Government.

That if the Imperial Government is to hold the territory of Uganda, it would be better that it should do so directly, than through the medium of the British East Africa Company or another.

* NOTE.—The objection urged against this is that without the presence of an European administration anarchy could not be prevented.

That capable steamships will float sooner or later on the great African lakes is certain, but the first thing to be done is plainly to improve the roads connecting them with the coast, and the means of transport.

That to fulfil our obligations Uganda must be held, even if it becomes necessary for England to enter into possession by the establishment of a protectorate, relieving the Company from the duties of government and pursuing the work with a single heart.

That a Commissioner, with local knowledge and influence, be appointed to maintain British jurisdiction in the interior, as in the case of the Oil Rivers, Zambezi, and elsewhere.

The cheapest way for Great Britain to assume the administration of Uganda would be to utilise the Company's staff and the Soudanese soldiers now upon the spot, recouping the Company for its outlay in effecting the peaceful issue it has accomplished.

**THE
PROPOSED EAST AFRICA RAILWAY.**

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To connect Mombasa with the Victoria Nyanza, a distance of 700 miles, and estimated by surveyors appointed by Her Majesty's Government to cost £3,000 per mile, say £2,500,000.

It is proposed to construct this railway under a Government guarantee—as in the case of Indian railways—in fulfilment of the obligations incurred by Great Britain under the General Act of the Brussels Conference. The Railway Company would be wholly unconnected with the Imperial British East Africa Company.

"We now spend large sums on ships and boats to arrest the accursed slave traffic with considerable success, but also at great cost, not only to the Treasury at home, but also to the lives and health of the sailors, who under that sun have to give themselves to that tremendous labour. If we are able, instead of taking this expensive and difficult precaution, to pursue the evil to its home and kill it at its root, we shall not only have saved mankind from a fearful curse, but we shall have spared the Treasury of our own people and the lives of the gallant sailors."—Lord SALISBURY at Glasgow, 20th May, 1891.

*Extracts from the General Act of the Anti-Slavery Conference,
July, 1890.*

CHAPTER I.

Slave-Trade Countries.—Measures to be taken in the country of Origin.

Article I.—The Powers declare that the most effective means for counteracting the slave trade in the interior of Africa are the following :—

- (1.) Progressive organisation of the administrative, judicial, religious, and military services in the African territories placed under the sovereignty or protectorate of civilised nations :
- (2.) The gradual establishment in the interior, by the Powers to which the territories are subject, of strongly occupied stations, in such a way as to make their protective or repressive action effectively felt in the territories devastated by slave-hunting :
- (3.) The construction of roads, **and, in particular, of railways**, connecting the further (*avancés*) stations with the coast, and permitting easy access to the inland waters and on the upper courses of the rivers and streams broken by rapids and cataracts, in view of substituting economical

in Central Africa ; to now retire would entail a calamitous reversal.

That the surrender of Uganda would have a disastrous effect on the " Hinterland " of Mombasa, and confine the effective influence of England to the strip along the coast.

That for the British taxpayer it is a national loss rather than a national economy we must expect if the future of British enterprise in East Africa is to be deliberately sacrificed.

That if we evacuate Uganda, we might even be driven by the state of native affairs to do again all that has now been well done, and to do it in a hurry, and consequently badly and expensively.

That if the nation shrinks from the dreaded effects of evacuating Uganda, it must take immediate steps for continuing the administration of the province out of Imperial funds.

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That whilst the railway would check the slave trade, it would not be a commercial success—(See the "Commercial Aspect.")

That Australian, New Zealand, and South African Colonies, to say nothing of India, have realised the urgency of investing largely in railways, and in new countries State guarantees are almost indispensable to attract the necessary capital.*

That, in fact, the salvation of Africa depends on a railway guarantee, and that, perhaps, for a limited period.

That it is an enormous undertaking to set about making and providing for the defence of a railroad some 500 or 600 miles long through a territory inhabited by warlike tribes.†

That the bitterest opponents to the East Africa Railway are those who know least of its commercial possibilities, its political advantages, and its humanising issues.

That caravans in the British sphere are absolutely unremunerative, whilst a railway would not only effect the greatest economies in the conduct of our beneficent jurisdiction, but at the same time immensely stimulate British commerce.‡

That the trade in hides alone would go a long way towards defraying the cost of railway construction.

That the East Africa Railway is to stretch across the belt of swamps which cuts off Uganda from the coast, in order that we may send an army along the line to seize and hold the province for a commercial Company.§

The proposed East Africa Railway is spoken of as if it were a "wild cat" line of indefinite length ending in irreclaimable wildernesses, instead of reaching half-way to the lakes an elevated table land offering all the conditions for a prosperous European settlement.

That the East Africa Railway will bring our commerce into contact with 12,000,000 of people, whose wants will grow concurrently with the extension of civilisation.

* NOTE.—The Indian railways in the aggregate during 1891 did not draw anything from the guarantors.

† NOTE.—The Company has had caravans, some as small as 40 carriers, and has never lost an officer. The Government railway survey party did not fire a single shot in self-defence.

‡ NOTE.—Transport is now £200 to £300 per ton to Victoria Nyanza.

§ NOTE.—No swamp exists. The country gradually rises from the coast for the first 300 miles to an altitude of about 7,000 feet, then falls to the level of the lake, which is itself 3,850 feet above the sea. Kikuyu (half-way to the lake) is 6,000 feet, and the Mau plateau 7,000 to 9,000 feet.

That the postponement of the East Africa Railway would be disastrous to humanity and injurious to the moral, religious, commercial, and political interests of the Empire.

"That the cost of making the East Africa Railway, as compared with the vast sums we have expended in maintaining our vessels off the East Coast of Africa, is trifling."—Mr. J. W. LOWTHER, Under Secretary of State.

That the locomotive in fact by means of competition would kill both the caravan and the kidnapper. Animals cannot be used owing to the prevalence in some places of the tsetse fly.

That if the East Africa Railway is not carried to the Victoria Nyanza it should be at once constructed to the Kikuyu highlands, where Europeans can settle in an exceptionally fertile and well-watered country.

That Germany, France, and the Congo State are making railways whilst *we* discuss evacuation.

That by substituting for this human portorage some better kind of transport the slave trade would die out.

*That the guaranteeing of a railway for the benefit of a private Company would be a dangerous precedent.**

That the construction of the East Africa Railway specially recommends itself at a time when protective duties are closing so many markets to our manufacturers, whilst at the same time it would advance the cause of humanity, civilisation, and commerce.

That Her Majesty's Government proposed we should show (by the East Africa Railway) that our vaunted philanthropy was not a sham and our professions of humanitarianism were not mere hypocrisy.

That the Government must be prepared to fortify their railway, which might be done by making the stations fortresses and the signal boxes Martello towers, with guns raking the railway up and down.†

That Great Britain should recoup the Imperial British East Africa Company for its expenditure in Imperial objects, and guarantee the interest on the Victoria Nyanza Railway, in fulfilment of her obligations under the Brussels Act.

* NOTE.—The only benefit to be derived by the Imperial British East Africa Company would be the Customs dues for administrative purposes. The guarantee would be for the direct benefit of the subscribers to the railway company—quite a distinct concern.

† NOTE.—The Company has stations along this route, but has not found such measures requisite. See note (†) at foot of previous page.

That if Uganda is to be left to anarchy, it is idle pushing forward a railway, of which the terminus will not be a British fort, but a region of unregenerate savages, with nothing except serfs to sell.

That a railway connecting Mombasa with the Victoria Nyanza would in any benefits which might thereby accrue to the coast, enable a more effective administration on the littoral to arrest the export of slaves by sea, and by its civilising effect upon the interior prevent the import of slaves from the lake region for agricultural or domestic purposes by the Arab and Swahili population of the coast area.

That the Parliamentary opponents of the grant for the East Africa Railway were justified in their action in the absence of essential information upon the merits of the case; but that they may with equal justification now reconsider the question apart from political bias in the light of the further intelligence and estimates available.

That during the debate upon the Survey Grant an extraordinary appetite was developed for information of a kind it was well known could not in the nature of things be forthcoming. The surveyors have, however, since dispelled many of the imaginary complications and gloomy apprehensions then expressed.

*That the greatest difficulties in the construction of the railway would be the supply of labour food.**

That the easiest portion of the railway should be constructed, viz., to about 300 miles from the coast, leaving the mountainous part to be traversed by caravans until such time as it is desirable that the railway be extended to the lake.

That the question of holding Uganda must be decided before the railway could be constructed.

That to subsidise the East Africa Railway would be voting money for the benefit of a private Company,

That the entire Empire would, in the end, benefit by the preliminary expenditure of a Government Guarantee for the East Africa Railway.

That the substantial argument in regard to slavery was that in pursuance of the Brussels Act it could only be suppressed by a railway under guarantee, and, therefore, Parliament is bound to vote the money.†

“That when the railway is made the country can be held easily enough.”—Lord SALISBURY.

* NOTE.—The estimates provide for the importation of skilled Indian labour to ensure efficiency in construction. Abundance of food can be grown along the route of the line whenever required. Had any difficulty existed the railway could have carried supplies from the coast.

† NOTE.—This is not quite correctly expressed.—(See the quotation from the Act.)

APPENDICES.

A.—THE ROYAL CHARTER.

VICTORIA, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Queen Defender of the Faith. To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting :

Whereas a humble Petition has been presented to us in our Council by

William Mackinnon, of Loup and Balinakill, in the County of Argyll, Scotland.

The Right Honourable Lord Brassey, Knight Commander of our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, of Normanhurst Court, Sussex.

General Sir Donald Stewart, Baronet, Knight Grand Cross of our Most Honourable Order of the Bath, Knight Grand Commander of our Most Exalted Order of the Star of India and a Companion of our Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire, of Harrington Gardens, London.

Sir John Kirk, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of St. Michael and St. George, of Wavertree, Sevenoaks, Kent.

William Burdett-Coutts, a Member of the Commons House of Parliament, of Holly Lodge, Highgate, Middlesex.

Robert Palmer Harding, of Wetherby Gardens, Kensington, Esquire.

George Sutherland Mackenzie, of 13, Austin Friars, London, Merchant.

And whereas the said Petition states amongst other things:—

That the Petitioners and others are associated for the purpose of forming a Company or Association, to be incorporated, if to us should seem fit, for the objects in the said Petition set forth under the corporate name of the Imperial British East Africa Company.

That His Highness the Sayyid Barghash Bin-Said, Sultan of Zanzibar and its East African Dependencies, by his grants or concessions dated the 24th May, 1887, granted and conceded to the Petitioners, or some of them, under the name or description of the British East African Association, all his powers, and the

rights and duties of administration, and other privileges specially named on the mainland of East Africa, in the territory of the Mrima, and also on the islands embraced in such territory, and in all his territories and dependencies on the coast of East Africa, from Wanga to Kipini, both inclusive, such powers, rights, and duties to be exercised and performed in his name and under his flag, and subject to the provisions of the said grants and concessions.

That divers preliminary agreements have been made on behalf of the Petitioners with chiefs and tribes in regions which adjoin or are situate to the landward of the territories included in the said grants or concessions, and which are included in the sphere of British influence, agreed on behalf of ourselves and the Government of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, in 1886, by which powers of government and administration in such regions are granted or conceded to or for the benefit of the Petitioners.

That the Petitioners desire to carry into effect the said grants, concessions, and agreements, and such other grants, concessions, agreements, and treaties as they may hereafter obtain within the districts already referred to as being within the sphere reserved for British influence and elsewhere, as we may be pleased to allow with the view of promoting trade, commerce, and good government in the territories and regions which are or may be comprised in such grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties, as aforesaid, and the Petitioners believe that, if the said grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties can be carried into effect, the condition of the natives inhabiting the aforesaid territories and regions would be materially improved, and their civilisation advanced, and an organisation established, which would tend to the suppression of the slave trade in such territories, and the said territories and regions would be opened to the lawful trade and commerce of our subjects and of other nations.

That the possession by a British Company of the coast line, as above defined, and which includes the Port of Mombasa, would be advantageous to the commercial and other interests of our subjects in the Indian Ocean, who may otherwise become compelled to reside and trade under the government or protection of alien Powers.

That the success of the enterprise in which the Petitioners are engaged would be greatly advanced if it should seem fit to us to grant them our Royal Charter of Incorporation as a British Company under the said name or title, or such other name or title,

and with such powers as to us may seem fit for the purpose of more effectually carrying out the objects aforesaid.

That the Petitioners have already subscribed large sums of money for the purposes of the intended Company, and are prepared to subscribe or to procure such further amount as may hereafter be found requisite for the development of the said enterprise in the event of our being pleased to grant to them our Royal Charter of Incorporation, as aforesaid.

Now, therefore, we having taken the said Petition into our royal consideration in our council, and being satisfied that the intentions of the Petitioners are praiseworthy and deserve encouragement, and that the enterprise in the Petition described may be productive of the benefits set forth in the said Petition by our prerogative royal, and of our especial grace, certain knowledge and mere motion have constituted, erected and incorporated, and by this our Charter for us and our heirs and royal successors do constitute, erect, and incorporate into one body politic and corporate by the name of the Imperial British East Africa Company the said William Mackinnon; the Right Honourable Lord Brassey, K.C.B.; General Sir Donald Stewart, Bart., G.C.B., G.C.S.I., C.I.E.; Sir John Kirk, G.C.M.G.; William Burdett-Coutts, M.P.; Robert Palmer Harding; George Sutherland Mackenzie; and such other persons and such bodies as from time to time become and are members of that body, with perpetual succession and a common seal, with power to break, alter, or renew the same at discretion, and with the further authorities, powers, and privileges conferred, and subject to the conditions imposed by this our Charter, and we do hereby accordingly will, ordain, grant, and declare as follows (that is to say):—

1. The said Imperial British East Africa Company (in this our Charter referred to as “the Company”) is hereby authorised and empowered to hold and retain the full benefit of the several grants, concessions, agreements, and treaties aforesaid, or any of them, and all rights, interests, authorities and powers necessary for the purposes of government, preservation of public order in, or protection of the said territories, or otherwise, of what nature or kind soever, under or by virtue thereof, or resulting therefrom, and ceded to or vested in the Company, in, over, or affecting the territories, lands, and property comprised in those several grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties, or in, over, or affecting any territories, lands, or property in the neighbourhood of the same, and to hold, use, and exercise the same lands, property rights,

interests, authorities, and powers respectively for the purposes of the Company, and on the terms of this our Charter.

2. The Company is hereby further authorised and empowered, subject to the approval of one of our Principal Secretaries of State (herein referred to as our Secretary of State) to acquire and take by any grant, concession, agreement, or treaty, other rights, interests, authorities, or powers of any kind or nature whatever in, over, or affecting the territories, lands, or property comprised in the several grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties, as aforesaid, or any rights, interests, authorities, or powers of any kind or nature whatever in, over, or affecting other territories, lands or property in Africa, and to hold, use, enjoy, and exercise the same for the purposes of the Company and on the terms of this our Charter.

3. Provided that none of the powers of this our Charter shall be exercised under or in relation to any grant, concession, agreement, or treaty, as aforesaid, until a copy of such grant, concession, agreement, or treaty in such form and with such maps or particulars as our Secretary of State approves and verified as he requires, has been transmitted to him, and he has signified his approval thereof, either absolutely or subject to any conditions or reservations.

4. The Company shall be bound by and shall fulfil all and singular the stipulations on their part contained in any such grant, concession, agreement, or treaty, as aforesaid, subject to any subsequent agreement affecting those stipulations approved by our Secretary of State.

5. The Company shall always be and remain British in character and domicile, and shall have its principal office in Great Britain, and the Company's principal representative in East Africa, and all the Directors shall always be natural born British subjects or persons who have been naturalised as British subjects by or under an Act of Parliament of our United Kingdom.

6. The Company shall not have power to transfer wholly or in part the benefit of the grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties aforesaid, or any of them, except with the consent of our Secretary of State.

7. In case at any time any difference arises between the Sultan of Zanzibar, or the chiefs or tribes which are included in the sphere of British influence, as hereinbefore recited, and the Company, that difference shall on the part of the Company be

submitted to the decision of our Secretary of State, if he is willing to undertake the decision thereof.

8. If at any time our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from or object to any of the dealings of the Company with any foreign power and to make known to the Company any suggestion founded on that dissent or objection, the Company shall act in accordance therewith.

9. If at any time our Secretary of State thinks fit to object to the exercise by the Company of any authority or power within any part of the territories comprised in the several grants, concessions, agreements, or treaties aforesaid, or otherwise acquired by the Company, on the ground of there being an adverse claim to that part, the Company shall defer to that objection until such time as any such claim has been withdrawn or finally dealt with or settled by our Secretary of State.

10. The Company shall, to the best of its power, discourage, and, so far as may be practicable and as may be consistent with existing treaties between non-African Powers and Zanzibar, abolish by degrees any system of slave trade or domestic servitude in the Company's territories.

11. The Company as such, or its officers as such, shall not in any way interfere with the religion of any class or tribe of the peoples of its territories or of any of the inhabitants thereof, except so far as may be necessary in the interests of humanity, and all forms of religious worship or religious ordinances may be exercised within the said territories, and no hindrance shall be offered thereto except as aforesaid.

12. In the administration of justice by the Company to the peoples of its territories or to any of the inhabitants thereof, careful regard shall always be had to the customs and laws of the class or tribe or nation to which the parties respectively belong, especially with respect to the holding, possession, transfer, and disposition of lands and goods, and testate or intestate succession thereto, and marriage, divorce, and legitimacy, and other rights of property and personal rights.

13. If at any time our Secretary of State thinks fit to dissent from or object to any part of the proceedings or system of the Company relative to the peoples of its territories or to any of the inhabitants in respect of slavery or religion, or the administration of justice or other matter, he shall make known to the Company his dissent or objection, and the Company shall act in accordance with his directions duly signified.

14. The Company shall freely afford all facilities requisite for our ships in the harbours of the Company without payment, except reasonable charges for work done or services rendered, or materials or things supplied.

15. Except in the dominions of His Highness the Sultan of Zanzibar (within which it is required to use His Highness's flag), the Company may hoist and use on its buildings and elsewhere in its territories and on its vessels such distinctive flag indicating the British character of the Company, as our Secretary of State and the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty shall from time to time approve.

16. Nothing in this our Charter shall be deemed to authorise the Company to set up or grant any monopoly of trade, provided that the establishment of or the grant of concessions for banks, railways, tramways, docks, telegraphs, waterworks, or other similar undertakings, or any undertakings or system of patents or copyright approved by our Secretary of State, shall not be deemed monopolies for this purpose.

17. Subject to the Customs duties and taxes, hereby authorised, and subject to such restrictions as may be imposed by the Company on importation of spirits, opium, arms, and ammunition, and to restrictions on other things similar to those restrictions which may be applied in our United Kingdom, or in our Indian Empire, or as may be approved by our Secretary of State, there shall be no differential treatment of the subjects of any Power as to trade or settlement, or as to access to markets; provided that foreigners as well as British subjects shall be subject to administrative dispositions in the interest of commerce and of order.

18. The Company shall in Zanzibar territory conform to all the restrictions and provisions with respect to export and import, or other duties or taxes which are contained in any treaty for the time being in force between Zanzibar and any other Power in relation to the Zanzibar territories of the Company.

19. The Company shall not in Zanzibar territory levy on foreigners any other duty or taxes than such as are authorised in Zanzibar territory by such treaties as last mentioned, and shall not in their other territories, without the approval of our Secretary of State, levy on foreigners any duties or taxes other than duties and taxes similar to those authorised to be levied in Zanzibar territory by the treaties in force between us and the Sultan of Zanzibar at the date of this our Charter, and if any such other taxes are levied with the approval of our Secretary of State, accounts of their

nature, incidence, proceeds, and application shall from time to time, if required, be furnished to our Secretary of State at such times and in such form and in such manner as he directs.

20. For the more effectual prevention of the slave trade the Company may, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, levy within the territories administered by the Company, other than their Zanzibar territory, a tax on caravans and porters or carriers carrying merchandise or other goods passing through the Company's territories, provided such tax shall not be imposed in contravention of any treaties between Great Britain and Zanzibar.

21. For regulating the hunting of elephants, and for their preservation, for the purpose of providing means of military and other transport in our Indian Empire or elsewhere, the Company may, notwithstanding anything hereinbefore contained, impose and levy within any territories administered by them, other than their Zanzibar territory, a license duty, and may grant licenses to take or kill elephants, or to export elephants' tusks or ivory.

22. The Company shall be subject to and shall perform and undertake all the obligations contained in or undertaken by ourselves under any treaty, agreement, or arrangement between ourselves and any other State or Power, whether already made or hereafter to be made.

In all matters relating to the observance of this Article, or to the exercise within the Company's territories for the time being, of any jurisdiction exercisable by us under the Foreign Jurisdiction Acts, the Company shall conform to and observe and carry out all such directions as may from time to time be given in that behalf by our Secretary of State, and the Company shall appoint all necessary officers to perform such duties and shall provide such courts and other requisites as may from time to time be necessary for the administration of justice.

23. The Company is hereby further specially authorised and empowered for the purposes of this our Charter :—

(I.) To fix the capital of the Company and to increase the same from time to time and for the purpose of raising such sums of money as it may find necessary for the proper working of the Company as the field of its operations extend, to issue shares and to borrow monies by debentures or other obligations :

(II.) To acquire and hold, or charter, or otherwise deal with steam vessels and other vessels :

- (III.) To create banks and other companies, and authorise persons and companies, and establish undertakings or associations for purposes consistent with the provisions of this our Charter:
- (IV.) To make and maintain therein roads, harbours, railways, telegraphs, and other public and other works, and carry on therein mining and other industries:
- (V.) To make therein concessions of mining, forestal, or other rights:
- (VI.) To improve, develop, clear, plant, and cultivate any territories and lands comprised in the several grants aforesaid or otherwise acquired under this our Charter:
- (VII.) To settle any such territories and lands as aforesaid, and to aid and promote immigration into the same:
- (VIII.) To grant any lands therein for terms or in perpetuity absolutely, or by way of mortgage or otherwise:
- (IX.) To make loans or contributions of money or money's worth, for promoting any of the objects of the Company:
- (X.) To acquire and hold personal property:
- (XI.) To carry on any lawful commerce, trade, or dealing whatsoever, in connection with the objects of the Company:
- (XII.) To establish and maintain agencies in our colonies and possessions, and elsewhere:
- (XIII.) To sue and be sued by the Company's name of incorporation, as well in our courts in our United Kingdom, or in our courts in our colonies or possessions, or in our courts in foreign countries, or elsewhere:
- (XIV.) To take and hold without license in mortmain or other authority than this our Charter messuages and hereditaments in England, and subject to any local law in any of our colonies or possessions and elsewhere, convenient for carrying on the management of the affairs of the Company, and to dispose from time to time of any such messuage and hereditaments when not required for that purpose:
- (XV.) To do all lawful things incidental or conducive to the exercise or enjoyment of the authorities and powers of the Company in this our Charter expressed or referred to, or any of them.

24. Within one year after the date of this our Charter there

shall be executed by the Members of the Company for the time being a deed of settlement, providing so far as necessary for :—

- (I.) The further definition of the objects and purposes of the Company:
- (II.) The amount and division of the capital of the Company, and the calls to be made in respect thereof:
- (III.) The division and distribution of profits:
- (IV.) The number, qualification, appointment, removal, rotation, and powers of Directors of the Company, and the time when the first appointment of Directors under such deed is to take effect:
- (V.) The registration of Members of the Company:
- (VI.) The preparation of annual accounts, to be submitted to the Members at a General Meeting:
- (VII.) The audit of those accounts by independent Auditors:
- (VIII.) The making of bye-laws:
- (IX.) The making and using of official seals of the Company:
- (X.) The winding up (in case of need) of the Company's affairs:
- (XI.) Any other matters usual or proper to be provided for in respect of a Chartered Company.

25. The deed of settlement shall before the execution thereof be submitted to and approved by the Lords of our Council, and a certificate of their approval thereof, signed by the clerk of our Council shall be endorsed on this our Charter, and on the deed of settlement, and such deed of settlement shall take effect from the date of such approval.

26. The provisions of the deed of settlement may be from time to time varied or added to by a supplementary deed, made and executed in such manner and subject to such conditions as the deed of settlement prescribes.

27. Such deed of settlement may provide for the creation of founders' shares, and for assigning to the holders of such shares a right to a proportion of the profits or revenues of the Company, to be defined by the Company's deed of settlement, to be approved, as aforesaid, without contribution to the capital of the Company.

28. The Members of the Company shall be individually liable for the debts, contracts, engagements, and liabilities of the Company to the extent only of the amount for the time being unpaid on the shares held by them respectively.

29. Until such deed of settlement as aforesaid takes effect the said William Mackinnon shall be the President; the said Right Honourable Lord Brassey, K.C.B., shall be Vice-President; and the said General Sir Donald M. Stewart, Bart., G.C.B.; Sir Thomas Powell Buxton, Bart.; Sir John Kirk, G.C.M.G.; General Sir Arnold Burrowes Kemball, R.A., K.C.S.I.; Lieutenant-General Sir Lewis Pelly, M.P., K.C.B., K.C.S.I.; Colonel Sir Francis De Winton, R.A., K.C.M.G., C.B.; W. Burdett-Connors, M.P.; Alexander Low Bruce; Robert Palmer Harding; George Sutherland Mackenzie; and Robert Ryrie, shall be Directors of the Company, and may, on behalf of the Company, do all things necessary or proper to be done under this our Charter by or on behalf of the Company.

And we do further will, ordain, and declare that this our Charter shall be acknowledged by our governors, and our naval and military officers, and our consuls, and our other officers in our colonies and possessions, and on the high seas and elsewhere, and they shall severally give full force and effect to this our Charter, and shall recognise and be in all things aiding to the Company and its officers.

And we do further will, ordain, and declare that this our Charter shall be taken, construed, and adjudged in the most favourable and beneficial sense for and to the best advantage of the Company as well in our courts in our United Kingdom, and in our courts in our colonies or possessions, and in our courts in foreign countries or elsewhere, notwithstanding that there may appear to be in this our Charter any non-recital, mis-recital, uncertainty, or imperfection.

And we do further will, ordain, and declare that this our Charter shall subsist and continue valid, notwithstanding any lawful change in the name of the Company or in the deed of settlement thereof, such change being made with the previous approval of our Secretary of State signified under his hand.

And we do lastly will, ordain, and declare, that in case at any time it is made to appear to us in our council that the Company have substantially failed to observe and conform to the provisions of this our Charter, or that the Company are not exercising their powers under the recited grants, concessions, agreements, and treaties, so as to advance the interests which the Petitioners have represented to us to be likely to be advanced by the grant of this our Charter, it shall be lawful for us, our heirs and successors, and we do hereby expressly reserve and take to ourselves, our heirs, and successors the right and power by writing under the great seal of our United Kingdom to revoke this our Charter

without prejudice to any power to repeal the same by law belonging to us or them, or to any of our courts, ministers, or officers, independently of this present declaration and reservation.

In witness whereof we have caused these our letters to be made patent.

Witness ourself at Westminster, the third day of September, in the fifty-second year of our reign.

By warrant under the Queen's sign manual.

MUIR MACKENZIE.



B.—Treaty with Mwanga.

DATED MARCH 30TH, 1892.

I, Mwanga, Kabaka of Uganda, do hereby make the following treaty (in supersession of all former treaties whatsoever, with whomsoever concluded) with Captain F. D. LUGARD, D.S.O.—an officer of the Army of Her Majesty Queen Victoria, Queen of England, &c.—acting solely on behalf of the IMPERIAL BRITISH EAST AFRICA COMPANY (incorporated by Royal Charter); the aforesaid Captain F. D. Lugard, D.S.O., having full powers to conclude and ratify the same on behalf of the said Company. And to this treaty the principal officers and chiefs of my country do sign their names as evidence of their consent and approval:—

Clause 1. The Imperial British East Africa Company (hereinafter called “the Company”) agree on their part to afford protection to the kingdom of Uganda, and by all means in their power to secure to it the blessings of peace and prosperity; to promote its civilisation and commerce; and to introduce a system of administration and organisation by which these results shall be obtained.

Clause 2. I, Mwanga, Kabaka of Uganda, in the name of my chiefs, people and kingdom, do acknowledge the Suzerainty of the Company, and that my kingdom is under the British sphere of influence, as agreed between the European Powers. And in recognition hereof I undertake to fly the flag of the Company, and no other, at my capital and throughout my kingdom; and to make no treaties with, grant no kind of concessions to, nor allow to settle in my kingdom and acquire lands or hold offices of State, any Europeans of whatever nationality without the knowledge and consent of the Company’s representative in Uganda (hereinafter called “the Resident”).

Clause 3. The Resident, as arbitrator, shall decide all disputes and all differences between Europeans in Uganda. All lands acquired by Europeans in Uganda shall be subject to his consent and approval and shall be registered in his office. All arms in possession of Europeans and their followers shall be marked and registered by the Resident. His decision in all matters con-

nected with Europeans shall be final, and subject only to appeal to the higher authorities of the Company. All employees of the Company shall be solely under the orders of the Resident.

Clause 4. The consent of the Resident shall be obtained, and his counsel taken by the king, before any war is undertaken, and in all grave and serious affairs and matters of the State, such as the appointment of chiefs to the higher offices, the assessment of taxes, &c.

Clause 5. Missionaries, viz., those solely engaged in preaching the Gospel and in teaching the arts and industries of civilisation, shall be free to settle in the country, of whatever creed they may be, and their religious rights and liberties shall be respected. There shall be perfect freedom of worship. No one shall be compelled to follow any religion against his will.

Clause 6. The property of the Company and its employees, and all servants of the Company, shall be free from the incidence of all taxes.

Clause 7. The revenues of the country shall defray, as may be found feasible, the money expended purely on the development and organisation of the country, the expenses of its garrisons, &c. For such objects the king shall supply labour and give every facility.

Clause 8. All arms in the country shall be registered, and a license given for them. Unregistered arms shall be liable to confiscation. The importation of arms and munitions is prohibited.

Clause 9. Traders of all nations shall be free to come to Uganda, provided they do not import or offer for sale goods prohibited by international agreement.

Clause 10. Slave trading or slave raiding, or the exportation or importation of people for sale or exchange as slaves, is prohibited.

Clause 11. The Company will uphold the power and honour of the king, and the display of this Court shall be maintained.

Clause 12. This treaty shall be binding in perpetuity, or until cancelled or altered by the consent and mutual agreement of both parties to it.

Dated Kampala, this 30th day of March, 1892.

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,

Captain 9th Regiment,

Offtg. Resident in Uganda, I. B. E. A. Co.

(Sd.) MWANGA, X (his mark), Kabaka of Uganda.

Witnesses.—I certify that the signature of Mwanga was made in my presence and was of his own free will.

(Sd.) W. H. WILLIAMS,

11th April, 1892.

Captain Royal Artillery.

(Sd.) KATI KIRO APOLLO KAGWA, Katikiro of Uganda.

(Sd.) KIMBUGWE KAGO, Mugema. ("Kimbugwe" is Schwatu, late Pokino, now Sekibobo, temporarily acting Kimbugwe.)

X Mark of SEBOA, Pokino (R.C.)

X Mark of SETATIMBA, late Kago (R.C.)

Witness to signatures.

(Sd.) S. S. BAGGE.

(Swahili.)

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,

Captain 9th Regiment,

Commanding Uganda for I. B. E. A. Co.

MWANGA, X (his mark.)

I certify that the signature of Mwanga above was made in my presence, and was of his own free will.

(Sd.) W. H. WILLIAMS,

11th April, 1892.

Captain Royal Artillery.

X Mark of SEBOA, Pokino (R.C.), present rank, late Sekibobo.

X Mark of SEMATIMBA, late Kago (R.C.)

I certify that the above marks were made in my presence this the 7th day of May, 1892, of their own free will.

(Sd.) S. S. BAGGE.

Mark of DUWALIRA, Kangao.

Name of ABDALLAH, Pokino.

Mark of LUTALAH, Mutasa.

Mark of WAMALA, Sekibobo.

Mark of KAGO, Asmani.

Mark of MUEPI, Mujasi.

Mark of SEKIRU, Mugema.

Name of ABDAL AZIZ.

Mark of KAMIA, Kimbugwe.

I certify that these signatures or marks have been made in my presence by the principal Mahomedan chiefs—each by the man noted against it—of their own free will, and without compulsion. The titles shown against each are those held by them among the Mahomedans prior to their return to Uganda. The treaty was also read in their presence in the vernacular before the king, in public baraza.

(Sd.) F. D. LUGARD,

Dated Kampala, this 3rd day of June, 1892.

Captain.

C.—Translation of Letter from Mwanga to Her Majesty the Queen.

Buganda, Mengo, June 17th, 1892.

To my friend the Queen, our great Sovereign ; I and all my chiefs send you many greetings. I write this letter to thank you. Thank you exceedingly for sending the representatives of the Company in order to set my country to rights.

When they reached Buganda, at first I did not like them ; I did not think that they could set the country to rights. After we had fought, Captain Lugard wrote me a letter and invited me and restored me to my kingdom ; then he went and invited the Mahomedans, as well with whom I had been at war, and brought them back, and gave them a part of the country. But now my country is at peace ; the agents of the Company have arranged it excellently. Now I earnestly beseech you to help me ; do not recall the Company from my country. I and my chiefs are under the English flag, as the people of India are under your flag ; we desire very, very much that the English should arrange this country ; should you recall these agents of the Company, my friend, my country is sure to be ruined, war is sure to come.

Captain Lugard has now brought to terms these three religions ; he has returned to England ; he will inform you of the state of affairs in Buganda. But I want you to send this same Captain Lugard back again to Buganda, that he may finish his work of arranging the country, for he is a man of very great ability, and all the Buganda like him very much ; he is gentle ; his judgments are just and true, and so I want you to send him back to Buganda. So, our friend, persevere in helping us, for we are your people.

May God give you blessing and long life.

I, MWANGA, King of Buganda, and my great chiefs.

(The names of the chiefs in full are added.)

APOLO, Katikiro.	MATAYO, Mujasi.
NIKODEMO, Sekibobo.	Kago.
SIMEI, Kimbugwe Pokino.	Mugema.
YONA, Mukwenda.	Kayima.
ZAKARIA, Kangao.	Katambala.
ABDULLA SUDI, Kitunzi.	Kasuju.

D.—Letter from Mwanga and Chiefs to the Directors of the I. B. E. A. Co.

(Translation.) Buganda, Mengo,
June 17th, 1892.

To my friends the Directors of the Company in England. I and all my chiefs send you many greetings: My friends, many, many thanks for sending so able a man as this Captain Lugard to arrange my country. My friends, at first, when the agents of the Company arrived in Buganda, at first I did not like them, I thought they had come to ruin my country. But after we had fought, Captain Lugard wrote me a letter and invited me back, and restored me to my kingdom. Then Captain Lugard went and brought the Mahomedans as well as those with whom I had been at war, and brought them back into Buganda, and gave them a part of the country. Now Buganda has been settled and is at peace.

Captain Lugard has returned to England; he will inform you of all affairs in Buganda. But, my friends, I beseech you do not cease from helping me; I want you to send a number of Europeans to Buganda to settle it. Do not be grieved by the thought that there are no profits in Buganda; "our outlay will be without returns"; it is not so. I tell you so because of late what has been making ivory scarce in the country has been the late war; and now Captain Lugard has succeeded in bringing the three religions to terms; he has settled the country, and the Company will make profits.

My friends, I and my chiefs agreed to be under the Company's flag; we want the Company to help us to settle this country, and to occupy it in force. Should you at present recall your forces from Buganda, the country is ruined; there will be war again. Therefore I pray you not to cease from helping us Baganda, for we are your people. Further, we ask you, our friends, to bring us guns for sale, and useful articles.

May God help you ever to wise decisions in respect to this our country, Buganda.—I am your friend who loves you,

MWANGA, King of Buganda, and my great chiefs.

(The names in full of the chiefs are added.)

APOLO, Katikiro.	MATAYO, Mujasi.
SIMEI, Kimbugwe.	Kago.
NIKODEMO, Sekibobo Pokino.	Mugema.
YONA, Mukwenda.	Kayima.
ZAKARIA, Kangao.	Katambala.
ABDULLA SUDI, Kitunzi.	Kasuju.

But we, the Protestant chiefs, were annoyed with Captain Lugard. It is the small matter about which we wrote to the Elders of the Church (Church Missionary Society) to tell you, the Directors of the Company, to give us another man, who might, perhaps, please us. But a short time afterwards he (Captain Lugard) settled the matter which had annoyed us, and pleased both us and those of all religions in Buganda, as well as those who do not know how to read. Now he is the friend of all of us who are in Buganda. This is why we have written that you should send him back a second time to Buganda..

E.—Extract from a Letter from Captain Lugard.

DATED UGANDA, JANUARY 5TH, 1892.

E V A C U A T I O N .

“My second half-yearly Report, dated August 24th, 1891, had not reached the Directors at the time their decision of withdrawal (in August, 1891) was made. I am in hopes that the lines therein indicated for developing the country, and the hopes expressed that it may be found capable of bringing in substantial returns when this development of its commercial resources may have taken place, will largely modify their views, and prove to them that, no less in the interests of their shareholders than on the broader grounds of Imperial policy, responsibility for the fulfilment of pledges entered into by their accredited agent—and the preservation of the good faith and honour of the British—the retention of Uganda is imperative. By this mail I forward my third half-yearly Report, and from it the Directors will learn that free access to a country abounding in ivory has now been secured; that the Salt Lake (in my opinion of more value than a gold mine of ordinary yield, since the distance from the coast and cost of transport, fuel, &c., would preclude the working of anything except the most fabulously rich quartz) has been secured, and is now the site of a station which promises to bring in substantial returns, and that access to the trade of the Albert Lake has also been secured, and that while obtaining these advantages very heavy responsi-

bilities have been entered into, and protection pledged to a helpless people (in Toru) who, on the withdrawal of that protection, would be left to certain destruction. These considerations will, I hope, support the Directors in their noble resolve to retain their hold on Uganda and its sister countries, and the possession of these facts will, I hope, enable them so to represent the case both to their shareholders and the British public that there may be no difficulty in raising the required capital to carry on the work on which the Company have embarked in these countries.

"As regards the withdrawal of the Company from Uganda," he continues, "I will briefly state what in my opinion would be the immediate results of such a step, disregarding the remoter contingencies:—(A.) In the first place the Protestant party would leave the country with us. This they have always distinctly intimated from the time I first arrived. This means the total break-up of the Protestant Mission in Uganda. Secondly, the Catholics are quite unable to defy the Mahomedan party by themselves, and in all probability would fly at once, without engaging the latter. An understanding between these two parties is impossible. The immediate result of our withdrawal would therefore be anarchy and the rehabilitation of the Mahomedan Raj, accompanied by a terrible amount of bloodshed, and vast numbers of people sold into slavery, as is the custom of the Waganda Mahomedans. (B.) Further, our withdrawal from Southern Unyoro and Toru would mean the wholesale massacre of all those people who, relying on our pledges of protection, have sided with us. This massacre would be similar to that made by Kabrega on the Egyptian withdrawal from Mruli, &c. Ntali, king of Ankoli, has also (relying on our treaty) prevented powder passing through his country to Kabrega and the Mahomedans, and thereby incurred their active hostility. (C.) We are pledged here by all the binding force of a treaty to maintain a Resident in the country and protect the king. We are equally bound to Ankoli and to Toru. Both by treaty and by repeated verbal pledges that we should infallibly remain I have involved at once the Company's honour and my own, and also that of the British nation, since these people are aware that I am an officer holding the Queen's commission, and, being unable to discriminate between the Imperial Government and Chartered Companies, they look on me as sent by the Queen and on my pledges as emanating from her gracious Majesty herself."

FINIS.



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